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R. James Woolsey on The War On Terrorism
From: Dave Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 06:55:53 -0400
------ Forwarded Message From: Foreign Policy Research Institute <fpri () fpri org> Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 05:32:19 -0400 To: David Farber <dave () farber net> Subject: R. James Woolsey on The War On Terrorism Foreign Policy Research Institute A Catalyst for Ideas www.fpri.org E-Notes Distributed Exclusively via Fax & Email R. James Woolsey on The War on Terrorism October 10, 2002 This lecture, delivered on October 1 in Philadelphia, was established in 2002 by the Pitcairn Trust (http://www.pitcairn.com), one of the leading private investment concerns in America. Mr. Woolsey served as Director of Central Intelligence (1993-95). He has enjoyed a distinguished career, both in public service and in private legal practice. His career in government service has included high-level positions in two Republican and two Democratic administrations. THE WAR ON TERRORISM The Pitcairn Trust Lecture in World Affairs Summary of Remarks by The Honorable R. James Woolsey Mr. Woolsey began by stating his conviction that the war on terrorism was the successor to the three World Wars of the Twentieth Century (the third being the Cold War). He agreed with Professor Eliot Cohen that this was a global struggle. It would be long and hard but hopefully not as long as the Cold War. The former CIA Director then described the "enemy" (those at war with the United States) an enemy we did not fully recognize until after September 11th. The first consisted of the Islamist Shia that constitute the ruling circle in Iran. Their campaign, begun by the Ayatollah Khomeini, had already lasted nearly twenty-five years and exacted heavy casualties, such as the Beirut bombings (1983) and Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia (1995). Their part in this war, however, depended on politics in Iran, where the Islamist clerical regime was struggling to maintain control. The second consisted of the fascist regimes, the Baath parties ruling in Syria and Iraq that now combined a fascist party structure, originally secular, with a patina of Islamism. The Iraqi animus dated to the Gulf War a decade ago and, indeed, the Gulf War had never really ended given Saddam's violation of the cease-fire terms, especially his retention of longer-range rockets, chemical-biological weapons, and his search for nuclear capability. The third comprised Sunni Islamists. Such groups as al- Qaeda had become active against us in the mid-1990's and were a merger in a sense of long-standing movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt) and the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia. There was a history of such movements in the Arab portion of the Islamic world, often in reaction against foreign presence: Mongol, Ottoman, European or American. The most recent manifestation had been boosted since 1979 when, after Khomeini's accession in Iran and the battle over the Grand Mosque in Mecca at a cost of 4,000 casualties, the Saudi royals had given much more license and resources to Wahhabi activities abroad. Mr. Woolsey asked the audience to imagine the Spain of Ferdinand and Isabela possessing twenty-five per cent of the world's oil and giving Torquemada and the Inquisition license to spread their doctrines abroad, preaching hate for Jews, Christians and those who disagreed with them. These three groups of American enemies, somewhat like Mafia families, hate and kill one another, but are also capable of occasionally helping one another vis-a-vis us (e.g., with training, sanctuary, or equipment). Probably neither of the two governments at issue (Iraq and Iran) controlled al-Qaeda operatives under the old "state-sponsored terrorism" model. Al-Qaeda is too wealthy to need to submit to that. Indeed in Sudan and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda had come close to achieving "terrorist-sponsored states." No one should be surprised to discover links here and there, short of control, between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Why are they at war with the United States? Mr. Woolsey answered that question by quoting a Washington, D.C., cab driver who said, "They don't hate us for what we've done wrong but for what we do right. Freedom itself is the threat they see to their own values. Another factor was their conviction that they could win. Woolsey criticized U.S. policy for much of the last 25 years in the Middle East for its "kick me" quality. Over the years numerous incidents (hostages, the Beirut bombings, Saddam's survival in 1991, and our largely criminal law approach to terrorism) suggested to them that they could attack the United States or American friends and get away with it. Moreover, the United States tended to treat the