Like Adding Wings to the Tiger: Chinese Information War Theory and Practice

[William Knowles <wk () C4I ORG>]

http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/chinaiw.htm

by: Mr. Timothy L. Thomas , Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort
Leavenworth, KS.

Introduction

During the past five years, numerous Chinese military and civilian
scholars published significant articles or longer works on information
war (IW) and related issues (networking, information theory,
simulations, etc.). An analysis of their works yields several
interesting results.[1] First, the Chinese feel a compelling need to
develop a specific Chinese IW theory. This theory must be in
accordance with Chinese culture, the economic and military situation
in the country, the perceived threat, and Chinese military philosophy
and terminology.

Second, Chinese IW theory is strongly influenced by Chinese military
art. China is quickly integrating IW theory into its Peoples War
concept, for example, a development ignored in the West but one with
far-reaching strategic and operational implications. It is also
considering the development of an independent net force branch of
service (to supplement the navy, army and air force), and potentially
looking at applying the 36 stratagems of war to IW methods. Third,
Chinese military science dictates that IW be divided into sub-elements
very different from those studied in the United States. These include
the forms, nature, features, distinctions, principles, types, circles,
and levels of IW. These subdivisions are similar to Russias IW
methodology, and result in diverse IW definitions and discussions as
compared with those in the West .

While a theory of IW with Chinese characteristics is developing,
turning theory into practice has proven more difficult. This is not
unusual since China is still developing the civilian and military
infrastructure to support their philosophy.[2] This article will
highlight key aspects of the Chinese specific approach to IW. It will
begin by discussing how the information age has affected Chinas
attitude toward warfare and the specific Chinese historical factors
affecting this interpretation. Next, Chinese IW definitions will be
discussed, and the training courses and organizational structures to
teach IW will be investigated. Finally, an examination will be made of
Chinas interpretation of IW activities during the fight for Kosovo,
and the most recent training exercises in its military regions that
try to turn theory into reality.

IW with Chinese Characteristics


How has the information age affected Chinas attitude toward warfare?
It is fair to say that the major change was a reevaluation of how to
evaluate and conduct warfare. China realized that it couldnt threaten
countries as a superpower might do with its current nuclear force, but
something it can do with its IW force. For example, China can
theoretically threaten U.S. financial stability through peacetime IW.
Electrons lie at the heart of not only IW but also the worldwide
economic boom associated with stock markets and e-commerce. The
characteristics of information (global reach, speed of light
transmission, nonlinear effects, inexhaustibility, multiple access,
etc.) control the material and energy of warfare in a way that nuclear
weapons cannot.[3] IW attempts to beat the enemy in terms of
promptness, correctness, and sustainability,[4] and electrons are
capable of reaching out and touching someone a long way away. It thus
makes complete sense to put a significant effort into developing an
information-based capability in both the civilian and military sense.
> From the Chinese point of view, IW is like adding wings to a tiger,
making the latter more combat worthy than ever before.

Recent reports of hacker attacks on U.S. labs indicate that China is
moving from theory to practice in security matters as well. The
Washington Times reported on 3 August 2000 that hackers suspected of
working for a Chinese government institute broke into a Los Alamos
computer system and took large amounts of sensitive but unclassified
information. Los Alamos spokesman Jim Danneskiold stated that an
enormous amount of Chinese activity hitting our green, open sites
occurs continuously.[5]

Targets of Chinese IW include information sources, channels, and
destinations,[6] and C4I and electronic warfare assets. First attack
objectives, some note, will be the computer networking system linking
political, economic and military installations of a country as well as
society in general; and the ability to control decision-making to
hinder coordinated actions. This requires that both cognitive and
information systems are hit.[7] This IW focus implies that not just
soldiers will conduct warfare in the future, but civilians too. Some
Chinese theorists have recommended organizing network special warfare
detachments and computer experts to form a shock brigade of network
warriors to accomplish this task. They will look for critical nodes
and control centers on networks, and sabotage them.[8] Thus both
computer experts and soldiers, a reflection of Chinas changing
attitude, may conduct warfare.

IW has also forced Chinese experts to reconsider how to compute the
correlation of forces. The Chinese believe that military strength can
no longer be calculated using the number of armored divisions, air
force wings, and aircraft carrier battle groups. In the information
age, invisible forces such as computing capabilities, communications
capacity, and system reliability must also be studied.[9]

[...]



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without communications is irrelevant." Gen Alfred. M. Gray, USMC
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