Interesting People mailing list archives

The LSE Report on the proposed UK ID Card schem


From: David Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2005 13:43:47 -0400



Begin forwarded message:

From: Brian Randell <Brian.Randell () newcastle ac uk>
Date: July 5, 2005 11:10:22 AM EDT
To: dave () farber net
Subject: The LSE Report on the proposed UK ID Card schem


Dave:

The parliamentary committee stage of UK Government's Identity Card Bill starts today, so there has been a lot more on radio and TV and in the newspapers about it, though the general consensus is that the Government's plans will be much more at risk when the debate reaches the House of Lords.

Much of the public debate has been fuelled by the report that has been very recently-released by the London School of Economics, but the main focus has been on cost estimates. What has not been evident to me before is how detailed the LSE Report is, and in particular, that it is not just a critique of the Government's scheme, but that it also "considers alternative models for an identity card scheme that may achieve the goals of the legislation more effectively."

I don't recall seeing anything on IP which pointed to the actual detailed report.

Anyway, here is the (318-page) full report:

http://is.lse.ac.uk/idcard/identityreport.pdf

and here is a (10-page) Exec Summary:

http://is.lse.ac.uk/idcard/identitysummary.pdf

in which one can find the following one page Summary of Conclusions:

The Report concludes that the establishment of a secure national identity system has the potential to create significant, though limited, benefits for society. However, the proposals currently being considered by Parliament are neither safe nor appropriate. There was an overwhelming view expressed by stakeholders involved in this Report that the proposals are too complex, technically unsafe, overly prescriptive and lack a foundation of public trust and confidence. The current proposals miss key opportunities to establish a secure, trusted and cost-effective identity system and the Report therefore considers alternative models for an identity card scheme that may achieve the goals of the legislation more effectively. The concept of a national identity system is
supportable, but the current proposals are not feasible.
Many of the public interest objectives of the Bill would be more effectively achieved by other means. For example, preventing identity theft may be better addressed by giving individuals greater control over the disclosure of their own personal information, while prevention of terrorism may be more effectively managed through strengthened border patrols and increased presence at borders, or allocating adequate resources for
conventional police intelligence work.
The technology envisioned for this scheme is, to a large extent, untested and unreliable. No scheme on this scale has been undertaken anywhere in the world. Smaller and less ambitious systems have encountered substantial technological and operational problems that are likely to be amplified in a large-scale, national system. The use of biometrics gives rise to particular concern because this technology has never been used at such a
scale.
We estimate the likely cost of the ten-year rollout of the proposed identity cards scheme will be between £10.6 billion and £19.2 billion, with a median of £14.5 billion. This figure does not include public or private sector integration costs, nor does it take into
account possible cost overruns.
Any system that supports critical security functions must be robust and resilient to malicious attacks. Because of its size and complexity, the identity system would require security measures at a scale that will result in substantially higher implementation and operational costs than has been estimated. The proposed use of the system for a variety of purposes, and access to it from a large number of private and public sector
organisations will require unprecedented attention to security.
All identity systems carry consequential dangers as well as potential benefits. Depending on the model used, identity systems may create a range of new and unforeseen problems. These include the failure of systems, unforeseen financial costs, increased security threats and unacceptable imposition on citizens. The success of a national identity system depends on a sensitive, cautious and cooperative approach involving all key stakeholder groups including an independent and rolling risk assessment and a regular review of management practices. We are not confident that these conditions have been satisfied in the development of the Identity Cards Bill. The risk of failure in the current proposals is therefore magnified to the point where the scheme should be regarded as a potential danger to the public interest and to the legal
rights of individuals.

cheers

Brian


--
School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne,
NE1 7RU, UK
EMAIL = Brian.Randell () ncl ac uk   PHONE = +44 191 222 7923
FAX = +44 191 222 8232  URL = http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/~brian.randell/


-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as lists-ip () insecure org
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/


Current thread: