Chinese military modernization continues

[InfoSec News <isn () C4I ORG>]

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=21547

Wednesday, January 31, 2001
By Jon Dougherty

China is continuing to make advances in military warfighting
techniques, including a crucial ability to direct multiple forces from
different branches of service in the same theater of operations, a
recent analysis said.

According to a report written by Al Santoli -- an Asian-affairs
expert, editor of the American Foreign Policy Council's China Reform
Monitor, and a senior national-security adviser to Rep. Dana
Rohrabacher, R-Calif. -- during "ongoing large-scale military
exercises, China has demonstrated significant new joint-service
warfighting skills 'under high-tech conditions' that are steadily
altering the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait."

Specifically, the report said, China's People's Liberation Army is
applying U.S. military doctrine to integrate its "relentless
expanding" of strategic missile forces; high performance Su-27 and
Su-30 fighter planes bought from Russia; new blue-water, long-range
naval ships, including a pair of Russian-built Sovremenny-class
destroyers armed with SS-N-22 "Sunburn" anti-ship missiles;
state-of-the-art communications systems purchased from U.S. and
Western companies; and "development of advanced information and
electronic warfare capabilities."

The United States currently possesses the capability to coordinate its
forces through secure, satellite-linked communications systems. In
practice, that means possessing the ability to guide land, air and
naval forces simultaneously and against multiple targets and threats,
though the U.S. is currently at work developing more advanced systems
that will eventually include the ability for small-unit ground
commanders, Navy ship captains and air battle group commanders to all
share the same battle data in real time.

For the past decade, China has also been working to develop this
capability and, according to the AFPC report, is making greater
progress than previously acknowledged in recent years by the former
Clinton administration, the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies.

The report said that "Taiwan's senior military intelligence analysts
observe that in current large-scale exercises," the PLA is "showing
surprisingly rapid advances in joint maneuvers between naval, air
force, marine infantry, paratroop, armored and missile units."

The PLA is also developing a radar information network "that includes
some 68 interconnected radars" for the PLAAF -- the People's
Liberation Army Air Force, the report said.

Growing air power

Taiwan's military leaders have been particularly impressed with
China's rapidly developing air combat and command capabilities.

For example, the report said Taiwanese military officials have noted a
marked increase in PLAAF missions flown over the Taiwan Straits,
especially as China acquires more sophisticated fighters, and in
higher numbers.

"On the other hand," the report said, "with a 2- to 10-minute response
time to a PLA air or missile strike across the strait, Taiwan has
repeatedly requested that the United States help upgrade its
early-warning radar systems and transfer software that integrates
these disparate systems."

Over the past half-decade, however, former Clinton administration
officials were not responsive to Taiwan's requests, either for
upgraded radar systems or more lethal weapons designed to counter
China's growing threat in terms of technology and numbers of systems
deployed against the island.

The last major fighter purchase by Taiwan came in 1981, when the
Reagan administration agreed to sell Taipei 150 then-modern F-16
fighters. However, because of diplomatic differences, the planes were
not actually delivered until 1992. China was angered by the sale and
would, undoubtedly, oppose further advanced-fighter sales to Taiwan.

Taiwan's request to buy new U.S. destroyers equipped with the
ultra-modern Aegis battle management systems -- needed to help form a
cohesive and effective anti-air and missile defense shield to protect
against Chinese planes and ballistic missiles -- was denied last year
by the Clinton administration.

Since then, Taiwan has repeated its request for more advanced weapons,
including a request to purchase up to four Aegis destroyers at a cost
of $1 billion each.

In response to Taiwan's destroyer request, the Pentagon has said it
would be willing to sell the island less-sophisticated Kidd-class
destroyers -- ships Taiwan has said it would accept as a short-term
fix in advance of the eventual deliveries of the Aegis warships, if
approved by the Bush administration.

"Our president is saying we need the Aegis ships and that the
Kidd-class ships are not enough," Parris Chang, a legislator and
senior member of Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party, told
the Washington Times last week. "This will be very, very important for
Taiwan's defense," he added.

Growing technological edge

"Taiwan is particularly impressed with the PLA's rapid advances in
utilizing a national 'plug-and-play' fiber optic civilian
telecommunications network to thoroughly secure its military
communications," the AFPC report said. "At the same time, Taiwan
believes its current military information system is relatively easy to
monitor," meaning Chinese intelligence assets can keep a better eye on
Taiwanese military and security capabilities than Taiwan agencies --
without U.S. help -- can monitor Chinese advances.

