Re: BGP-based blackholing/hijacking patented in Australia?

[Niels Bakker <niels=nanog () bakker net>]

> > Niels Bakker wrote:
> > Do you propose blocking goatse/tubgirl as well?  The
> > same reasoning can apply to those sites.

* michel () arneill-py sacramento ca us (Michel Py) [Sat 14 Aug 2004, 06:38 CEST]:
> No, and you are comparing apples to oranges. As far as I know, neither
> goatse nor tubgirl tried to phish my password, SSN, or PIN (or I am
> missing something?)

You forgot to quote some needed context.  You said that "the user never
wanted to access the site in the first place" and "[t]he reason to visit
a web site never existed in reality." This applies to goatse/tubgirl as
well (at least in my case, and I assume I'm in polite company).

The problem is users sending personal information to the wrong party
where they could've known better (unverified website over unencrypted
and unauthenticated connections).  The problem isn't users accidentally
visiting websites they, in retrospect, didn't want to visit.


> I agree. Although I personally find some stuff disgusting, I prefer
> freedom of speech to censorship.
>
> That being said, phishing is not about freedom of speech. I would oppose
> blocking goatse/tubgirl but I do not oppose blocking phishing.

Have you read the LINX paper on this subject?  It's a good read.


> However, the issue I see with this redirection stuff is that what it
> does is to redirect surfers from goatse to tubgirl (or the other way
> around, depending on which way you voted, perverts). The wrong part is
> the redirection, not the content.

Well then, say bye-bye to the principle of links such as
<a href="http://site1/";>visit site2</a> where the href target differs
textually from the anchor text.

Oh, the usual (old, tired) trick is redirecting from an innocent-looking
link to either goatse or tubgirl, not between the latter two.


        -- Niels.