nanog mailing list archives

Fwd: This is a coordinated hacking. (Was Re: Need help in flushing DNS)


From: jamie rishaw <j () arpa com>
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2013 15:37:29 -0500

Wait, wait.

whois doesnt jive with dns.

.. Conspiracy Theory Hat On :

- Did someone gain access to the COM dispersion zone, or parts thereof?
- Did someone figure out how to [ insert theory here ] ?

I'm looking at domains that were solidly pointing at ztomy at 2:30AM (that
are 'recovered'  to other nameservers) that show no "updates" in `whois`
records.

Curiouser and curiouser.

Paul?

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: jamie rishaw <j () arpa com>
Date: Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 3:21 PM
Subject: Re: This is a coordinated hacking. (Was Re: Need help in flushing
DNS)
To: George Herbert <george.herbert () gmail com>
Cc: Jared Mauch <jared () puck nether net>, NANOG <nanog () nanog org>


It's not poisoning.  They somehow were able to modify the NS records; one
would presume, at the registrar/s.

As far as the logic of the DNS, it is functioning as designed (What's up,
Vix!) - There's another aspect of this that caused this situation.

Any Alexa or similar people on this list (Goog PR, etc)?  I'd love to bulk
submit a domain list for some analytics.  Contact me off list.



On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 3:14 PM, George Herbert <george.herbert () gmail com>wrote:

Poisoning a domain's NS records with localhost will most certainly DOS the
domain, yes.

I have not yet seen the source of this; if anyone has a clue where the
updates are coming from please post the info.

Is there anything about ztomy.com that has been seen that's supicious as
in they might be the origin?  This could be them, or could be a joe-job
against them.  I do not want to point a finger lacking any sort of actual
data dump of the poisoning activity...




On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 1:02 PM, jamie rishaw <j () arpa com> wrote:

I'm rechecking realtime ns1620/2620 DNS right now and, looking at the
output, I see an odd number of domains (that have changed) with a listed
nameserver of "localhost.".

Is this some sort of tactic I'm unaware of?


On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 2:57 PM, Jared Mauch <jared () puck nether net>
wrote:

It seems there may be a need for some sort of 'dns-health' check out
there
that can be done in semi-realtime.

I ran a report for someone earlier today on a domain doing an xref
against
open resolver data searching for valid responses vs invalid ones.

Is this of value?  Does it need to be automated?

- Jared

On Jun 20, 2013, at 3:53 PM, jamie rishaw <j () arpa com> wrote:

This is most definitely a coordinated and planned attack.

And by 'attack' I mean hijacking of domain names.

I show as of this morning nearly fifty thousand domain names that
appear
suspicious.

I'm tempted to call uscentcom and/or related agencies (which agencies,
who
the hell knows, as ICE seems to have some sort of authority over
domains
(nearly two hundred fifty of them as I type this in COM alone and
another
thirty-some in NET).

Anyone credentialed (credentialed /n/., "I know you or know of you,")
wanting data, e-mail me off-list for some TLD goodness.






On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 12:29 PM, Phil Fagan <philfagan () gmail com>
wrote:

Agree'd in these "smaller" scenario's I just wonder if in a larger
scale
scenario, whatever that might look like, if its necessary. Whereby
many
organizations who provide "services" are effected. Perhaps the result
of a
State led campaign ....topic for another day.




On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 11:25 AM, Paul Ferguson <
fergdawgster () gmail com
wrote:

I am betting that Netsol doesn't need any more "coordination" at the
moment -- their phones are probably ringing off-the-hook. There are
still ~400 domains still pointing to the ztomy NS:


; <<>> DiG 9.7.3 <<>> @foohost parsonstech.com NS
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 49064
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;parsonstech.com.        IN    NS

;; ANSWER SECTION:
parsonstech.com.    172800    IN    NS    ns2617.ztomy.com.
parsonstech.com.    172800    IN    NS    ns1617.ztomy.com.

;; Query time: 286 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1)
;; WHEN: Thu Jun 20 19:16:25 2013
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 81

- ferg

On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 10:13 AM, Phil Fagan <philfagan () gmail com>
wrote:

I should caveat.....coordinate the "recovery" of.


On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 11:10 AM, Brandon Butterworth
<brandon () rd bbc co uk>wrote:

Is there an organization that coordinates outages like this
amongst
the
industry?

No, usually they are surprise outages though Anonymous have tried
coordinating a few

brandon




--
Phil Fagan
Denver, CO
970-480-7618



--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
fergdawgster(at)gmail.com




--
Phil Fagan
Denver, CO
970-480-7618






--
-george william herbert
george.herbert () gmail com



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