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Re: Last Mile Design


From: Grant Taylor via NANOG <nanog () nanog org>
Date: Sat, 9 Feb 2019 11:44:29 -0700

On 2/9/19 11:22 AM, Sander Steffann wrote:
Same for me. I like the architecture where the PON splitters are in powered roadside cabinets (even though the splitter is passive). That way the ISP can convert it to AE at any time they want. The architectures where PON has been hardcoded into the design has always felt like a huge risk regarding future developments.

I agree that PON with splitters where you can't put Active Ethernet equipment is largely equivalent to solution lock-in. But is that in and of itself a bad thing? Especially when viewed in within the lifecycle of the network?

From an outsider n00b point of view, the things that I'm reading it seems that people don't like about PON are largely it's inflexibility to be able to be converted to Active Ethernet without careful forethought and planning at construction time of the fiber network to allow it to change in the future.

In some ways, I've heard of the industry having this, or a very similar discussion for 25 years. Twisted pair (Cat 3 vs Cat 5 vs Cat 5e vs Cat 6) vs coax (RG 59 vs RG 6 vs F-11) vs fiber (OS1 vs OS2 vs OM1 vs OM2 vs OM3 vs OM4 vs OM5) vs RF (myriad of options). Included to topology designs equating to lock-in.

However, none of this seems to be related to how functional any given design is. I guess perhaps that the subject "Last Mile Design" does encourage discussions about topology and technology.

So let me ask this: Are there any functional reasons to favor AE over PON /within/ the lifecycle of a deployment? Does one methodology offer any significant advantages or disadvantages over the other? If so, is (are) the pro(s) / con(s) applicable to specific use case(s)?

Remember that there are LOTs of ways to do things. I'm trying to glean what makes one method better or worse than another, possibly for different types of deployments.




--
Grant. . . .
unix || die

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