nanog mailing list archives

Re: Malicious SS7 activity and why SMS should never by used for 2FA


From: Tom Beecher <beecher () beecher cc>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 11:10:04 -0400


Can you point out the specific data you think supports your claim?


I can, but I'm not going to, because that's not what this side discussion
has been based on.

You said :

These low-income people are not the targets of identity thieves, spear
fishers, or data ransomers.


I just showed you data that shows they are, but now are trying to move the
goalposts with new quantifiers. I think this discussion has run its course
for me. Take care.

On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 10:45 AM Mel Beckman <mel () beckman org> wrote:

I don’t see any data showing that poor people are *targets* of Account
access attacks. Can you point out the specific data you think supports your
claim?

-mel via cell

On Apr 19, 2021, at 7:33 AM, Tom Beecher <beecher () beecher cc> wrote:



https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-2020/csn_annual_data_book_2020.pdf

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit18.pdf




On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 10:10 AM Mel Beckman <mel () beckman org> wrote:

Can you cite data? Or provide a rational argument other than “they are”?

-mel via cell

On Apr 19, 2021, at 7:01 AM, Tom Beecher <beecher () beecher cc> wrote:



These low-income people are not the targets of identity thieves, spear
fishers, or data ransomers.


This is patently false. Low-income / disabled / minority / non-english
speakers are absolutely targets of scams like those, and in
significant numbers.



On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 9:33 AM Mel Beckman <mel () beckman org> wrote:

Tom,

Well, yes, not everyone can afford all technology options. That’s life.
One has to wonder how someone who needs to protect online accounts cannot
afford a $30 hardware token (which can be shared across several accounts).
These low-income people are not the targets of identity thieves, spear
fishers, or data ransomers. Unlike you, I AM arguing against something: SMS
as a 2FA token. In this case I don’t think we have ignored low-income
users, for the same reason that home alarm security aren't ignoring
low-income users who can’t afford their products. It’s certainly no reason
to hobble security for the rest of us.

 -mel


On Apr 19, 2021, at 6:07 AM, Tom Beecher <beecher () beecher cc> wrote:

HW tokens are great, sure.

Except there is a lot of overlap in the Venn diagram between those who
still use feature phones and those that spending $30 on said hardware token
is financially obtrusive. ( Not to mention that every hardware token I can
remember looking at requires an app to set themselves up in the first
place, and if this is for the people who can't install apps, that's an
interesting circular dependency. )

I'm not arguing for or against anything here honestly. I'm just pointing
out that we ( as in the technical community we ) have a tendency to put
forward solutions that completely ignore what might be reasonably feasible
for those of lower income , or parts of the world not as technologically
developed as we might be in ourselves, and we should try to shrink that gap
whenever possible, not make it worse.

On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 8:47 AM Mel Beckman <mel () beckman org> wrote:

Then they can buy a hardware token. Using SMS is provably insecure, and
for people being spear-phished (a much more common occurrence now that so
much net worth data has been breached), a huge risk

 -mel

On Apr 19, 2021, at 5:44 AM, Tom Beecher <beecher () beecher cc> wrote:



As far as I know, authenticators on cell phone apps don’t require the
Internet. For example, the Google Authenticator mobile app doesn't require
any Internet or cellular connection


Lots of people still use feature phones that are not capable of running
applications such as this.

On Sun, Apr 18, 2021 at 9:05 AM Mel Beckman <mel () beckman org> wrote:

As far as I know, authenticators on cell phone apps don’t require the
Internet. For example, the Google Authenticator mobile app doesn't require
any Internet or cellular connection. The authenticated system generates a
secret key - a unique 16 or 32 character alphanumeric code. This key is
scanned by GA or can be entered manually and as a result, both the
authenticated system and GA know the same secret key, and can compute the
time-based 2nd factor OTP just as hardware tokens do.

There are two algorithms: HOTP and TOTP. The main difference is in OTP
expiration time: with HOTP, the OTP is valid until it hasn’t been used;
TOTP times out after some specified interval - usually 30 or 60 seconds.
For TOTP, the system time must be synced, otherwise the generated OTPs will
be wrong. But you can get accurate enough clock time without the Internet,
either manually using some radio source such as WWV, or by GPS or cellular
system synchronization.

 -mel

On Apr 18, 2021, at 5:46 AM, Mark Tinka <mark@tinka.africa> wrote:



On 4/18/21 05:18, Mel Beckman wrote:

No, every SMS 2FA should be prohibited by regulatory
certifications. The telcos had years to secure SMS. They did nothing. The
plethora of well-secured commercial 2FA authentication tokens, many of them
free, should be a mandatory replacement for 2FA in every security
governance regime, such as PCI, financial account access, government web
portals, etc.

While I agree that SMS is insecure at the moment, I think there
still needs to be a mechanism that does not rely on the presence of an
Internet connection. One may not be able to have access to the Internet for
a number of reasons (traveling, coverage, outage, device, money, e.t.c.),
and a fallback needs to be available to authenticate.

I know some companies have been pushing for voice authentication for
their services through a phone call, in lieu of SMS or DTMF-based PIN's.

We need something that works at the lowest common denominator as
well, because as available as the Internet is worldwide, it's not yet at a
level that one would consider "basic access".

Mark.




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