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How Secure is Windows Hardware-enforced Data Execution Prevention [was ani_loadimage_chunksize problem]


From: security at vahle.de (Thomas Werth)
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2007 12:03:22 +0100

I've taken a look at this. Still i have one more question.
It seems exploit rewrites seh so that dep deactivation can be called. If
i'm wrong how is then deactivation func called ?
Now to my question. I guess deactivation needs admin rights, so if a
application is exploited which runs not as admin such an deactivation +
exploit attempt should fail, right ?


Rhys Kidd schrieb:
Oh Metasploit has already provided exploits that will reliably bypass
Windows NX/DEP

http://metasploit.com/dev/trac/browser/framework3/trunk/modules/exploits/windows/dcerpc/msdns_zonename.rb

The issue, as I discussed it with HD previously, is that there is no
widespread way of doing this by making changes to the payloads. In the above
case it was done within the exploit module, first ensuring NX/DEP was
disabled in the target vulnerable process, and then passing to the chosen
payload.

Keep in mind that NX/DEP isn't the only built in protection against remote
code execution in modern Windows. There's also stack canaries, ASLR, heap
protection etc which may or may not be enabled depending on the particular
process, CPU and OS release. The type of vulnerability it self is also
relevant. Certain vulnerable API calls will be easier/harder to use when the
target may be using these mitigating protections.

But if you have suggestions for a more generically applicable method, please
discuss!

Rhys





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