oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Small exposure in ocfs2 fast symlinks.


From: Joel Becker <Joel.Becker () oracle com>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2010 14:31:12 -0700

On Thu, Sep 30, 2010 at 10:32:14PM +0800, Eugene Teo wrote:
On 09/30/2010 01:49 PM, Joel Becker wrote:
On Wed, Sep 29, 2010 at 08:30:09PM -0700, Greg KH wrote:
On Wed, Sep 29, 2010 at 07:04:07PM -0700, Joel Becker wrote:
Hey Everyone,
  We just discovered that ocfs2 could walk off the end of fast
symlinks -- that is, symlinks that are stored directly in the inode
block.  ocfs2 terminates these with NUL characters, but a disk
corruption or an attacker with direct access to the ocfs2 disk could
overwrite the NUL.  Following the symlink via the filesystem would walk
off the end of the in-memory block buffer.  We're not sure how
exploitable this is, but I figured I'd provide a heads-up.  The fix is
in ocfs2's git tree and will be sent upstream tonight.  Erratas with the
fix are being built.

Care to send the git commit id to the stable () kernel org tree when it
hits Linus's tree so it gets backported there?

    I Cc'd stable () kernel org in the commit, don't worry ;-)

Thanks, please also cc oss-sec when the commit hash is available.

        The commit hash in Linus's tree is
1fc8a117865b54590acd773a55fbac9221b018f0.  This problem only exists from
2.6.30 onwards; it is not present in older kernels.

Joel

-- 

"In the long run...we'll all be dead."
                                        -Unknown

Joel Becker
Consulting Software Developer
Oracle
E-mail: joel.becker () oracle com
Phone: (650) 506-8127


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