nanog mailing list archives

Re: Transparent hijacking of SMTP submission...


From: Owen DeLong <owen () delong com>
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 09:48:08 -0800

I suspect it isn’t comcast at all.

I suspect it is the wifi operator and they happen to use comcast as an upstream. The RDNS points to the public address 
in front of the wifi. The proxy doing the rewriting is likely behind that.

Owen

On Nov 29, 2014, at 10:46 AM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists () gmail com> wrote:

backing up a bit in the conversation, perhaps this is just in some
regions of comcastlandia? I don't see this in Northern Virginia...

$ openssl s_client -starttls smtp  -connect my-mailserver.net:587
CONNECTED(00000003)
depth=0 description = kVjtrCL8rUdvd00q, C = US, CN =
my-mailserver.net, emailAddress = my-emailaddrss.com
verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
verify return:1
depth=0 description = kVjtrCL8rUdvd00q, C = US, CN = my-mailsever.net,
emailAddress = my-emailaddress.com
verify error:num=27:certificate not trusted
verify return:1
depth=0 description = kVjtrCL8rUdvd00q, C = US, CN =
my-mailserver.net, emailAddress = my-emailaddress.com
verify error:num=21:unable to verify the first certificate
verify return:1

...

Certificate chain
0 s:/description=kVjtrCL8rUdvd00q/C=US/CN=my-mailserver.net/emailAddress=y-emailaddress.com
  i:/C=IL/O=StartCom Ltd./OU=Secure Digital Certificate
Signing/CN=StartCom Class 1 Primary Intermediate Server CA

...

New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
Server public key is 2048 bit
Secure Renegotiation IS supported
Compression: NONE
Expansion: NONE
SSL-Session:
   Protocol  : TLSv1.2
   Cipher    : ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
   Session-ID: FC3E47AF2A2A96BF6DE6E11F96B02A0C41A6542864271F2901F09594DE9A48FA
   Session-ID-ctx:
   Master-Key:
BE7FB76EF5C0A9BA507B175026F73E67080D6442201FDF28F536FA38197A9B1353D644EEAF8D0D264328F94B2EF5742C
   Key-Arg   : None
   PSK identity: None
   PSK identity hint: None
   SRP username: None
   Start Time: 1417286582
   Timeout   : 300 (sec)
   Verify return code: 21 (unable to verify the first certificate)
---
250 DSN
ehlo me
250-my-mailserver.net
250-PIPELINING


On Sat, Nov 29, 2014 at 12:26 PM, Jean-Francois Mezei
<jfmezei_nanog () vaxination ca> wrote:
On 14-11-29 11:07, Sander Steffann wrote:

I am so glad that our Dutch net neutrality laws state that "providers of Internet access services may not hinder or 
delay any services or applications on the Internet" (unless [...], but those exceptions make sense)


However, in the case of SMTP, due to the amount of spam, most ISPs break
"network neutrality" by blocking outbound port 25 for instance, and
their SMTP servers will block much incoming emails (spam).  However,
SMTP is a layer or two above the network. But blocking port 25 is at the
network level.

I have seen wi-fi systems where you ask to connect to 20.21.22.23 port
25, and you get connected to 50.51.52.53 port 25. (the ISPs own SMTP
server).  I would rather they just block it than redirect you without
warning to an SMTP server of their own where they can look and your
outbound email, pretend to acccept it, and never deliver it.





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