Dvorak on eVoting: True Audit

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Barry Ritholtz <ritholtz () optonline net>
Date: November 4, 2004 6:49:09 AM EST
To: Dave Farber <dave () farber net>
Subject: Dvorak on eVoting: True Audit

Hey Dave,

PC Magazine columnist John C. Dvorak has some good common sense advice  
regarding the future of eVotiing . . .



Barry L. Ritholtz
Chief Market Strategist
Maxim Group
britholtz () maximgrp com
(212) 895-3614
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Big Picture:  A blog of capital markets, geopolitics, with a dash  
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http://bigpicture.typepad.com/comments/




True audit of the Diebold machine
Commentary: Easy to use, but threats remain

By John C. Dvorak
Last Update: 8:29 PM ET Nov. 2, 2004   
http://cbs.marketwatch.com/news/story.asp? 
dist=&param=archive&siteid=google&guid=%7B0DBD4D54%2D61F1%2D4C35%2DB66C% 
2D3B82871D4C47%7D&garden=&minisite=

SAN FRANCISCO (CBS.MW) -- This is the second election in which I voted  
via the Diebold voting machine. In my community here in Northern  
California, we are asked what method we'd like to use -- paper or  
computerized voting machine. I, like everyone else in the room, chose  
the computer.

This is despite the fact that people are fearful that an election can  
be rigged with the machines. I also do not see the system as foolproof,  
but I'm certain that with a simple fix it can be close to perfect.

When I went in to vote I immediately studied the current methodology.  
The process begins with the voter being handed a smart card that  
appears to be reset by a precinct worker with a small hand held device.

When inserted into the Diebold machine, made by North Canton,  
Ohio-based Diebold Inc. the machine sees this fresh card and begins the  
voting process. The software is outstanding and the equipment very  
usable. It's easy to change votes and you get a full review at the end  
of the process. After you finalize your vote the small smart card is  
released. The votes are accumulated at a base station and there is data  
redundancy in case the power goes down, or whatever.

That said I still see weaknesses in this system that need fixing. To  
begin with, the smart card basis for starting the machine seems weak. I  
imagine scenarios where a smart card reset system is stolen and a voter  
resets the cards a few times and votes over and over.

The vote count, of course, must be compared to the voter tally kept at  
the front desk. If 400 people show up to vote there should be 400  
votes, not 403. But if there are indeed 403, then what happens? An  
audit can take place, but there is no real way to resolve this sort of  
thing.

A corrupt precinct could easy knock up the votes too, but this can be  
done with any methodology, so it's not any easier with the computer.

But this is all nickel-and-dime cheating. What the computer offers is  
the opportunity to steal or fake thousands and thousand of votes all at  
once through a clever hack. While I find the possibility of this  
happening during this election remote, I can see it happening in the  
future. And this is where the danger lies in computerized voting  
machines. Once they are established and once they work well (like this  
time) they will become commonplace. And the longer they are commonplace  
the more exposure they have to hackers and cheats.

The key to making sure that this doesn't happen is a new auditing  
methodology since there is no longer a paper trail. And, in fact, with  
today's computer technology this should be easy and Diebold and the  
other makers of these machines should consider my proposition, which  
I'll outline here.

It would quite simple for the computer to assign a numerical value to  
all the possible iterations that could be extrapolated from any ballot  
no matter how long.

So here is the scenario. A person would cast his or her vote. At the  
end a small two-part slip of paper would be printed from a small  
bar-code printer hooked to the machine or even a more centralized  
printer.

The small print-out would have a voter receipt on one half and a bar  
code on the other that would represent the votes cast by the voter. The  
voter would tear this in half and place the bar code in a ballot box  
and keep the other half.

There would be a bar-code reader in the room to validate the votes if  
the voter was concerned about accuracy. The sealed ballot box  
containing all the bar-coded little pieces of paper would be the paper  
trail and final back up for serious audits of districts.

It would only be used for recounts, catastrophic system failures and  
spot checks as needed. Most of the time, it would never be looked at.  
But it would be there just in case. Currently there is no paper trail  
and with computers it's needed badly.

If Diebold and the other companies are smart they'll add this  
inexpensive feature and allow everyone to sleep just a little better at  
night, knowing that the cheaters can't as easily cheat.


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