"Perception management"

[Dave Farber <dave () farber net>]

Delivered-To: dfarber+ () ux13 sp cs cmu edu
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2003 17:16:34 -0400
From: Mohammad Al-Ubaydli <mo () mo md>

Dear Dave,
for the IP List, if you wish, I found this article from the journal NATO 
Review.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art4.html>

I greatly enjoyed reading it because it introduced me to the term 
"perception management", my new favorite euphemism. I'm guessing it came 
from the same experts who decided to rename revenge as "reciprocity".

The article includes a rather candid discussion of the US efforts at such 
management in the Middle East. It includes a mention of new government 
bodies that have "put in place the most coordinated, best-funded, US 
strategic perception-management structure since the 1980s. It is focused on 
the Islamic world and has funding of more than US$750 million for the 
Middle East alone." I wonder how much of the 87 billion budget for 
rebuilding Iraq is earmarked for such purposes. I've copied the first part 
of the article below, but I'm also adding a little background on Radio 
Sawa, a station that the author of the article is very impressed with.

I first heard the station on a visit to Bahrain in December. The country's 
population makes for a very small market, and the state media have 
dominated the FM stations. So it seems that most of the broadcasters have a 
political connection - including a rather educational station by and for US 
military personnel.

Radio Sawa is a recent entrant to the region, and I found it by chance when 
searching for some modern Arabic / English music. After a while though I 
found it more entertaining to hear the listener polls. They include 
questions like "Would you work for a female boss" and answers from some 
uncomfortable sounding men. Sometime around the question "Can there be too 
much free speech" I understood that the station had American funding. No 
doubt people who live in the region throughout the year would have spotted 
this link earlier than I did.

It's a fun station to listen to, but I do think that US taxpayers' money 
could be spent better. The Middle East's citizens do not need an American 
radio station subtly introducing debate about American values - we are 
already having these debates with far less subtlety. Even Saudi Arabians 
know that they must allow women more rights and introduce democracy.

For the majority of Arabs, the disagreement with America centers on its 
foreign policy, not its liberal democracy. It is naive and 
counter-productive to ignore these issues in dialogue with the people of 
the region. Before the war, British and American government representatives 
regularly appeared on Al-Jazeera, a channel that prides itself on 
displaying both sides of every debate. With the build-up of the war, 
however, these representatives stopped appearing. During the war, 
Al-Jazeera journalists were killed by American soldiers. And after the war, 
Al-Jazeera journalists are harassed in Iraq.

Furthermore Arab viewers still watch CNN as well as Al-Jazeera to get more 
coverage.

By contrast American mainstream media are remarkably one-sided and 
jingoistic in their coverage. A while back on the IP List you showed the 
effect of this on Americans, many of whom were completely uninformed about 
the war, its motives and its outcomes.

So the author of the article is missing the point by a wide margin when he 
says that "An Arab viewer who finds the reporting on CNN to be contrary to 
his own news bias can switch to al Jazeera, the Arabic satellite news 
channel, and see a perspective of the world perhaps more consistent with 
his own."

Or perhaps the statement is part of perception management....

mohammad

Dr Mohammad Al-Ubaydli
e mo () mo md
w www.mo.m

=================================================================
Mind games

Lieutenant-Colonel Steven Collins assesses the Coalition's 
perception-management operations before, during and after Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and their implications for NATO.

In the coming months and years, analysts will no doubt examine every aspect 
of the 27-day period from the attempt to decapitate the Iraqi regime on 20 
March to the fall of Tikrit on 15 April to draw as many lessons from it as 
possible. One area worthy of attention with clear implications for NATO is 
the way in which the Coalition sought to influence the attitudes and 
reasoning of foreign audiences and especially those in Iraq in the run-up 
to, during and after Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Both Operation Iraqi Freedom and NATO’s own experiences in the Balkans have 
shown the importance of so-called "Perception Management". They have 
highlighted the necessity of developing the means to exploit this aspect of 
power, while taking measures to protect against its use by the enemy and 
other asymmetric political and military capabilities. As NATO re-organises 
its military structure and takes on missions beyond its traditional areas, 
such capabilities are becoming increasingly important to Alliance operations.

Perception management includes all actions used to influence the attitudes 
and objective reasoning of foreign audiences and consists of Public 
Diplomacy, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Public Information, Deception 
and Covert Action. Of special interest in the case of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom are public diplomacy, the deliberate attempt to persuade foreign 
audiences of the content and wisdom of one's policies, intentions and 
actions, and PSYOPS, the use of activities, predominantly media, to 
influence and persuade foreign audiences.

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States has 
sought to revamp its public-diplomacy capabilities. These had been allowed 
to atrophy during the 1990s as Washington had not felt the same need to 
explain its policies globally and build up international good will as it 
had during the Cold War. Today, the White House Office of Global 
Communications provides top-level direction for efforts designed to create 
an overall positive perception of US policy and defence activities. And the 
US National Security Council Policy Group coordinates the policies and 
messages developed by the White House between it, the State Department's 
Office of Public Diplomacy and the Pentagon. Together, these bodies have 
put in place the most coordinated, best-funded, US strategic 
perception-management structure since the 1980s. It is focused on the 
Islamic world and has funding of more than US$750 million for the Middle 
East alone.

Despite this massive effort, there was little demonstrated success in US 
public-diplomacy efforts prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell’s 78-minute speech to the UN Security Council broadcast 
live around the world on 5 February failed to convince representatives from 
the key nations on the Security Council — France, Germany, and Russia — 
that military action needed to be taken immediately against Iraq. By 
contrast, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin’s subsequent speech 
before the United Nations, casting doubt on every aspect of Secretary 
Powell’s presentation, was greeted with cheers and wild applause. As a 
result, the United Kingdom and United States made little headway in gaining 
support among their traditional allies, and a second UN Security Council 
Resolution authorising military action against Iraq was never put to a 
vote, as it was obvious it would fail to garner the required support.

Within the Islamic world, US public-diplomacy activities have to date 
failed to generate much return. Immediate, positive results may be 
impossible to achieve. Effective public diplomacy takes a sustained effort 
and a long-term view. For the foreseeable future, as Osama Sibliani, the 
publisher of Arab American News noted: “The United States could have the 
Prophet Muhammad doing public relations and it wouldn’t help.” One 
instrument with a great deal of promise for the future could be Radio Sawa 
(Radio Together), a US Congress-funded station covering the Arab world and 
featuring both Arab and Western pop music, interspersed with news from a US 
perspective. Within months of its debut in 2002, Radio Sawa's advocates 
announced that it was one of the most popular radio stations among young Arabs.

During the conduct of the military campaign, the Coalition attempted 
favourably to shape the world-wide perception of the conflict by a variety 
of measures, including that of "embedding" reporters with military units 
scheduled to deploy. Although initially controversial, the decision to 
embed was, in retrospect, a brilliant move for several reasons. First, 
reporters who wanted to be embedded were forced to undergo a mandatory 
mini-boot camp, which gave many their first appreciation of the challenges 
faced by the average soldier. Second, embedding created an inevitable bond 
between reporters and the units they covered. And third, embedding made 
sense because it ensured the safety of the reporters and gave the world its 
first "real-time coverage" of a battlefield. Because of the fluid nature of 
Iraqi Freedom, many more reporters would likely have been killed and 
captured had they been allowed to roam the battlefield freely.

[snip]
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art4.html>

-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as interesting-people () lists elistx com
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/