Re: Government scrutiny is headed our way

["Richard Thomas" <buglord () ex-pressnet com>]

-----Original Message-----
From: Karl Denninger <karl () mcs net>
To: Jay R. Ashworth <jra () scfn thpl lib fl us>
Cc: nanog () merit edu <nanog () merit edu>
Date: Tuesday, June 16, 1998 3:54 PM
Subject: Re: Government scrutiny is headed our way


> > > Since they don't cooperate, the only two defenses are:

> > > 1. Black-hole detected amplifier networks (what we're doing here).
> >
> > Indeed.  And what I think is the best approach.  Kick 'em in the
> > nads^Wnets.
>
> Not really.  The best approach is to nail a few of these folks with felony
> indictments for the denial of service attacks, and the theft of the
> amplifier network's services.  That would stop this practice cold.


Unfortunantly I highly doubt this will have much impact. Firstly, all of the
"smurf kiddies" are using hacked shells, so when you trace it back to them
they don't care, they just move to the next machine. Secondly, the most
annoying
and persistant smurfers (read "conflict") are too stupid to know better even
if you
start bumping off smurfers left and right. You're likely to scare the casual
immoral
network admin who smurfs his isp's competition or such, but thats about it.

My strategy is to hit the smurfers where it hurts, the broadcasts. I email
the broadcast
network, and their uplink, and their uplink, until something gets done. If
you can exaust
their broadcasts quickly enough it becomes too "expensive" for them to
continue.