oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE Request 1, NSS 2, Qt: Doesn't handle wildcards in Common Name properly


From: Richard Moore <rich () westpoint ltd uk>
Date: Sun, 05 Sep 2010 15:25:24 +0100

On 04/09/2010 14:37, Joe Orton wrote:
On Fri, Sep 03, 2010 at 06:20:49PM +0200, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
   1, Network Security Services (NSS) handled wildcard (*) character
      in the Common Name field of a x509v3 digital certificate.
      If an attacker is able to get a carefully-crafted certificate,
      signed by a Certificate Authority trusted by Firefox, the attacker
      could use the certificate during the man-in-the-middle attack and
      potentially confuse Firefox into accepting it by mistake. Different
      vulnerability than CVE-2009-2408.

I would suspect that many of the usual raft of OpenSSL-based apps with
hand-crafted cert identity checks will be vulnerable to this too, where
wildcard certs are supported.

We did try some other openssl based apps but most had either no
wildcard support, no real CN validation, or wildcard support that
use the old-style shell-globs which is much worse anyway. Unlike NSS
openssl doesn't provide a function for performing CN validation
which means that apps have generally rolled their own (poor)
implementations.

Cheers

Rich.


Regards, Joe




--
Richard Moore, Principal Software Engineer,
Westpoint Ltd,
Albion Wharf, 19 Albion Street, Manchester, M1 5LN, England
Tel: +44 161 237 1028
Fax: +44 161 237 1031


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