more on The Columbia space shuttle accident report

[Dave Farber <dave () farber net>]

Delivered-To: dfarber+ () ux13 sp cs cmu edu
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2003 08:39:14 -0700 (PDT)
From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <jhall () SIMS Berkeley EDU>
Subject: Re: [IP] The Columbia space shuttle accident report
To: Dave Farber <dave () farber net>
Cc: Andreas Ramos <andreas () andreas com>


On Sun, 19 Oct 2003, Andreas Ramos <andreas () andreas com> wrote:

> NASA managers, with their demand to stick to the schedule, their
> refusal to listen to the engineers, and using threats of reprimands
> against engineers who spoke up, caused the loss of the shuttle and
> the deaths of the astronauts.

I would say it's more complicated than that, and I'd be quite
surprised to find that wording in the CAIB report.

You both (and perhaps the IP list) would likely be interested in
reading a forthcoming paper of mine in the November issue of Space
Policy (most of this paper was written in May):


Columbia & Challenger: Organizational Failure at NASA
http://pobox.com/~joehall/papers/nasa.pdf

Abstract:

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)as the global
leader in all areas of spaceflight and space science is a unique
organization in terms of size, mission, constraints, complexity and
motivations. NASAs flagship endeavor--human spaceflight--is extremely
risky and one of the most complicated tasks undertaken by man. It is
well accepted that the tragic destruction of the Space Shuttle
Challenger on 28 January 1986 was the result of organizational
failure. The surprising disintegration of the Space Shuttle Columbia
in February 2003--nearly 17 years to the day after Challenger--was a
shocking reminder of how seemingly innocuous details play important
roles in risky systems and organizations. NASA as an organization has
changed considerably over the 42 years of its existence. If it is
serious about minimizing failure and promoting its mission, perhaps
the most intense period of organizational change lies in its immediate
future.  This paper outlines some of the critical features of NASAs
organization and organizational change, namely path dependence and
normalization of deviance. Subsequently, it reviews the rationale
behind calling the Challenger tragedy an organizational failure.
Finally, it argues that the recent Columbia accident displays
characteristics of organizational failure and proposes recommendations
for the future.

-----------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
Graduate Student                        http://pobox.com/~joehall

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