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Technology Empowers Information Operations in Afghanistan


From: InfoSec News <isn () c4i org>
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2002 05:27:01 -0500 (CDT)

http://www.us.net/signal/Archive/March02/technology-march.html

[This might answer some of the questions raised in the article from 
last week in Wired. I might add that of the many groups I am a member 
of, the AFCEA is one that's membership has been worth every penny. 
http://www.afcea.org   - WK]


March 2002
SIGNAL Magazine 2002
By Robert K. Ackerman

Satellite communications, Web services and imagery have come of age in
the battlespace of operation Enduring Freedom. This first
network-centric war has revealed an explosion in capabilities that has
been matched by information demands at all levels of command.

Many of these capabilities represent the fruits of technology
investments and developments begun years ago. Both military and
commercial satellites are whipping digital streams of voice, data and
imagery between the United States and the theater of operations, as
well as among units on the battlefield. Web messaging has all but
rendered the venerable pencil and map obsolete, even at the individual
warfighter level. National technical assets and tactical surveillance
and reconnaissance platforms provide imagery for distribution to the
full range of command and control nodes.

The maturing of these technologies and capabilities has allowed the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to establish a seamless command,
control, communications, computers and intelligence network that
literally runs from the White House down to the foxhole.

"Technology has allowed us to flatten the command and control
structure," states Brig. Gen. Dennis C. Moran, USA, director of
command, control, communications and information systems (J-6) at
CENTCOM. "The CINC [commander in chief], because of the command and
control system that has evolved in support of this operation, has the
ability to reach out and get information quickly from the lowest level
of command.

"That has brought with it the challenge to ensure that information
flows not only vertically but horizontally so that everybody knows the
same thing about the same time," he adds.

The CINC often will receive a report or a piece of information at the
same time as intermediate levels of command, the general notes. As a
result, the ability of intelligence specialists to collaborate quickly
on a report has become more important.

Operational situation reports have both operational value and
intelligence value, and CENTCOM is following existing doctrinal
arrangements for linking all of its forces. Operational forces report
to a command and control node, which in turn assesses the information,
collates it and passes it on to higher headquarters when appropriate.

Information about the battlefield may be collected from a number of
different types of sensors and platforms. Intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance information, whether collected by national
technical means or tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), is routed
to a command and control node.

Some equipment in the field even allows ground-based personnel to
locate a target and transmit its location data to a weapons platform
for input into precision-guided munitions. This would be used by a
U.S. Air Force forward air controller who would communicate directly
to the aircraft.

A tremendous amount of logistical information is moving through the
network. A side benefit of this is that it provides asset visibility
to virtually any level of command that requires it.

"Gone are the days of faxing reports, posting information on maps or
even taking down reports over the telephone," Gen. Moran declares.

Communications in CENTCOM's area of responsibility, which encompasses
25 countries, depend heavily on military and commercial satellites,
Gen. Moran relates. To move information around the Afghanistan
battlefield, planners are employing ultrahigh frequency (UHF) and
super high frequency (SHF) tactical satellites as well as commercial
orbiters. The general continues that these satellite links serve as
the primary means of communication both from the United States into
the theater of operations and from bases on the Arabian Peninsula to
Afghanistan and its surrounding countries.

The prime driver behind the use of satellite communications is not the
ruggedness of Afghanistan's terrain but instead the wide dispersal of
CENTCOM's forces. Unconventional warfare forces, for example, tend to
operate in remote areas independently of other forces. Widely
dispersed command and control nodes rely on satellite communications
because they are beyond the line-of-sight distance to their
headquarters.

Communications in this operation are different from others in the
amount of bandwidth being employed, the general offers. Bandwidth
requirements at each command and control node are considerably higher
than previously experienced. "We always had a model that said that at
a higher headquarters you need a lot of information; at the next level
headquarters you need a little bit less information; and when you
finally get down to the people operating and actually executing, you
need only a little bit of information. What we are finding is that the
demand for all forms of information--voice, data, video, imagery,
topographic--is great at every level of command," he declares.

The general continues that even the smallest command and control node
requires nearly the same amount of bandwidth as the larger nodes. This
runs counter to previous experiences, so CENTCOM had to resort to
establishing bandwidth priorities and allocations for the various
information services.

Bandwidth allocation is the single biggest issue facing CENTCOM
communicators in operation Enduring Freedom, Gen. Moran states. The
command has not had enough bandwidth, particularly satellite, at the
right place at the right time. The problem has focused mostly on the
timing of having the right kinds of terminals at the right places as
well as the need to sort through which communications services are
most required at particular command and control nodes. Accordingly,
the command has had to decide on allocating bandwidth for voice, data
and video. Time sharing has been one remedy.

The great demand for UHF tactical satellite communications has
required considerable prioritization, the general continues. Newer
technologies that provide capabilities such as demand assigned
multiple access or narrowband satellite channels have proved very
useful in this endeavor, he states.

