Will Bioterror Fears Spawn Science Censorship?

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Date: April 30, 2007 10:21:15 AM EDT
To: dave () farber net
Cc: lauren () vortex com
Subject: Re: [IP] Will Bioterror Fears Spawn Science Censorship?


Dave,

I am reminded of an early Isaac Asimov short story first published
in 1956 called "The Dead Past" -- about actually quite laudable (at
least in principle) broad government attempts to suppress and
control research, and how they resulted in a technological disaster
triggered unintentionally by a dedicated academic.

In the story, Asimov noted the ease with which even a few copies of
forbidden material could be distributed through academic
publications, making "putting the genie back into the bottle" nearly
impossible.  He didn't even need to invoke more modern communications
technologies (like Internet-type concepts) which vastly simplify the
ease of distribution and the difficulty of genie re-bottling.

It is understandable that there would be -- as there always have
been, throughout human history -- calls to control certain
technological and other information that could be considered to be,
and often really are, potentially dangerous.  But history also
teaches us that such attempts nearly always fail in the long run, and
often in the short run as well.

This suggests that such efforts may be more political than realistic
in the final analysis.

--Lauren--
Lauren Weinstein
lauren () vortex com or lauren () pfir org
Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800
http://www.pfir.org/lauren
Co-Founder, PFIR
   - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org
Co-Founder, IOIC
   - International Open Internet Coalition - http://www.ioic.net
Founder, CIFIP
   - California Initiative For Internet Privacy - http://www.cifip.org
Founder, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com
Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy
Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com
DayThink: http://daythink.vortex.com

 - - -

> Begin forwarded message:
>
> From: Richard Forno <rforno () infowarrior org>
> Date: April 29, 2007 6:21:26 PM EDT
> To: Infowarrior List <infowarrior () attrition org>, Dave Farber
> <dave () farber net>
> Subject: Will Bioterror Fears Spawn Science Censorship?
>
> Will Bioterror Fears Spawn Science Censorship?
> 04.25.07 | 2:00 AM
> http://www.wired.com/print/politics/onlinerights/commentary/
> circuitcourt/200
> 7/04/circuitcourt_0425
>
> Since September 11th, people have been increasingly worried about the
> misuse
> of legitimate scientific research to create dangerous weapons or to
> bypass
> security measures. Now a federal advisory board is about to recommend
> new
> guidelines to limit publication of life-sciences research that  
> could be
> misused by terrorists. I think it's treading on dangerous ground.
>
> Last Thursday, a draft of the rules was formally adopted by the  
> National
> Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, or NSABB, at a meeting in
> Bethesda,
> Maryland. The draft proposes voluntary compliance by scientists,
> universities and journals, but leaves open the possibility of federal
> legislation to turn the guidelines into law. Indeed, it almost
> invites that
> result by supporting application of the NSABB recommendations to
> researchers
> that do not receive federal funds -- a result that can only be  
> achieved
> through regulation.
>
> As a lawyer for computer security researchers, it is impossible to
> regard
> this prospect with anything but dread. For example, the proposal  
> (.pdf)
> broadly defines "dual use research of concern" as any "research that,
> based
> on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide
> knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly
> misapplied by
> others to pose a threat to public health and safety, agriculture,
> plants,
> animals, the environment, or materiel."
>
> That's a perfectly reasonable description of an article or paper  
> worth a
> closer look before publication. But if this language becomes a
> statute that
> prohibits publication under some circumstances, the author risks
> criminal
> prosecution if law enforcement disagrees with a scientist,  
> university or
> peer-review publication's decision that the research should be
> published.
>
> And, legally, I'd find it extremely difficult to advise the author
> with any
> certainty whether publishing the research is lawful or not. Whose
> "current
> understanding" applies? What does "reasonably anticipated" mean?  
> When is
> research "directly" misapplied, or merely indirectly used? How much  
> of a
> risk "poses a threat"?
>
> The NSABB draft also sets out a procedure to follow once a  
> scientist has
> identified research of concern. Instead of outright suppression in  
> every
> case, the proposal suggests a risk/benefit analysis, which can result
> in a
> variety of options for communicating the research to the public.
>
> This seems flexible and case-specific, which again, is great in a
> guideline,
> but terrible when you are trying to advise a client how to avoid the
> risk of
> jail. We know that reasonable scientists can and do disagree about  
> these
> things. What do prosecutors, judges and juries think?
>
> Rejecting new regulation doesn't mean we have to be subject to the
> whims of
> bioterrorists. Voluntary self-regulation, ethical training, peer
> review and
> additional practices currently followed by recombinant DNA  
> researchers,
> microbiologists and other scientists all have a track record of
> success. And
> smart federal laws can control access to pathogens -- and prohibit
> dangerous
> practices -- while steering clear of restricting scientific
> publications.
>
> Until recently, U.S. policy has been to allow the publication of
> information, with only narrow controls on classified information.
> Then, in
> 2002, the president signed the National Security Act, which requires
> federal
> agencies to create procedures to protect "sensitive but unclassified"
> knowledge. The statute is unclear about whether these procedures
> should take
> the form of voluntary guidelines, or regulations with the force of
> law, and
> whether they'll apply outside of federal agencies. But the NSABB  
> report
> appears to be part of the effort to craft such procedures.
>
> The scientists on the board have good reasons for wanting to be
> involved in
> crafting the guidelines. They want to stop terrorists, and they  
> take the
> dangers from dual-use research seriously. They also want to protect  
> the
> scientific process, and they believe correctly that if regulation is
> going
> to happen, it would be much, much better if scientists were involved.
>
> Once such scientist is NSABB board member David A. Relman, M.D.,
> associate
> professor of medicine, microbiology and immunology at Stanford
> University
> School of Medicine. He told me about a 2004 addition to federal law
> which
> criminalizes possession of the smallpox virus. Unfortunately, the
> statute
> defines the pathogen as any virus that contains 85 percent or greater
> sequence similarity to smallpox, effectively outlawing a whole range
> of pox
> viruses, including the smallpox vaccine. The maximum penalty for
> violating
> the law is a fine of $2 million dollars and 25 years in prison.
>
> Doctor Relman views his role on the NSABB as helping the government
> avoid a
> similar kind of mistake in the future. He and his colleagues are
> doing us a
> service by participating, but they have to be extremely careful that
> their
> work is not used to legitimize regulation. Any guidelines should be
> crystal
> clear that they are good only as that -- guidelines.
>
> If the NSABB is not careful, its well-balanced recommendations may
> become a
> precursor for abandoning voluntary self-regulation in favor of federal
> regulation of scientists. Once we have regulations, we will also have
> penalties for non-compliance. At that point, the only question left
> will be
> how much scientific self-determination remains.
>
> - - -
>
> Jennifer Granick is executive director of the Stanford Law School
> Center for
> Internet and Society and teaches the Cyberlaw Clinic.
>
>
>
>
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