nanog mailing list archives

Re: Namecheap's outbound email flow compromised: valid rdns, spf, dkim and dmarc on phishes


From: Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com>
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2023 16:14:12 -0800

It makes you wonder why they just don't rekey and put up a different selector while deleting the compromised selector?

Yes, this is bad but it has a straightforward solution to the compromise -- unlike compromised cert signing keys, natch.

Mike

On 2/12/23 4:01 PM, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
Namecheap has updated their status page item to include

"We have stopped all the emails (that includes Auth codes delivery, Trusted Devices’ verification, and Password Reset emails, etc.)"


Yikes.


On Sun, Feb 12, 2023, 3:54 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:

    I think that it might be appropriate to name and shame the third
    party, since they should know better too. It almost has the whiff
    of a scam.

    Mike

    On 2/12/23 3:49 PM, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
    One very possible theory is that whoever runs the outbound
    marketing communications and email newsletter demanded the keys
    and got them, with execs overriding security experts at Namecheap
    who know better.

    I would sincerely hope that the people whose job titles at
    Namecheap include anything related to network engineering,
    network security or cryptography at that company do know better.
    Large domain registrars are not supposed to make such a rookie
    mistake.


    On Sun, Feb 12, 2023, 3:46 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:


        On 2/12/23 3:40 PM, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
        >
        https://www.namepros.com/threads/concerning-e-mail-from-namecheap.1294946/page-2#post-8839257

        >
        >
        > https://lowendtalk.com/discussion/184391/namecheap-hacked
        >
        > It looks like a third party service they gave their keys to
        has been
        > compromised. I got several phishes that fully pass as legit
        Namecheap
        > emails.
        >
        > https://www.namecheap.com/status-updates/archives/74848
        >
        >
        If they actually gave them their own private keys, they
        clearly don't
        get how that's supposed to work with DKIM. The right thing to
        do is
        create a new selector with the third party's signing key.
        Private keys
        should be kept... private.

        Mike

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