nanog mailing list archives
Re: OpenSSL
From: alex () yuriev com
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2003 10:36:48 -0500 (EST)
While the timing attack is the attack against the SSL server, it is my reading of the paper that the attacks' success largely depends on ability to tightly control the time it takes to communicate with a service using SSL. Currently, such control is rather difficult to achive on links other than ethernet.Doesn?t MPLS provide consistent delay and minimal jitter and thus SSL servers connected to MPLS networks are more suspectible to attack?
Have you seen MPLS cards for servers being widely deployed? :) The smaller the number of router(s) sitting between attacker and the target, the closer attacker can control the timing. Alex
Current thread:
- OpenSSL Len Rose (Mar 17)
- Re: OpenSSL Scott Francis (Mar 17)
- Re: OpenSSL Steven M. Bellovin (Mar 17)
- Re: OpenSSL Scott Francis (Mar 17)
- Re: OpenSSL Steven M. Bellovin (Mar 17)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: OpenSSL Stewart, William C (Bill), SALES (Mar 17)
- Re: OpenSSL Michael . Dillon (Mar 18)
- Re: OpenSSL Eric Rescorla (Mar 18)
- Re: OpenSSL alex (Mar 18)
- Re: OpenSSL Petri Helenius (Mar 18)
- Re: OpenSSL alex (Mar 18)
- Re: OpenSSL Eric Rescorla (Mar 18)
- Re: OpenSSL Eric Rescorla (Mar 18)
- Re: OpenSSL Scott Francis (Mar 17)
- RE: OpenSSL alex (Mar 18)
- Re: OpenSSL Petri Helenius (Mar 18)