oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE request: kernel stack infoleaks


From: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2010 15:08:46 -0400

And since I've already gotten flack for this comment, I'll add for the
sake of clarity: the second item is not a security issue if
CAP_NET_RAW is synonymous with root access in your privilege model, as
is the case on most systems.

-Dan

On Tue, Nov 2, 2010 at 1:11 PM, Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg () gmail com> wrote:
Note that AF_PACKET requires CAP_NET_RAW to open a socket, so the
second issue isn't reachable by unprivileged users and shouldn't be
considered a security issue.

-Dan

On Tue, Nov 2, 2010 at 12:07 PM, Jon Oberheide <jon () oberheide org> wrote:
Vasiliy Kulikov discovered three kernel stack infoleaks in various
packet families of the net subsystem:

===========================================================

net/ax25

Sometimes ax25_getname() doesn't initialize all members of
fsa_digipeater field of fsa struct.  This structure is then copied to
userland.  It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.  We
have to initialize them to zero.

http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=128854507120898&w=2

===========================================================

net/packet

packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of
sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13.  This structure is then
copied to userland.  It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack
memory.  We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of
strlcpy().

http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=128854507220908&w=2

===========================================================

net/tipc

Structure sockaddr_tipc is copied to userland with padding bytes after
"id" field in union field "name" unitialized.  It leads to leaking of
contents of kernel stack memory.  We have to initialize them to zero.

http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=128854507420917&w=2

===========================================================

Regards,
Jon Oberheide

--
Jon Oberheide <jon () oberheide org>
GnuPG Key: 1024D/F47C17FE
Fingerprint: B716 DA66 8173 6EDD 28F6  F184 5842 1C89 F47C 17FE




Current thread: