IP: on air travel security

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

> X-Sender:  (Unverified)
> Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2001 22:48:53 -0700
> To: dave () farber net
> From: "Glenn S. Tenney KCTJ" <tenney () well com>
> Subject: on air travel security
>
> Dave, I sent this to another list that you're on and edited it slightly.
> You're welcome to send it to IP if you think it appropriate...
>
> There have been many things said and written recently about the need for
> improved security.   Ideas such as air marshalls, baggage positively
> associated with passengers on a plane, real security checkpoints at
> airports with REAL security personnel (that would be a great step forward,
> IMO), kevlar cockpit doors, etc.    We're seeing some new security policies
> at airports (whether they're just for "show" or not can be discussed).
>
> When these tighter security policies are mentioned, people often refer to
> the type of security done by El Al...  El Al is a single airline, so that's
> easier than dozens of airlines; and when they handle the security for all
> flights going into Israel, it is not a huge number of flights (i.e.
> probably fewer than the flights into LAX, just one airport in the US).
> Well, that security has worked (despite some significant flaws that I've
> personally experienced!), but can it scale to a network of so many
> different airlines scattered across so many airports (some handling
> thousands of flights a day to those handling a handful of flights a day)?
> I do not think so, but we do need to strengthen security (especially with
> REAL security checks staffed by properly trained personnel).
>
> But, stepping back, is increasing security that much in and of itself the
> answer?
>
> No.   The answer is much more difficult for citizens of the world to face.
>
> You're never going to have 100% air travel security.   That's basic
> security.  It's just too costly (in time, money, inconvenience).   Proper
> security planning means that you have to plan for situations where the
> security is just not good enough ... i.e. if someone does get through with
> a small knife.   You have to plan from the outset that you're just not
> going to be able to stop all security breaches despite the best attempts to
> do so.
>
> Until this past week, the type of threat being considered was basically
> either (a) hijackers having the crew fly a plane somewhere, possibly
> holding the plane and passengers hostage; or (b) destroying the plane and
> passengers.   After Tuesday we now have: (c) using the plane as a piloted
> weapon in and of itself -- why try to use an ICBM or other missle when you
> can just use someone else's airplane to deliver death and destruction onto
> a target.
>
> In the past, one of the standard methods used in dealing with a hijacking
> (or other hostage) incident has been: minimize jeopardizing the passengers
> and crew, try to stall / talk  / delay / negotiate, etc.   The planned
> worst case was either everyone being held hostage for a long time on the
> ground, or some people might be killed (typically while on the ground)...
> but by delaying you had a chance to reach some better conclusion without
> harming any of the hostages.   We are all taught this same tactic to
> respond to muggings or car jackings where a material thing (a car, or
> money) is put at risk --- give the criminal your money/car, it's only a
> material thing so don't risk your life.
>
> You can have a bullet proof cockpit door, but what does the captain do if a
> criminal is back there killing passengers or crew if the captain doesn't do
> what the criminal wants?   We're going to need to change how we deal with
> both the terrorist getting through our security checks, and how we deal
> with the passengers, crew, and even the plane itself in the event of an
> incident.
>
> This change will undoubtedly require that we will have to be willing to
> take extreme measures to force a hijacking to come to an earlier end even
> if that means passengers and crew (let alone the perpetrator) might be
> KILLED because at any instant the entire plane itself might become a
> weapon.   If someone threatens a flight attendant or passenger with a knife
> (knives WILL get through even though the new rules say no knives of any
> kind -- personal experience of El Al's security checks), we will have to be
> willing to use lethal force to stop any hijacking.   Will we tell the
> captain to say "go ahead, you're not getting your way"?  Will crews need to
> be trained in courses of action that will incapacitate or kill the hijacker
> EVEN IF PASSENGERS MIGHT BE HURT OR KILLED, and even if all the hijacker
> wanted was to fly to Cuba?   And that's the rub... what if it was just some
> drunk who really wasn't really a hijacker and X number of passengers died?
> Then, of course, in a litigous society, there would be many issues of
> liability.
>
> We also may need to go even further ... we may have to be willing to shoot
> down our own aircraft with hundreds of people on board instead of allowing
> a plane to be comandeered by a hijacker.    That won't always be the right
> answer.. and that too is part of our future dilemma.
>
> All of the tightened security that we might do will be for naught, if we
> don't also change how we deal with incidents that get through the security
> checks.    We can't rely on "technology" (security and X-Ray checkpoints at
> airports) alone to protect us, we have to admit they can't be 100%.   We're
> going to have to have a change in mind-set in how we deal with situations
> where a hijacker does succeed in breaking through security, for that WILL
> happen.
>
> But, can the world's travelling public stomach this?
> Can our politicians?
> Can we?
> Can I?
>
>
>
> Glenn Tenney
> Systems Architecture and Web Security Specialist



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