nanog mailing list archives

Re: What could have been done differently?


From: Scott Francis <darkuncle () darkuncle net>
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2003 20:19:28 -0800

On Tue, Jan 28, 2003 at 11:13:19AM -0200, rkjnanog () ieg com br said:
[snip]
But this worm required external access to an internal server (SQL Servers
are not front-end ones); even with a bad or no patch management system, this
simply wouldn't happen on a properly configured network. Whoever got
slammered, has more problems than just this worm. Even with no firewall or
screening router,  use of RFC1918 private IP address on the SQL Server would
have prevented this worm attack

Only if the worm's randomly-chosen IP addresses were picked from the valid IP
space (i.e. not RFC1918 addresses), and although I am not sure, I doubt the
worm's author(s) was that conscientious.

Later, on Wed, Jan 29, 2003 at 19:01:25 -0500 (EST), <bdragon () gweep net>
replied:
RFC1918 addresses would not have prevented this worm attack.
RFC1918 != security

All too true. However, using NAT/packet filtering can at least prevent
casual/automated network scans. Of course, if one was implementing proper
filtering, 1434/udp wouldn't be accepting connections from outside sources,
whether directly or through NAT/port forwarding. But then, this observation
has been made many times already ...
-- 
-= Scott Francis || darkuncle (at) darkuncle (dot) net =-
  GPG key CB33CCA7 has been revoked; I am now 5537F527
        illum oportet crescere me autem minui

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