Other emerging technologies are playing a big role as well. The global
broadcast system (GBS) has served as a method of distributing some of
the high bandwidth products directly from the United States down to
the lowest levels of command. It permits moving large data files on an
as-required basis down to a command and control node. This includes
both classified and unclassified material, the general notes. Part of
the GBS system allows encrypted transmissions using National Security
Agency-approved encryption, and the command is moving all types of
information over GBS except voice transmissions. This encompasses
Internet protocol (IP) traffic, video and large data files. GBS has
been deployed ahead of its initial operational capability to several
headquarters both on the Arabian Peninsula and in the Afghanistan
region.

The command is moving considerably more imagery than it expected, the
general reports. This includes imagery generated from national
technical means as well as theater-based intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance systems. Some imagery is exploited within theater,
while other imagery is sent back to the United States for storage and
redistribution to the appropriate users.

"We probably are getting too much information," Gen. Moran concedes.  
"Information management down at the lowest level is probably the
biggest challenge we face. This requires some kind of standardized
system, procedures or business practices that help organize
information and bring the most important information to the operator
or the commander quicker without having to sift through reams of
information."

The general continues that the CENTCOM system permits a commander "at
his or her fingertips" to reach into multiple databases through the
secret Internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) to extract
information. A key to success is to move to a level of knowledge
management where information is being organized and presented to a
commander in the appropriate way. CENTCOM headquarters is employing
business processes to organize information in a joint operating center
in the same manner that the information is presented to a decision
maker. Key enablers include collaborative planning tools as well as
tools that help organize and archive information for easy retrieval.

"The most important technology that we have found useful is access to
data services and Web services," the general states. "There is more
information moving via e-mail and Web services than there ever has
been before. Even the lowest level of command has access to secure Web
services.

"This is a war that is being fought on IP services," he declares.  
"This involves movement of data, whether e-mail, Web services or large
files. It may be more important to move a large file or an e-mail from
one headquarters to another than to move a phone call from one
headquarters to another."

The general maintains that the SIPRNET is serving a much larger role
than its nonsecure counterpart, the NIPRNET. The command monitors the
performance of routers much more closely than it does the performance
of switches.

Commercial satellite telephone services also are playing a big role.  
The general cites Iridium and Inmarsat as two systems that have been
important to the success of Afghanistan operations. "Iridium has
performed very well in providing secure communications between command
and control nodes," he states. The command is encouraging as much use
of Iridium as possible to ensure voice communications redundancy.

The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) also has worked extremely
well in providing a common operating picture at all levels of command
seamlessly among each of the service-specific GCCS systems.

"The killer apps [applications] of this war are e-mail, Web services,
the common operating picture, the global transportation network and
the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, or JOPES," the
general declares.

One technology that has not seen action is UAV communications relay.  
Various types of UAVs have been tested as communications relays,
especially those with long battlefield loiter times. These could
perform some of the same functions of communications satellites.  
Despite the high demand for satellite communications, UAVs were never
considered for any role as relays, Gen. Moran warrants.

"The most important mission that UAVs have right now is for
intelligence," he declares. No discussion of using UAVs as relays was
ever held because the intelligence collection priority overrode any
possibility of considering them for other applications.

Computer network defense is a serious concern, the general allows. The
command has employed a traditional computer network defense strategy
with the use of intrusion detection devices and firewalls extended
down to the lowest level. CENTCOM headquarters monitors this security
in concert with the U.S. Space Command, and Gen. Moran reports that
CENTCOM has seen "no significant increase in any kind of probes since
the operation began." Similarly, no significant computer network
defense incident has taken place since the onset of operation Enduring
Freedom.

CENTCOM already had deployed land, sea and air components as part of
ongoing operations when operation Enduring Freedom began. Joint
procedures for land, sea and air operations had been well established.  
As the command expanded into combat in Afghanistan, it only had to
extend the existing joint procedures into the warfighting activities,
the general points out. This included having a joint network. U.S.  
Army earth terminals, for example, could be brought into Air Force
locations and vice versa. Special operations units also were well
integrated into the overall joint network.

Switches, whether tactical or strategic, all have integrated well, he
continues. The data network is seamless for nodes to which the user is
connected. Gen. Moran relates that the command began with a fairly
extensive network of tri-service tactical communications switches in
theater, and it built on that network to ensure interoperability
between newer and legacy systems.

Some legacy challenges did arise. When introduced, secure telephone
equipment did require configuration when operating on different types
of networks. Operator training was necessary to enable this telephone
equipment to interoperate with some terminals at the other end of the
communications link.

CENTCOM's J-6 notes that, as different elements of each service have
been brought into operation Enduring Freedom, they have tended to be
at different states of modernization, especially in regard to
capabilities. This has affected tasking orders, which in some cases
could be sent only to particular units. The general relates that some
Army units were equipped with multiplex gear far more capable than
that of other units, so the command had to be careful about ordering
forces for various types of missions.



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