nanog mailing list archives

Re: Dear RIPE: Please don't encourage phishing


From: Steven Bellovin <smb () cs columbia edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 15:26:12 -0500


On Feb 10, 2012, at 12:37 01PM, Leo Bicknell wrote:

In a message written on Fri, Feb 10, 2012 at 09:29:30AM -0800, Randy Bush wrote:
more and more these days, i have taken to not clicking the update messages, 
but going to the web site manyually to get it.

waaaay to much phishing, and it is getting subtle and good.

We know how to sign and encrypt web sites.

We know how to sign and encrypt e-mail.

We even know how to compare keys between the web site and e-mail via a
variety of mechanisms.

We know how to sign DNS.

Remind me again why we live in this sad word Randy (correcly) described?

There's no reason my mail client shouldn't validate the signed e-mail
came from the same entity as the signed web site I'd previously logged
into, and give me a green light that the link actually points to said
same web site with the same key.  It should be transparent, and secure
for the user.

The really hard parts are (a) getting the users to pay attention to the
validation state (or, more precisely, the lack thereof on a phishing
email, and (b) get them to do it *correctly*.

Some of the browser password managers have protection against phishing as
a very useful side-effect: if they don't recognize the URL, they won't pony
up the correct login and password.  That's much better than hoping that
someone notices the absence of a little icon that means "this was signed".

The "correctly" part has to do with the PKI mess.


                --Steve Bellovin, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb







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