nanog mailing list archives

RE: DNS Hijacking by Cox


From: "Marcus H. Sachs" <marc () sachsfamily net>
Date: Sun, 22 Jul 2007 22:04:50 -0400


DNSSEC provides source authenticity and data integrity.  You may get a bogus
answer, but with DNSSEC in place at least you have a way of verifying the
bogosity (is that a word?) of the reply.

I agree with Steve, DNSSEC won't stop these tricks but it makes them
detectable.

I'm a Cox user at home but I have my Linksys home router configured to use
DNS servers of my own choosing rather than Cox' choice.  I also tunnel my
email through SSH to a mail server I control so that I'm not blocked by
their port 25 filters.

Marc 

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-nanog () merit edu [mailto:owner-nanog () merit edu] On Behalf Of
Steven M. Bellovin
Sent: Sunday, July 22, 2007 9:46 PM
To: Patrick W. Gilmore
Cc: nanog () merit edu; Patrick W. Gilmore
Subject: Re: DNS Hijacking by Cox


On Sun, 22 Jul 2007 21:40:05 -0400
"Patrick W. Gilmore" <patrick () ianai net> wrote:


On Jul 22, 2007, at 9:29 PM, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Sun, 22 Jul 2007 14:56:13 -0700
"Andrew Matthews" <exstatica () gmail com> wrote:

It looks like cox is hijacking dns for irc servers.

And people wonder why I support DNSsec....

Steve,

One of us is confused.  It might be me, but right now I think it's 
you.

To be clear, here is the situation as I understand it: Cox has 
configured their recursive name servers such that when an end user 
queries the recursive server for a specific host name (names?), the 
recursive server responds with an IP address the host's owner did not 
configure.

How exactly is DNSSEC going to stop them from doing this?

If my host expects the response to be signed and it isn't, my host can
scream bloody murder.  The whole point of DNSSEC is to prevent random
changes to DNS replies, whether by hackers or by ISPs.

Yes, they can change it, but they can't change it without being caught.


                --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb


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