nanog mailing list archives

Re: syn attack and source routing


From: "Jeff Young" <young () mci net>
Date: Sat, 21 Sep 1996 12:47:17 -0400

i think that the better fix for the spoofing scare was to filter 
at the edges of your network for your own source addresses so that 
no one could send to your networks with a source address of your 
networks.  i don't believe that this will disable lsrr.  we're now 
completing the cycle and suggesting that we should also prevent folks
from sourcing packets in their networks destined to flow the
opposite direction with anything other than the real source 
addresses in their networks.

i haven't thought about it much, but i'm sure that someone here
would know, could you use lsrr to launch the predictive-seq-#-
spoofing attack?

Jeff Young
young () mci net

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Date: Sat, 21 Sep 1996 11:41:45 -0400
To: John Hawkinson <jhawk () bbnplanet com>
From: Paul Ferguson <pferguso () cisco com>
Subject: Re: syn attack and source routing
Cc: nanog () merit edu
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Deja vu.

Didn't this same topic crop up a couple of years ago when the
IP spoofing-sky-is-falling scare began? If I'm not remiss, the
discussion drifted towards encouraging end-system networks to
disable source-routing at the entrance to their networks if
they were paranoid, but encourage ISP's & transit providers
to allow it.

- paul

At 01:18 PM 9/18/96 -0400, John Hawkinson wrote:


Worst case, those folks feeling victimized can (and do!) simply shut
it off.

This is a very different case from that of SYN flooding, where the
victims are powerless to stop it.

Please don't take our LSRR away from us, it is very useful.
Campaigning to remove something just because you suspect it might be
bad is really not nice -- it will result in random clueless people
believeing you when perchance they should not :-)

--jhawk



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