RE: YouTube IP Hijacking

["Tomas L. Byrnes" <tomb () byrneit net>]

I figured as much, but it was worth a try.

Which touches on the earlier discussion of the null routing of /32s
advertised by a special AS (as a means of black-holing DDOS traffic).

It seems to me that a more immediately germane matter regarding BGP
route propagation is prevention of hijacking of critical routes.

Perhaps certain ASes that are considered "high priority", like Google,
YouTube, Yahoo, MS (at least their update servers), can be trusted to
propagate routes that are not aggregated/filtered, so as to give them
control over their reachability and immunity to longer-prefix hijacking
(especially problematic with things like MS update sites).



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Simon Lockhart [mailto:simon () slimey org] 
> Sent: Sunday, February 24, 2008 2:07 PM
> To: Tomas L. Byrnes
> Cc: Michael Smith; neil.fenemor () fx net nz; will () harg net; 
> nanog () merit edu
> Subject: Re: YouTube IP Hijacking
>
> On Sun Feb 24, 2008 at 01:49:00PM -0800, Tomas L. Byrnes wrote:
> > Which means that, by advertising routes more specific than the ones 
> > they are poisoning, it may well be possible to restore universal 
> > connectivity to YouTube.
>
> Well, if you can get them in there.... Youtube tried that, to 
> restore service to the rest of the world, and the 
> announcements didn't propogate.
>
> Simon