Worse, the report said, Taiwanese military and political leaders
believe their forces have "fallen behind the PLA in that important
command-and-control area, which could lead to their defeat" in a
cross-strait conflict.

The ability to monitor Chinese progress, however, may be changing
somewhat more to Taiwan's favor. Last week, Jane's Defense Weekly
reported that Taiwan and the U.S. National Security Agency are jointly
operating a major signals intelligence, or SIGINT, facility on
Yangmingshan Mountain, just north of Taipei.

Jane's said the NSA was helping Taiwan to "coordinate and process its
SIGINT data collected from various SIGINT stations located around
Taiwan." The data is subsequently used by Taiwan's military
intelligence wing and is relayed via satellite back to the NSA.

Also, as reported by WorldNetDaily Jan. 19, the Chinese are also
developing "asymmetrical warfare" techniques -- unconventional warfare
tactics designed to attack an enemy's information, financial and other
high-tech centers -- with alarming speed.

One such development, called the "parasitic satellite," is a
mini-satellite capable of attaching itself to U.S. military and
communications satellites, rendering them useless or destroying them
outright. Also, the weapon can be used against space stations and
space-based laser weapons.

"The PLA doctrine of 'asymmetrical' warfare emphasized paralyzing the
high-tech strength of the U.S. and our allies through attacks on
military, economic and governmental computerized information systems,"
the AFPC report said. "Since mid-1999, some of the first incidents of
21st century Internet warfare have been conducted across the strait,
with the PLA now openly recruiting an 'army of hackers' in civilian
newspapers." Also, the report said, the PLA has an "aggressive"
program underway to develop exotic high-tech weapons.

"Titled 1-26, which was initiated in January 2000 ... this program
involves dual-use space and information technology, and exotic
weapons, such as miniaturized nano weapons," the report said, noting
that "unfortunately," U.S., European and Israeli technology is in use
in different aspects of the project.

The AFPC analysis said China was also working on "deception tactics"
designed to prohibit detection of its missiles by U.S. satellites.

Coming conflict?

Taiwanese leaders, the report said, also find it "significant" that
Beijing seems to be conditioning its population for an eventual war
with the democratic island nation.

"This includes such activities as a highly publicized mid-August air
raid drill in the Shanghai area -- the first such drill in 50 years,"
the report said.

Other analysts say that in order to avoid any such eventuality, the
U.S. must redouble its diplomatic efforts aimed at developing better
relations between Beijing and Washington, though most analysts believe
the road will not be smooth either way because of competing interests.

"Of all the bilateral relationships the United States will negotiate
in the coming decade, the most critical -- and complex -- is that with
the People's Republic of China," says a Brookings Institute report on
China diplomacy, released last fall.

The relationship between the U.S. and China "has been on a downward
slide since the mid-1990s, as the two sides have become increasingly
wary of one another's long-term intentions," the Brookings Institute
-- a liberal-leaning think tank based in Washington, D.C. -- said.

"Can a consistently stable relationship with China be expected?
Probably not. Most indicators point to a rocky road ahead, with many
potential detours into even worse conditions," said the Brookings
report, noting that "the stakes for regional stability and prosperity
that come from a China that is 'tied in,' rather than 'shut out,' are
too high to allow such challenges to slip into hostility,
confrontation, or even conflict."

The report recommends that the Bush administration put more of an
effort into fostering a better relationship with China than did the
Clinton administration.

Of China's military and technological advances, AFPC said those
"activities may not mean that Beijing is ready to immediately launch a
war to conquer Taiwan. However, the PLA's rapid advances do show that
China is serious in its professed claims to dominate the Asia-Pacific
region during the 21st century," which is "underscored by Beijing's
steadily increasing military budget" and quest to improve military
systems.

In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee July 19, 2000,
Bates Gill -- a senior Asian policy fellow for Brookings -- said
"acquisition" of better and more deadly weapons and technology does
not necessarily equate to "capability," adding that many U.S. analysts
often define the two as the same thing.

"It is easy to see and touch an Su-27, for example, and readily
recognize its potential," Gill said. "But noting its existence, while
important, does very little to inform us of how, when, and under what
conditions that weapon will be operated, how well it will operate,
what can be expected of it under combat conditions, and whether it
will be integrated to fight with other military assets."

Consequently, "our job should be to carefully analyze what potentiates
China's military modernization program," he said, adding that U.S.
analysts should put more effort into understanding "Chinese security
assessments, doctrinal shifts, operational planning, logistics
capacities, training regimens, command and control guidelines, and
technology absorption, assimilation, and diffusion."

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