Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)

[Mike Hammett <nanog () ics-il net>]

Sorta like in the IP world, if everyone did BCP38/84, amplification attacks wouldn't exist. Not everyone does, so... 




----- 
Mike Hammett 
Intelligent Computing Solutions 
http://www.ics-il.com 

Midwest-IX 
http://www.midwest-ix.com 

----- Original Message -----

From: "Mike Hammett" <nanog () ics-il net> 
To: "Shane Ronan" <shane () ronan-online com> 
Cc: nanog () nanog org 
Sent: Tuesday, October 4, 2022 8:07:55 AM 
Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls) 


I think the point the other Mike was trying to make was that if everyone policed their customers, this wouldn't be a 
problem. Since some don't, something else needed to be tried. 




----- 
Mike Hammett 
Intelligent Computing Solutions 
http://www.ics-il.com 

Midwest-IX 
http://www.midwest-ix.com 

----- Original Message -----

From: "Shane Ronan" <shane () ronan-online com> 
To: "Michael Thomas" <mike () mtcc com> 
Cc: nanog () nanog org 
Sent: Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM 
Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls) 


The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I accept from my customers, but which 'prefixes' I accept from the people I peer with, 
because it's entirely dynamic and without a doing a database dip on EVERY call, I have to assume that my peer or my 
peers customer or my peers peer is doing the right thing. 


I can't simply block traffic from a peer carrier, it's not allowed, so there has to be some mechanism to mark that a 
prefix should be allowed, which is what Shaken/Stir does. 


Shane 






On Mon, Oct 3, 2022 at 7:05 PM Michael Thomas < mike () mtcc com > wrote: 


The problem has always been solvable at the ingress provider. The 
problem was that there was zero to negative incentive to do that. You 
don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress provider which prefixes 
customers are allow to assert. It's pretty analogous to when submission 
authentication was pretty nonexistent with email... there was no 
incentive to not be an open relay sewer. Unlike email spam, SIP 
signaling is pretty easy to determine whether it's spam. All it needed 
was somebody to force regulation which unlike email there was always 
jurisdiction with the FCC. 

Mike 

On 10/3/22 3:13 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote: 
> We're talking about blocking other carriers. 
>
> On 10/3/22, 3:05 PM, "Michael Thomas" < mike () mtcc com > wrote: 
>
> On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote: 
> > Because it's illegal for common carriers to block traffic otherwise. 
>
> Wait, what? It's illegal to police their own users? 
>
> Mike 
>
> > On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Michael Thomas" <nanog-bounces+jbazyar= verobroadband.com () nanog org on 
> > behalf of mike () mtcc com > wrote: 
> >
> >
> > On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote: 
> > > 'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens to blacklist voice 
> > > providers for flouting robocall rules 
> > >
> > > https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/ 
> > >
> > > [...] 
> > > “This is a new era. If a provider doesn’t meet its obligations under 
> > > the law, it now faces expulsion from America’s phone networks. Fines 
> > > alone aren’t enough,” FCC chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel said in a 
> > > statement accompanying the announcement. “Providers that don’t follow 
> > > our rules and make it easy to scam consumers will now face swift 
> > > consequences.” 
> > >
> > > It’s the first such enforcement action by the agency to reduce the 
> > > growing problem of robocalls since call ID verification protocols 
> > > known as “STIR/SHAKEN” went fully into effect this summer. 
> > > [...] 
> >
> > Why did we need to wait for STIR/SHAKEN to do this? 
> >
> > Mike