nanog mailing list archives

Re: IRRs


From: Steve Carter <scarter () pobox com>
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 02:32:45 -0700


Sean Donelan wrote:
192.239.92.47 is announced by NTIS's ASN 10616 via UUNET ASN 701.  I could
not find a valid aut-num object for ASN 10616, and the covering route object
for 192.239.92.47 was an old SURANET/BBN block for 192.239/16 indicating
a source AS 1.

This is reasonably typical ...

The lack of correct current routing registry information for the IRS web
site doesn't seem to have hurt its connectivity.  Other the other hand,
it also wouldn't hurt the connectivity of someone impersonating the IRS
web site network route.  The rest of the Internet just has to take the
routes on faith.

Don't let a route being registered in one of the routing registries lull
you into a false sense of security (sic), there is zero to very little
real authentication done on a route registration.  It only takes an ounce
(or less) knowledge to register a route as being originated from any AS.

Do I think this is a real problem?  It hasn't been so far, probably due to
our cooperative and trusting nature >;). I think it would take quite some
resources and reputation killing stupidity (or malice) to inject 'illegal'
routes and then do something meaningful with them.

-Steve



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