THE TRUSTED OFFICE OF THE FUTURE -- 1984

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

                TITLE:
                    THE TRUSTED OFFICE OF THE FUTURE
                   Compcon  '84


               AUTHORS:
                    Prof. David J. Farber, University of Delaware
                    Peter G. von Glahn, University of Delaware
                    Stephen T. Walker, Trusted Information Systems, Inc.


               ABSTRACT:


                    Several studies have examined the character of the
               office of the future.  They generally looked at handling
               routine information and at general information 
processing.
               In any real office, however, a certain amount of non-
               routine, sensitive information must also be handled.
               Personnel, financial, patent-related, or proprietary
               corporate information as well as government classified
               information fall into this latter category.  We believe 
that
               it is possible and desirable to handle this non-routine
               information using the same computer tools as are used to
               handle routine matters.  This paper describes an
               architecture and a family of tools that allow information
               with varying sensitivities to be thus handled.


                    We assume that organizations and offices of the 
future
               will not be too different from those of today. Human 
beings
               will run these offices using procedures not far removed 
from
               today's.  We assume that this future office will be fully
               computerized and that everyone will have his or her 
personal
               computer.  All the personal computers will be linked
               together with a local computer network.  Certain 
resources
               (e.g., large file stores, printers, high speed 
computational
               engines) will still be expensive in the future thus, 
sharing
               them among many users will be common.  This sharing will
               take place using the same network that links the personal
               computers.  Since neither the common resources nor the
               computer networks will be cheap, using one system to 
handle
               both routine and sensitive information will be common.  
This
               integrated system use will make the computers more
               acceptable to users and management.  (In fact, personal
               computers and office networks may not be accepted until 
this
               can be done.) Rather than invent new procedures for 
handling
               this mix of material, we propose to extend current office
               information-handling practice into what we call the 
Trusted
               Office of the Future.


                    We base our Trusted Office of the Future on a
               distributed network architecture made up of personal
               computers and isolated specialized servers linked 
together
               with a local computer network.  We feel that such an
               architecture can be made safe for use with sensitive
               information and is capable of growth as needs change.  
This
               safety can be provided by integrating security-related
               features into each member of the network.  Since each 
member
               can be trusted to deal with sensitive information 
properly,
               we call our system the Trusted Office System.


                    We anticipate that each worker in the office of the
               future will have his or her own Personal Work Place
               connected to the office computer network.  The Personal 
Work
               Place, we envision, will be a dedicated 
microprocessor-based
               personal computer or workstation with built-in user
               interfaces and mass storage.  It will provide the tools 
and
               local storage the worker needs to do his or her work.  We
               assume that workers dealing with sensitive materials are
               trusted to do their jobs properly and maintain security
               since they can be held accountable for their actions.
               Therefore, they will be free to manipulate both routine 
and
               sensitive information within their Personal Work Place as
               required.  Embedded within the Personal Work Place will 
be a
               hardware/software module we call the Private Secretary.  
The
               Private Secretary will handle security functions as well 
as
               provide the network interface for the Personal Work 
Place.


                    Besides Personal Work Places, a collection of 
servers
               will reside on the network. These will be single purpose
               computers, each with a hardware/software module similar 
to
               the Private Secretary to handle security.  Archival 
storage
               will be handled by file servers.  Hard copy printout 
will be
               handled by a print server augmented by a personnel
               identification module (to validate a user's 
identification
               prior to delivering sensitive material to him or her).
               Computational servers will handle database and number-
               crunching functions on a single-user-at-a-time basis (to
               eliminate security problems associated with multiple 
users).
               A security server will handle system security
               administration.  Since we assume the existence of 
multiple
               offices, each with its own local network, an office 
gateway
               server will handle interoffice traffic. It will provide
               security encapsulation and routing for this traffic.  It
               will also maintain a local user directory to process
               incoming interoffice communications.


                    This paper is divided into four sections. The first
               expands on our assumptions about the environment of the
               office of future.  The second gives an overview of 
current
               (non-computerized) office practice for handling a mix of
               routine and sensitive material.  The next section 
suggests
               an extension of this practice into the office of the 
future.
               The final section presents our thoughts on how such a
               Trusted Office of the Future could be realized.

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