nanog mailing list archives

Re: Thank you, Comcast.


From: Mike Hammett <nanog () ics-il net>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2016 19:21:04 -0600 (CST)

So we have people saying that blocking residential users from hosting DNS servers is not really providing Internet 
service. Now we have people saying it isn't service if it doesn't (more or less) completely work in lynx. 




----- 
Mike Hammett 
Intelligent Computing Solutions 
http://www.ics-il.com 

Midwest-IX 
http://www.midwest-ix.com 

----- Original Message -----

From: "Keith Medcalf" <kmedcalf () dessus com> 
To: "NANOG list" <nanog () nanog org> 
Sent: Friday, February 26, 2016 6:59:28 PM 
Subject: RE: Thank you, Comcast. 


The default configuration of IE (all versions), Firefox (all versions), Edge (all versions) and Chrome (all versions) 
is a zero-security configuration. Of course it works fine in a zero-security configuration -- I said that from the get 
go. 

It does not work if you do not permit javascript to run unless approved, and do not permit unapproved (and unapprovable 
scripts from third-party sites of unknown provenance) to run. It does not work if you block cross-site access to 
widgets and crap coming from third-parties of equally unknown provenance. 

I do not know what it is looking for, but it cannot do that, so therefore it does not work. 

You may not care about how insecure your browser is -- I do. 

-----Original Message----- 
From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-bounces () nanog org] On Behalf Of Naslund, Steve 
Sent: Friday, 26 February, 2016 10:11 
To: NANOG list 
Subject: RE: Thank you, Comcast. 

Also worked fine in IE 11 and Firefox. I didn't change any particular 
security settings either. Might want to check your stuff before you rant 
on someone's web site. 

Steven Naslund 
Chicago IL 

-----Original Message----- 
From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-bounces () nanog org] On Behalf Of Mike Hammett 
Sent: Friday, February 26, 2016 10:01 AM 
To: NANOG list 
Subject: Re: Thank you, Comcast. 

Works fine on a default Chrome installation. *shrugs* 




----- 
Mike Hammett 
Intelligent Computing Solutions 
http://www.ics-il.com 

Midwest-IX 
http://www.midwest-ix.com 

----- Original Message ----- 

From: "Keith Medcalf" <kmedcalf () dessus com> 
To: "NANOG list" <nanog () nanog org> 
Cc: "Nirmal Mody" <Nirmal_Mody () cable comcast com> 
Sent: Friday, February 26, 2016 9:55:20 AM 
Subject: RE: Thank you, Comcast. 


On Friday, 26 February, 2016 08:13, Jason_Livingood () comcast com said: 

FWIW, Comcast's list of blocked ports is at 
http://customer.xfinity.com/help-and-support/internet/list-of-blocked- 
ports/. The suspensions this week are in direct response to reported 
abuse from amplification attacks, which we obviously take very 
seriously. 

God is that a horrid web page. I cannot view it. The wheels on the bus go 
round and round non-stop. 

It has so much intertwined malicious javascript, cross-site scripting, and 
malicious trackers that the alarm klaxons go off when I attempt to access 
it. I spent a couple of minutes attempting to access the page but still 
maintaining blocks to the malicious links. Apparently, viewing the page 
requires that all security be turned off and that the viewer allows 
completely untrusted code from completely untrustworty sources to run 
unabated on the viewers computer. 

I do not permit this. For anyone. Ever. 

This pretty much ensures that I would never be one of your customers. If 
you cannot operate a server which serves renderable non-malicious web 
pages properly, what hope is there that you can do anything else right? 

We are in the process of considering adding some new ports to this 
block list right now, and one big suggestion is SSDP. If you have any 
others you wish to suggest please send them to me and the guy on the 
cc line (Nirmal Mody). 

On 2/26/16, 9:31 AM, "NANOG on behalf of Keith Medcalf" <nanog- 
bounces () nanog org on behalf of kmedcalf () dessus com> wrote: 



ISP's should block nothing, to or from the customer, unless they make 
it clear *before* selling the service (and include it in the Terms and 
Conditions of Service Contract), that they are not selling an Internet 
connection but are selling a partially functional Internet connection 
(or a limited Internet Service), and specifying exactly what the 
built-in deficiencies are. 

Deficiencies may include: 
port/protocol blockage toward the customer (destination blocks) 
port/protocol blockage toward the internet (source blocks) DNS 
diddling (filtering of responses, NXDOMAIN redirection/wildcards, etc) 
Traffic Shaping/Policing/Congestion policies, inbound and outbound 

Some ISPs are good at this and provide opt-in/out methods for at least 
the first three on the list. Others not so much. 


-----Original Message----- 
From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-bounces () nanog org] On Behalf Of Maxwell Cole 
Sent: Friday, 26 February, 2016 07:19 
To: Mikael Abrahamsson 
Cc: NANOG list 
Subject: Re: Thank you, Comcast. 
I agree, 
At the very least things like SNMP/NTP should be blocked. I mean how 
many people actually run a legit NTP server out of their home? 
Dozens? And the 
people who run SNMP devices with the default/common communities aren't 
the ones using it. 
If the argument is that you need a Business class account to run a 
mail server then I have no problem extending that to DNS servers also. 
Cheers, 
Max 
On Feb 26, 2016, at 8:55 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson 
<swmike () swm pp se> 
wrote: 

On Fri, 26 Feb 2016, Nick Hilliard wrote: 

Traffic from dns-spoofing attacks generally has src port = 
53 and dst 
port = random. If you block packets with udp src port=53 towards 
customers, you will also block legitimate return traffic if the 
customers run their own DNS servers or use opendns / google dns / etc. 

Sure, it's a very interesting discussion what ports should 
be blocked or 
not. 

http://www.bitag.org/documents/Port-Blocking.pdf 

This mentions on page 3.1, TCP(UDP)/25,135,139 and 445. 
They've been 
blocked for a very long time to fix some issues, even though there is 
legitimate use for these ports. 

So if you're blocking these ports, it seems like a small 
step to block 
UDP/TCP/53 towards customers as well. I can't come up with an argument 
that makes sense to block TCP/25 and then not block port 
UDP/TCP/53 as 
well. If you're protecting the Internet from your customers 
misconfiguraiton by blocking port 25 and the MS ports, why not 
53 as well? 

This is a slippery slope of course, and judgement calls are 
not easy to 
make. 

-- 
Mikael Abrahamsson email: swmike () swm pp se 
















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