Re: NAT etc. (was: Spam Control Considered Harmful)

["Jay R. Ashworth" <jra () scfn thpl lib fl us>]

On Sat, Nov 01, 1997 at 07:44:55PM -0600, Tim Salo wrote:
> > Date: Sat, 1 Nov 1997 17:37:57 -0500
> > From: "Jay R. Ashworth" <jra () scfn thpl lib fl us>
> > To: "You're welcome" <nanog () merit edu>
> > Subject: Re: NAT etc. (was: Spam Control Considered Harmful)
> >     [...]
> > Well, yes, Paul, but unless I misunderstood you, that's exactly the
> > point.  If a client inside a NAT cloud does a DNS lookup to a
> > supposedly authoritative server outside, and the NAT box is _required_
> > to strip off the signature (which it would, because it has to change
> > the data), then it's not possibile, by definition, for any client
> > inside such a NAT box to make any use of SecDNS.
> >
> > The point is that you _can't_ regenerate the signature, usefully to the
> > client, anyway, precisely because _it is a signature_.
>
> Presumably, the NAT could,
>
> o     Verify the signature of the DNS responses it receives, and
>       dump any responses that don't meet its [authentication]
>       criteria, or
>
> o     Sign the the response it creates and let the client verify
>       the NAT's signature.  Presumably, the client will trust
>       the NAT.

Yup, it could, but as I noted to Paul, in the cases Sean is advocating,
the client and the NAT box may not be within the same span of
administration, either.  IE: no, you may _not_ trust the NAT op.

Cheers,
-- jra
-- 
Jay R. Ashworth                                                jra () baylink com
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