Re hacking voting machine vendors

["Dave Farber" <farber () gmail com>]

Begin forwarded message:

> From: Gordon Peterson <gep2 () terabites com>
> Date: March 31, 2018 at 11:48:37 AM GMT+9
> To: dave () farber net
> Subject: Re: [IP] hacking voting machine vendors
>
> I'm SO tired of nonsense from people (like talk show host Brad Friedman) who keep spouting idiotic, stupid BS about 
> how "hand marked, hand counted paper ballots" are the only reliable, trustworthy, robust and auditable voting 
> technology... OR that they are enough to achieve that.  NEITHER is true.
>
> First of all... when filling out hand marked paper ballots, PEOPLE MAKE MISTAKES.  They ambiguously mark their 
> ballots, they don't realize that voting a straight party ticket does NOT result in them voting in races where their 
> party might not have a candidate running, they don't realize how voting in one race affects another choice (like 
> cases for "vote for three out of this group of five").  They might not understand about propositions, bond issue 
> votes, and other issues.  A good touchscreen system for voting can call attention to races they missed voting on (in 
> case the undervote was not intentional), it can make sure that the vote is not illegal (like an overvote which will 
> get thrown away) or ambiguous.
>
> Once the voter has verified their choices are the way they want them, this first stage system should then PRINT an 
> UNAMBIGUOUSLY marked, HUMAN-READABLE, UNMODIFIABLE, hardcopy paper ballot.
>
> The user then verifies that this definitive printed paper ballot IS the way they wish to vote.
>
> Done correctly, NOBODY can later modify this paper ballot by surrepetitiously adding marks onto it after the voter 
> has checked it.  That is NOT true on hand-marked, hard-copy paper ballots.  It's impossible to later tell which marks 
> on such a hand-marked paper ballot were made by who!
>
> When the voter has verified the hardcopy version of their ballot, they slide it into the second-stage 
> scanner/counter/lockbox.
>
> When the polls close at the end of the day... both the first-stage and second-stage systems print independent results 
> tapes which reflect the ballots as printed, and the voter-verified-hardcopy-ballots as scanned.  The election judge 
> and their clerks sign each tape produced by each stage.
>
> When the judge drops off the results at the dropoff location that evening, they hand off most of the first and second 
> stage tapes to the county, or other official election authority.  BUT:  the judge also hands a printed copy of both 
> the first stage and second stage result tapes DIRECTLY to a member of (at least) both of the Republican, AND the 
> Democratic party.
>
> Each of these THREE recipient groups can INDEPENDENTLY confirm that the first and second stage results agree.
>
> Each of these THREE recipient groups can INDEPENDENTLY tally the results, both city-wide, county-wide, and state-wide 
> (and even nation-wide).  This prevents tampering with the vote totals by any officials involved with the election.  
> Any discrepancies found in the totals can be investigated and resolved/confirmed, including if necessary by 
> re-examining the definitive, machine-printed, voter-verified, UNAMBIGUOUSLY marked, hardcopy paper ballots.
>
> And some percentage of the randomly chosen paper ballots can and should be hand-counted to confirm that the counts 
> agree with the printed results tapes... just to be sure.
> Note that it is VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE for ANY hacker,  ANYWHERE,       to tamper with these votes.  Through the 
> Internet, through the tallying systems, the voting machine manufacturer, or whatever.  The voter has verified their 
> indelibly marked paper ballot;  the counts from both stages must agree, and three separate and independent 
> organizations have parallel-tallied the results.
>
> The rubbish about insisting on "hand-marked, hand-counted paper ballots" does NOT address, nor does it solve, many of 
> these issues.
>
> So whenever we hear this idiotic crap from Brad Friedman, or the gullible folks who believe his nonsense, we need to 
> call them on it, and point out just how they've been deceived.
>
>
> And as a second point, note that mailed-in paper ballots, and Internet voting, is INHERENTLY flawed because it is 
> IMPOSSIBLE to guarantee that nobody (in some position of power) is looking over the voter's shoulder, or otherwise 
> making sure that they're voting "the right way"... maybe selling their vote, for money, sex, drugs, alcohol, or 
> whatever.  Those voting methods should NOT EVER be allowed other than in VERY well-justified individual cases (e.g. a 
> voter who is on extended holiday abroad or something).
>
>
>
> On 3/30/2018 5:10 PM, Dave Farber wrote:
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> > > From: "J.M. Porup" <jm () porup com>
> > > Date: March 31, 2018 at 2:05:30 AM GMT+9
> > > To: farber () gmail com
> > > Subject: hacking voting machine vendors
> > >
> > > Hi Dave,
> > >
> > > For IP, if you wish...
> > >
> > > Want to hack a voting machine? Hack the voting machine vendor first
> > > https://www.csoonline.com/article/3267625/security/want-to-hack-a-voting-machine-hack-the-voting-machine-vendor-first.html
> > >
> > >    Thousands of voting machine vendor employees' work emails and
> > >    plaintext passwords appear in freely available third-party data breach
> > >    dumps reviewed by CSO, raising questions about the security of voting
> > >    machines and the integrity of past election results.
> > >
> > > best,
> > > jmp
> > >
> > > -- 
> > > J.M. Porup
> > > www.JMPorup.com



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