Interesting People mailing list archives
Re What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible? - Lawfare
From: "Dave Farber" <farber () gmail com>
Date: Sun, 2 Dec 2018 15:41:33 +0900
Begin forwarded message:
From: Herb Lin <herblin () stanford edu> Date: December 2, 2018 15:25:49 JST To: "dave () farber net" <dave () farber net>, ip <ip () listbox com> Cc: "ross.stapletongray () gmail com" <ross.stapletongray () gmail com> Subject: RE: [IP] Re What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible? - Lawfare Here’s the industry event to which Ross refers (https://youtu.be/tH7pHJAO1t8). Ross is right that I said some things that were said during the Clipper debate. That’s because some of the things said in favor of Clipper were valid. That doesn’t mean that Clipper was a good idea. If someone wants to challenge me on something specific that I said during that talk, I’m happy to engage in that discussion. That includes Ross, by the way. The short version of what I said – or what I was trying to say, in any case—was that the technical debate is over as far as I am concerned – I fully accept the conclusion that it is impossible to develop an encryption system with exceptional access that is as secure as one without it. But the advocates of responsible encryption are asking for something else—they are asking for the most secure system possible subject to the constraint that exceptional access is possible. Whatever system comes out of that process *will* be less secure than what is possible without exceptional access. Whether the diminished security is or is not worth the benefits to law enforcement is a policy question, not a technical question. Advocates of exceptional access say “yes”, privacy advocates say “no.” Both are reasonable answers, but neither should pretend that their judgments are technically based—they are policy judgments. For myself, I note that policy judgments – unlike technical conclusions – are necessarily made in the particular societal and political circumstances extant at the moment of that judgment, and so anyone making a policy judgment ought to take those circumstances into account. I confess to being surprised at Ross’s assertion that I am “fine with the potential to arm fascists in the information age,” which is as close to an ad hominem attack as I’ve ever heard him make on me or anyone else. If intellectual honesty is part of the that potential, then I regret that I have to plead guilty. But by the same token, I think that anyone who works to develop better information technology also has to plead guilty, since it’s impossible to make information technology unusable by fascists. Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin () stanford edu Twitter @HerbLinCyber From: Dave Farber <farber () gmail com> Sent: December 1, 2018 7:27 PM To: ip <ip () listbox com> Subject: [IP] Re What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible? - Lawfare Begin forwarded message: From: Ross Stapleton-Gray <ross.stapletongray () gmail com> Date: December 2, 2018 10:46:39 JST To: DAVID FARBER <dave () farber net> Subject: Re: [IP] Re What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible? - Lawfare On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 5:38 PM Dave Farber <farber () gmail com> wrote: Haven’t we been around this idea many many times like Clipper chip etc Is there no memory in the system? We have been. There's just a dogged persistence among those who would like the first-order job of the government knowing things for control to be easy. I heard Herb Lin speak on this at an industry event, and it was like Clipper all over again. Stu Baker similarly. I'm not exactly sure what drives either, as Baker hasn't been working for the NSA for decades, and Herb is at Stanford. But both are fine with the potential to arm fascists in the information age. Meanwhile, I'm back looking for work, as Rocket Lawyer (which had been a fascinating four months) seems to be imploding, and let a lot of us go. But the market is great... I've got a site interview with a Kleiner-backed tech-start up in a week, and interviews for a privacy engineer position with a major non-profit. But ideas for where else to look always solicited gratefully! Ross Archives | Modify Your Subscription | Unsubscribe Now
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- Re What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible? - Lawfare Dave Farber (Dec 01)
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- Re What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible? - Lawfare Dave Farber (Dec 01)
- Re What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible? - Lawfare Dave Farber (Dec 01)
- Re What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible? - Lawfare Dave Farber (Dec 01)
- Re What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible? - Lawfare Dave Farber (Dec 02)
- Re What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible? - Lawfare Dave Farber (Dec 02)
- Re What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible? - Lawfare Dave Farber (Dec 03)