Middle East as if it were a gasoline station. We frequently looked as if we cared about oil and nothing else, certainly not the fate of the peoples there suffering under bad governments. Mr. Woolsey then recited the dismal record of the past decade in dealing with Saddam, culminating in the end of U.N. inspections in 1998 and his defiance of the Security Council. He quoted former JCS Chairman General Thomas Moorer, who related that Japanese prisoners of war had not really believed the United States would fight back after Pearl Harbor. In this case, too, American enemies looked at our record and concluded they could win because we were weak-willed. Director Woolsey then turned to strategy and tactics in fighting the war at home and abroad. At home, he saw a combination of ordinary outraged Americans and realist internationalists in Washington supporting the struggle. But two hazards had to be avoided: (1) excessive abridgment of civil liberties and (2) branding Islam as the enemy. Most Muslims were not Wahhabi. Woolsey himself had worked, when practicing law, to obtain the release of eight Iraqi refugees unfairly imprisoned. Another urgent project was to protect the United States from terrorist exploitation of a range of vulnerabilities, especially the advanced transportation, energy, and communications networks that made the county work and that had been designed without a thought to terrorism. September 11th was not a "random failure." Very smart and very evil men had noticed that we had a policy of not resisting aircraft hijackings (assuming the plane would only be flown to Cuba), that short knives were permitted aboard aircraft, and that cockpits were unprotected. We had to look at each network, such as the electricity grid, to see where the equivalent of flimsy cockpit doors might be found. All aspects of U.S. life might be affected both by these needed quick fixes and by the need to take steps to establish resiliency in all our networks. Abroad, Woolsey strongly recommended against military action against Iran. He cited popular demonstrations (students chanting "Death to Taliban in Kabul and Tehran") and growing unrest with the Islamist mullahs, including the defection of prominent Ayatollahs from a regime that violated the historic principles of Shi'ite Islam. Woolsey concluded: "We can't necessarily count on revolution soon in Iran but nothing would be stupider than to move militarily and drive everyone into the arms of the fanatics." Iraq, however, a fascist enemy, fully deserved to be the next target. There was no chance of popular change. Saddam had never stopped the 1991 war. His forces today are much smaller and less capable than they were in 1991 while the United States has even more effective weapons. But Saddam was working hard to obtain nuclear weapons to go along with the chemical and bacteriological ones he already possessed, and once he believed he could deter attacks against him, he would resume his attempts to dominate the Middle East. There were big risks: Saddam might use such weapons against U.S. forces or try to attack Israel, hoping for an Israeli response that would widen the war. The United States did not have much time to play out the current U.N.-centered diplomacy, as a military campaign was best waged during the winter when U.S. troops could wear protective gear against chemical attack. Finally, against the Sunni Islamists, Woolsey pointed out that the United States had always fought under the banner of democratic ideals and individual liberty. On the whole we had done well. In 1917, there were but ten democracies in the world and today there were 120 either free or mostly free states. One-half of the non-Arab Muslim-predominant states are democracies. So the job could be done. If American efforts -- they would have to be long and persistent to establish an Iraqi democracy after the Saddam regime -- made the rulers of Saudi Arabia or Egypt or Syria nervous, then so be it. They had no reason to deny their people basic rights. It would also be vital to spread America's oil business to other parts of the world (e.g., Russia) and to reduce our reliance on oil generally -- more fuel-efficient cars, fuels derived from waste, etc. -- so that the United States depended less on oil in general and on Middle East oil in particular. We needed to stop treating the area as a gasoline station. Woolsey concluded that while all of this was a big job, the American people were now keenly aware of their vulnerability. In the past, we had acted promptly and decisively to defeat our enemies. We would do so this time, too. ------ End of Forwarded Message ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as interesting-people () lists elistx com Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/
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- R. James Woolsey on The War On Terrorism Dave Farber (Oct 11)