RE: Real-Time Mitigation of Denial of Service Attacks Now Available With AT&T

["Michel Py" <michel () arneill-py sacramento ca us>]

Woulda, shoulda. If it is so simple, how come not everyone does it?

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-nanog () merit edu [mailto:owner-nanog () merit edu] On Behalf Of
Patrick W.Gilmore
Sent: Wednesday, June 02, 2004 9:17 AM
To: nanog () merit edu
Cc: Patrick W.Gilmore
Subject: Re: Real-Time Mitigation of Denial of Service Attacks Now
Available With AT&T


On Jun 2, 2004, at 11:35 AM, Michel Py wrote:

> > Jon R. Kibler wrote:
> > IMHO, there is absolutely no excuse for not doing ingress and
> > egress filtering. In fact, if you are an ISP, I would argue
> > that you are negligent in your fiduciary responsibilities to
> > your customers and shareholders if you are not filtering
> > source IP addresses.
>
> Hey, I'm all for it. Where's the money and the staff?

The money is from your customers, and the staff is your staff.  This 
scales nicely as the number of customers you have, and therefore your 
money and staff, is directly related to the effort you have to put into 
the system.

The Internet is a collective.  The whole thing does not work if 
everyone does not help to keep the whole, well, whole.

If DDoS gets out of hand, if BGP churn is too high, if spam gets out of 
hand, if, if, if.

Of course, if everyone filtered ISPs who did not validate the source 
IPs of packets originating in their network the way some networks 
filter spam sources, the problem would likely correct itself quickly.  
The  problem is figuring out which providers do not validate source 
addresses since, by definition, the problem we are discussing are 
spoofed source addresses.... =)

-- 
TTFN,
patrick