Re: Securing Greenfield Service Provider Clients

["Curtis, Bruce via NANOG" <nanog () nanog org>]

> On Oct 10, 2020, at 10:58 AM, Ca By <cb.list6 () gmail com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 8:14 AM Christopher J. Wolff <cjwolff () nola gov> wrote:
> Dear Mr. Curtis and Nanog;
>
> Thank you for your responses.  Yes, I am investigating the feasibility of public internet access to help with Digital 
> Divide issues in light of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the challenges of security in this public application.
>
> It’s relatively straightforward to segment East-West traffic; however, I’m not so sure about the case of North-South. 
>  I need to address this issue somehow in my assessment of risks in public networks.
>
> I do *not* want to decrypt SSL traffic.  But I would *like* to be able to have some black box with a subscription at 
> the network edge prevent malware from being downloaded through the network.
>
> My question was whether this is even possible in a public context.  Secure DNS services would go a long way toward 
> this goal.
>
> Is it fair to say that an NGFW *must* decrypt SSL traffic in order to fully categorize for IPS/IDS prevention?  
>
> Thank you,
> CJ
>
>
>
> Just my humble opinion, many network security devices in the middle decrease the overall network security.

  Yes.  And in more ways than by being compromised themselves as indicated in the links you provide below.  (Remember 
that boxes that decrypt TLS are in scope for PCI).

In addition most middle boxes are stateful devices that can be affected by DoS attacks that create state on the middle 
boxes.

In the CIA principle Availability is supposed to be equally important.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_security#Availability

So if a middle box is affected by a DoS attack and normal traffic is dropped so that Availability of a service is 
affected that should also be considered a security failure or a decrease in overall network security.

Unfortunately in most instances the CIA principle is really applied as the CIa principle where Availability is not 
equal and is always secondary to C and I.  Even to the point where if a primary protection is in place but a a 
secondary protection fails in a way that affects availability the secondary protection is not bypassed to restore 
Availability.




> Especially if they fall into the category of NGFW, they do too much and end up blowing themselves up. 
>
> https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.zdnet.com/google-amp/article/us-cyber-command-says-foreign-hackers-will-attempt-to-exploit-new-pan-os-security-bug/
>
> https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cisco-patches-asa-ftd-firewall-flaw-actively-exploited-by-hackers/amp/
>
>
> Also, they are insanely priced and market to people based on fear. 
>
> IPS / IDS only works if you have a full time team of folks willing to tune it. And, it is never worth it. Been the 
> same way for 20 years.  I was recently involved in an outage with an IPS rule taking an entire site off line. The fix 
> was to stop doing IPS. 
>
> The fact is,  most modern systems (win10, iOS, Android) are very secure from a network stack and do not benefit from 
> network based tools.  Even windows Vista has a local firewall on by default. The real hacks that happen in the wild 
> are phishing ... and no network based thing is going to stop that.  You do see occasional nsa tools turned into 
> wannacry style worms, but those only proliferate when SMB is enabled, and that is easily blocked with a router acl, 
> and is a best practice below. 
>
> For public internet access, please keep it simple. Please do not waste tax payer money on security snake oil. As 
> mentioned, free dns services like 1.1.1.3 and https://cleanbrowsing.org go a long way
>
> Simple router ACLS are also good to shutdown back trafffic, take a hint from Comcast 
>
> https://www.xfinity.com/support/articles/list-of-blocked-ports
>
>
> Regards,
> CB
>
>
>
>
>
> Get Outlook for iO
>  
> From: Curtis, Bruce <bruce.curtis () ndsu edu>
> Sent: Friday, October 9, 2020 5:23:45 PM
> To: Christopher J. Wolff <cjwolff () nola gov>
> Cc: nanog () nanog org <nanog () nanog org>
> Subject: Re: Securing Greenfield Service Provider Clients
>  
> EMAIL FROM EXTERNAL SENDER: DO NOT click links, or open attachments, if sender is unknown, or the message seems 
> suspicious in any way. DO NOT provide your user ID or password. If you believe that this is a phishing attempt please 
> forward this message to phishing () nola gov
>
>
>
> If you search for this phrase
>
>         During 2020 more than fifty percent of new malware campaigns will use various forms of encryption and 
> obfuscation to conceal delivery, and to conceal ongoing communications, including data exfiltration.
>
> you will find lots of vendors of decryption have the phrase from Gartner mentioned prominently on their web site.
>
>
> I don’t think TLS decryption would be viable in our university environment.
>
> Your email address indicates that you are in a government environment and if so you might have more control over 
> devices and could have a better chance of making decryption work.
> On the other hand if you have more control over devices a better choice might be to spend your resources on 
> implementing whitelisting rather than decryption.
>
> Keep in mind that if you implement decryption your decryption device is in scope for PCI and subject to the various 
> PCI duding and logging requirements.
>
>
>
> Attackers abuse Google DNS over HTTPS to download malware
>
> https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/attackers-abuse-google-dns-over-https-to-download-malware/
>
>
> More general and as focused on decryption but I recommend you watch these sessions from RSA conferences.
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d90Ov6QM1jE
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qzI-N0p9hFk
>
>
> And also the NIST draft on Zero Trust Architecture.  The document is mainly about Zero Trust but does briefly mention 
> decryption.
>
> https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-207.pdf
>
> https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-207/final
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 9, 2020, at 2:09 PM, Christopher J. Wolff <cjwolff () nola gov> wrote:
> >
> > Dear Nanog;
> >
> > Hope everyone is getting ready for a good weekend.  I’m working on a greenfield service provider network and I’m 
> > running into a security challenge.  I hope the great minds here can help.
> >
> > Since the majority of traffic is SSL/TLS, encrypted malicious content can pass through even an “NGFW” device 
> > without detection and classification.
> >
> > Without setting up SSL encrypt/decrypt through a MITM setup and handing certificates out to every client, is there 
> > any other software/hardware that can perform DPI and/or ssl analysis so I can prevent encrypted malicious content 
> > from being downloaded to my users?
> >
> > Have experience with Palo and Firepower but even these need the MITM approach.  I appreciate any advice anyone can 
> > provide.
> >
> > Best,
> > CJ
>
> Bruce Curtis
> Network Engineer  /  Information Technology
> NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY
> phone: 701.231.8527
> bruce.curtis () ndsu edu

Bruce Curtis
Network Engineer  /  Information Technology
NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY
phone: 701.231.8527
bruce.curtis () ndsu edu