nanog mailing list archives

Re: [arin-announce] ARIN Resource Certification Update


From: Owen DeLong <owen () delong com>
Date: Sun, 30 Jan 2011 07:03:55 -0800


On Jan 30, 2011, at 6:11 AM, Carlos Martinez-Cagnazzo wrote:

Do you really think that a set of keys stored in a random PC in a
random office is safer than on a periodically backed-up, encrypted
database? In this future I only see lost keys, keys appearing listed
in something.ru domains, tons of support calls to hostmasters, and
ROAs repeatedly becoming invalid, all things that will seriously harm
RPKI adoption.

I think that organizational key security needs to be the responsibility
of the organization. I rarely use Valet parking because I don't like
having my car keys left on a peg board full of easy-to-steal car keys
along with many other attractive theft targets.

I think that centralizing a bunch of RPKI keys on a single server
makes a very attractive target.

In the end, I see two things:

- Hosted solutions aren´t supposed to fit everyone, that´s why
top-down is being developed. This is not news.

Yep.

- Hosted solutions offer a low barrier entry to smaller organizations
who simply cannot develop their own PKI infrastructure. This is the
case where they also lack the organizational skills to properly manage
the keys themselves, so, in most cases at least, they are *better off*
with a hosted solution

They also offer an attractive target for miscreants with a huge payoff
if they are ever compromised.

For RPKI to succeed we have to succeed not only on the technical side
but on the *human* side of things. Adoption of RPKI will only move
forward if network admins have *confidence* in the stability,
dependability and overall quality of the whole system. ROAs repeatedly
becoming invalid for the wrong reasons will represent a death blow to
RPKI adoption.

Succeeding on the human side includes doing things in a way that
makes people comfortable with the solution.

The internet has succeeded largely because we have avoided putting
all of our eggs (or even major subsets of our eggs) in single baskets.
Hosted RPKI private keys are an example of putting an awful lot of
very important eggs into a very small basket.

For RIPE, their hosted solution is clearly meeting expectations within
their region. Other region´s mileage may vary. I hope we (LACNIC) can
do just as well.

We'll see how people feel after the first time it gets pwn3d.

Have a great day!

Carlos

You too.

Owen

On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 11:52 PM, Owen DeLong <owen () delong com> wrote:
I don't understand why you can't have a hosted solution where the private keys
are not held by the host.

Seems to me you should be able to use a Java Applet to do the private key
generation and store the private key on the end-user's machine, passing
objects that need to be signed by the end user down to the applet for
signing.

This could be just as low-entry for the user, but, without the host holding
the private keys.

What am I missing?

Owen

On Jan 29, 2011, at 1:06 PM, Arturo Servin wrote:


      I agree with Alex that without a hosted solution RIPE NCC wouldn't have so many ROAs today, for us, even with 
it, it has been more difficult to roll out RPKI among our ISPs. As many, I do not think that a hosted suits to 
everybody and it has some disadvantages but at leas it could help to lower the entry barrier for some.


      Speaking about RPKI stats, here some ROA evolution in various TAs (the data from ARIN is from their beta 
test, the rest are production systems):

http://www.labs.lacnic.net/~rpki/rpki-evolution-report_EN.txt

      And visually:

http://www.labs.lacnic.net/~rpki/rpki-heatmaps/latest/global-roa-heatmap.png

      and

http://www.labs.lacnic.net/~rpki/rpki-heatmaps/latest/

      To see each region.

http://www.labs.lacnic.net/~rpki/rpki-heatmaps

      Also, bgpmon has a nice whois interface for humans to see ROAs (not sure if this link was share here or in 
twitter, sorry if I am duplicating):

http://bgpmon.net/blog/?p=414


Best regards,
-as



On 29 Jan 2011, at 13:26, Alex Band wrote:

John,

Thanks for the update. With regards to offering a hosted solution, as you know that is the only thing the RIPE NCC 
currently offers. We're developing support for the up/down protocol as I write this.

To give you some perspective, one month after launching the hosted RIPE NCC Resource Certification service, 216 
LIRs are using it in the RIPE Region and created 169 ROAs covering 467 prefixes. This means 40151 /24 IPv4 
prefixes and 7274499 /48 IPv6 prefixes now have a valid ROA associated with them.

I realize a hosted solution is not ideal, we're very open about that. But at least in our region, it seems there 
are quite a number of organizations who understand and accept the security trade-off of not being the owner of the 
private key for their resource certificate and trust their RIR to run a properly secured and audited service. So 
the question is, if the RIPE NCC would have required everyone to run their own certification setup using the open 
source tool-sets Randy mentions, would there be this much certified address space now?

Looking at the depletion of IPv4 address space, it's going to be crucially important to have validatable proof who 
is the legitimate holder of Internet resources. I fear that by not offering a hosted certification solution, real 
world adoption rates will rival those of IPv6 and DNSSEC. Can the Internet community afford that?

Alex Band
Product Manager, RIPE NCC

P.S. For those interested in which prefixes and ASs are in the RIPE NCC ROA Repository, here is the latest output 
in CSV format:
http://lunimon.com/valid-roas-20110129.csv



On 24 Jan 2011, at 21:33, John Curran wrote:

Copy to NANOG for those who aren't on ARIN lists but may be interested in this info.
FYI.
/John

Begin forwarded message:

From: John Curran <jcurran () arin net<mailto:jcurran () arin net>>
Date: January 24, 2011 2:58:52 PM EST
To: "arin-announce () arin net<mailto:arin-announce () arin net>" <arin-announce () arin net<mailto:arin-announce 
() arin net>>
Subject: [arin-announce] ARIN Resource Certification Update

ARIN continues its preparations for offering production-grade resource certification
services for Internet number resources in the region.  ARIN recognizes the importance
of Internet number resource certification in the region as a key element of further
securing Internet routing, and plans to rollout Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
at the end of the second quarter of 2011 with support for the Up/Down protocol for those
ISPs who wish to certify their subdelegations via their own RPKI infrastructure.

ARIN continues to evaluate offering a Hosting Resource Certification service for this
purpose (as an alternative to organizations having to run their own RPKI infrastructure),
but at this time it remains under active consideration and is not committed.   We look
forward to discussing the need for this type of service and the organization implications
atour upcoming ARIN Members Meeting in April in San Juan, PR.

FYI,
/John

John Curran
President and CEO
ARIN

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-- 
--
=========================
Carlos M. Martinez-Cagnazzo
http://www.labs.lacnic.net
=========================


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