nanog mailing list archives
Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack
From: Job Snijders <job () instituut net>
Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 17:01:36 +0000
Hi Andy, It smells like someone in 38478 or 131477 is using Noction or some other BGP "optimizer" that injects hijacks for the purpose of traffic engineering. :-( Kind regards, Job On Thu, 31 Aug 2017 at 19:38, Andy Litzinger <andy.litzinger.lists () gmail com> wrote:
Hello, we use BGPMon.net to monitor our BGP announcements. This morning we received two possible BGP MITM alerts for two of our prefixes detected by a single BGPMon probe located in China. I've reached out to BGPMon to see how much credence I should give to an alert from a single probe location, but I'm interested in community feedback as well. The alert detailed that one of our /23 prefixes has been broken into /24 specifics and the AS Path shows a peering relationship with us that does not exist: 131477(Shanghai Huajan) 38478(Sunny Vision LTD) 3491(PCCW Global) 14042 (me) We do not peer directly with PCCW Global. I'm going to reach out to them directly to see if they may have done anything by accident, but presuming they haven't and the path is spoofed, can I prove that? How can I detect if traffic is indeed swinging through that hijacked path? How worried should I be and what are my options for resolving the situation? thanks! -andy
Current thread:
- Validating possible BGP MITM attack Andy Litzinger (Aug 31)
- Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack Job Snijders (Aug 31)
- Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack Steve Feldman (Aug 31)
- Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack Christopher Morrow (Aug 31)
- Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack Andy Litzinger (Aug 31)
- Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack Steve Feldman (Aug 31)
- Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack Andy Litzinger (Aug 31)
- Re: Validating possible BGP MITM attack Job Snijders (Aug 31)