Metasploit mailing list archives

linux 2.6 stack randomization


From: sebastiaan.veenstra at gmail.com (Sebastiaan Veenstra)
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 13:55:46 +0100

Hi,

I've read a bit about some patches today introducing stack randomization
into the 2.6 kernel. With these patches, a stack overflowable buffer is
located on a different memory address for each invocation of the vulnarable
program. Thus, storing shellcode in a stack overflowable buffer and
overwriting the return address with the address of the buffer is no longer
possible since the buffer is stored on a completely different stack address
among subsequent invocations of the program. Even by utilizing a nop sled
it's not possible. How does the metasploit framework anticipate to this kind
of behavior? Are there any facilities in the new framework to automate the
exploitation process in such a situation?

With kind regards,

Sebastiaan
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