Re: IPv6 Security [Was: Re: misunderstanding scale]

[Owen DeLong <owen () delong com>]

On Mar 26, 2014, at 5:50 PM, Chuck Anderson <cra () WPI EDU> wrote:

> On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 06:52:53PM -0500, Timothy Morizot wrote:
> > On Mar 26, 2014 6:27 PM, "Luke S. Crawford" <lsc () prgmr com> wrote:
> > > My original comment and complaint, though, was in response to the
> > assertion that DHCPv6 is as robust as DHCPv4.   My point is that DHCPv6
> > does not fill the role that DHCPv4 fills, if you care about tying an IP to
> > a MAC and you want that connection to persist across OS installs by
> > customers.
> >
> > You're right. DHCPv6 is more robust than DHCPv4. At least those of us in
> > the enterprise space appreciate a client identifier that doesn't change
> > when the hardware changes.
>
> No, it is LESS robust, because the client identifier changes when the
> SOFTWARE changes.  Around here, software changes MUCH more often than
> hardware.  Heck, even a dual-boot scenario breaks the client
> identifier stability.  Worse yet, DHCPv6 has created a scenario where
> a client's IPv4 connectivity and IPv6 connectivity break under
> /different/ scenarios, causing difficult-to-troubleshoot
> half-connectivity issues when either the hardware is replaced or the
> software is reloaded.

Any client whose DUID changes on software re-install has a very poor choice of default DUID and should be configurable 
for a better choice of DUID. That is not DHCPv6’s fault.

DHCPv6 is perfectly capable of behaving as you wish. Blaming the protocol for poor implementation choices by your (or 
your client’s) vendors is a little odd in my opinion.

Owen