nanog mailing list archives

Re: Revealed: The Internet's well known BGP behavior


From: Randy Bush <randy () psg com>
Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2008 09:15:22 +1200

Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Thu, 28 Aug 2008 10:16:16 -0500
"Anton Kapela" <tkapela () gmail com> wrote:

I thought I'd toss in a few comments, considering it's my fault that
few people are understanding this thing yet.

On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 2:28 PM, Gadi Evron <ge () linuxbox org>
wrote:
People (especially spammers) have been hijacking networks for a
while
I'd like to 'clear the air' here. Clearly, I failed at Defcon, WIRED,
AFP, and Forbes.

We all know sub-prefix hijacking is not news. What is news? Using
as-path loop detection to selectively blackhole the hijacked route -
which creates a transport path _back to_ the target.

That's all it is, nothing more. All but the WIRED follow-up article
missed this point *completely.* They over-represented the 'hijacking'
aspects, while only making mention of the 'interception' potential.

Lets end this thread with the point I had intended two weeks ago:
we've presented a method by which all the theory spewed by academics
can be actualized in a real network (the big-I internet) to effect
interception of data between (nearly) arbitrary endpoints from
(nearly) any edge or stub AS. That, I think, is interesting.

Indeed, and I thank you for it.  As noted, I and others have been
warning about the problem for a long time.  You've shown that it isn't
just an ivory tower exercise; maybe people will now get serious about
deploying a solution.

To quote Bruce Schneier quoting an NSA maxim, attacks only get better;
they never get worse.  We now have running code of one way to do this.
I think most NANOG readers can see many more ways to do it.  A real
solution will take years to deploy, but it will never happen if we
don't start.  And we want to have the solution out there *before* we
see serious attacks on BGP.

Again, thank you -- it was really nice work.

<aol>



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