nanog mailing list archives
Re: government eavesdropping
From: William Allen Simpson <wsimpson () greendragon com>
Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2000 11:29:41 -0500
Thanks for all the private messages (I guess), but you all certainly know that I get at least as much email as you do, and if it's important enough to write you a personal reply, then it's important enough to send to the list.... ==== First, the Moskowitz story, excerpted. If you want the whole thing, buy him lunch, he's a nice guy -- just remember he eats kosher. Chrysler owned a big share of an Austrian company (now, Chrysler is owned by a German company, how time flies). They started running IPSec on the international link. They got a call from the French, saying it is/was illegal to send encrypted data over their lines. Chrysler had to reroute its link, through Italy as best I remember. This confirms several things, not the least of which is the French are monitoring commercial data circuits. ==== No, I've never been inside any MAE/NAP, and I have no photographs of men in black. But, besides the abundant persistent rumors, I've been on privacy panels hosted by my local congresscritters. And, I'm told by said congresscritters that the administration brags about their monitoring of Internet traffic at the international exchange points, as an indication of their wonderful efficacy in tracking pernicious activities, such as terrorists, pornographers, gambling, gun, and alcohol sales, and asked for more funding in last year's appropriations cycle. They also claim that commercial information is removed. This confirms several things, not the least of which is that there is intercepted commercial data to be removed. I presume that the techniques used are similar to the French. And not too different from their investigations of me, still classified secret. The files refer to email messages and excerpt voice conversations, none of which they got from court orders served upon me! The small parts of these I've been able to get under FOIA are posted on the net -- mostly blacked out -- but careful reading indicates that the investigation began after the posting of an internet-draft for PPP CHAP, back when it was called the "cryptographic handshake authentication protocol". Securing the net considered harmful.... Please FOIA your own FBI files before you tell me that I'm paranoid. Be prepared to pester them for 6 years to meet their statutory 20 day deadline. ==== Some patents have been widely circulated, being number 5,937,422 among others. Remember that the patent office can keep patents secret when they affect "national security". I presume, based on my experience, that in addition to those alcohol peddlers, the semantic trees search for "security" and "cryptography". ==== Merit has been around longer than most ISPs. They have had machines compromised. They have had machines attacked by DoS. They serve college campuses. They have a clue coefficient. 'nuff said. WSimpson () UMich edu Key fingerprint = 17 40 5E 67 15 6F 31 26 DD 0D B9 9B 6A 15 2C 32
Current thread:
- Re: government eavesdropping, (continued)
- Re: government eavesdropping Jim Mercer (Feb 24)
- RE: government eavesdropping Roeland M.J. Meyer (Feb 24)
- Re: government eavesdropping Henry R. Linneweh (Feb 24)
- Re: government eavesdropping William Allen Simpson (Feb 24)
- Re: government eavesdropping Brian Wallingford (Feb 24)
- Re: government eavesdropping Valdis . Kletnieks (Feb 24)
- DDoS/PPark (was: Re: government eavesdropping) Ville (Feb 25)
- Re: government eavesdropping Chris Cappuccio (Feb 24)
- Re: government eavesdropping Brian Wallingford (Feb 24)
- Re: government eavesdropping Kai Schlichting (Feb 24)
- Re: government eavesdropping Ehud Gavron (Feb 24)
- Re: government eavesdropping William Allen Simpson (Feb 25)
- Re: government eavesdropping Deepak Jain (Feb 25)
- Re: government eavesdropping Alex Bligh (Feb 25)