nanog mailing list archives

Re: RPKI for dummies


From: Tom Beecher <beecher () beecher cc>
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 10:53:17 -0400

ROA = Route Origin Authorization . Origin is the key word.

When you create an signed ROA and do all the publishing bits, RPKI
validator software will retrieve that , validate the signature, and pass
that up to routers, saying "This prefix range that originates from this ASN
is valid." Then, any BGP advertisement that contains a prefix in that
range, with an origin ASN that matches, is treated as valid. The
intermediary as-path isn't a factor.

If another ASN ORIGINATES an announcement for your space, then RPKI routers
will treat that announcement as INVALID, because that isn't authorized.

If another ASN spoofs your ASN , pretending that they are your upstream,
RPKI won't solve that. But that is a different problem set.

On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 10:02 AM Dovid Bender <dovid () telecurve com> wrote:

Fabien,

Thanks. So to sum it up there is nothing stopping a bad actor from
impersonating me as if I am BGP'ing with them. It's to stop any other AS
other then mine from advertising my IP space. Is that correct? How is
verification done? They connect to the RIR and verify that there is  a cert
signed by the RIR for my range?



On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 9:51 AM Fabien VINCENT (NaNOG) via NANOG <
nanog () nanog org> wrote:

Hi,

In fact, RPKI does nothing about AS Path checks if it's your question.
RPKI is based on ROA where signatures are published to guarantee you're the
owner of a specific prefix with optionnal different maxLength from your
ASN.

So if the question is about if RPKI is sufficient to secure the whole BGP
path, well, it's not. RPKI guarantee / permit only to verify the ressource
announcements (IPvX block) is really owned by your ASN. But even if it's
not sufficient, we need to deploy it to start securing resources', not the
whole path.

Don't know if it replies to your question, but you can read also the
pretty good documentation on RPKI here :
https://rpki.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rpki/introduction.html or the
corresponding RFC ;)

Le 20-08-2020 15:20, Dovid Bender a écrit :

Hi,

I am sorry for the n00b question. Can someone help point me in the right
direction to understand how RPKI works? I understand that from my side that
I create a key, submit the public portion to ARIN and then send a signed
request to ARIN asking them to publish it. How do ISP's that receive my
advertisement (either directly from me, meaning my upstreams or my
upstreams upstream) verify against the cert that the advertisement is
coming from me? If say we have
Medium ISP (AS1000) -> Large ISP (AS200)
in the above case AS200 know it's peering with AS1000 so it will take all
advertisements. What's stopping AS1000 from adding a router to their
network to impersonate me,  make it look like I am peering with them and
then they re-advertise the path to Large ISP?

Again sorry for the n00b question, I am trying to make sense of how it
works.

TIA.

Dovid


--
*Fabien VINCENT*
*@beufanet*



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