IP: Implications of 9/11

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

> From: Kobrin <KobrinS () wharton upenn edu>
> To: "Dave Farber (E-mail)" <farber () cis upenn edu>
> Subject: Implications of 9/11
>
> Dave,
>
> I have attached a memo I prepared for a meeting dealing, in part, with the
> implications of the terrorist attacks.  It may be of interest to the IP
> list.
>
> Steve



Stephen Kobrin, The Wharton School, September 18, 2001.

Thoughts regarding the major challenges society will face as a result of 
the terrorist attacks of the last week:

1.  The dark side of globalization has to be dealt with.  Globalization 
results from dramatic and discontinuous technological change and that is 
not going to be reversed; the genie is not going to be put back in the 
bottle.  The terrorist networks are a very visible manifestation of 
globalization  a world of integrated networks, electronic and 
otherwise.   While it is not clear that poverty and inequality are 
exacerbated by globalization, they certainly co-exist with it.  Poverty and 
inequality are not going to be addressed by romantic notions of turning 
back the clock to some imagined golden age of national autonomy.

The terrorists who attacked the WTC were not responding to the human 
condition; it was irrelevant to them.  That being said, it is clear that 
poverty and destitution are breeding grounds for recruits to the 
cause.   It is critical that we stop arguing about whether globalization 
can be reversed and turn serious attention to making a global world order 
more equitable; to finding ways to meet the needs of more of the world's 
people.  One of concerns of those worried about the  "digital divide," is 
that large parts of the globe would simply be switched off and 
forgotten.  The events of the last week make it clear that we disconnect at 
our peril.

2.  There is a real danger of bimodal thinking.   A song sung during the 
violent coal strikes in Kentucky said in part, "They say in Harlan county, 
there are no neutrals there; You'll either be a Union Man, or a thug for 
J.H. Blair."  The attacks raise the danger of a zero-one 
categorization:  you are either 100% with us or aiding the 
terrorists.  This is a concern both internationally and 
domestically.  There is a danger that the U.S. will not tolerate any middle 
ground internationally; one hears too much talk about choosing sides and 
making hard choices.  It is obvious that would be counterproductive in 
terms of building any sort of coordinated and collective international 
action.  There will be differences of opinion about the nature of the 
phenomenon and what constitutes an appropriate response that must be taken 
seriously if we are to build an effective anti-terrorist coalition.

Domestically, and especially in the United States, there is a very real 
danger of dissent of any sort being stifled by the claim that it aids or 
supports the terrorists.  I have already seen a claim by a foreign policy 
think tank that the terrorists have "many potential allies in the 
anti-globalization movement..," suggesting that they have anti-capitalist 
and anti-Western ideas in common and that the protesters are likely to 
oppose "tough anti-terrorist measures."  The temptation to tar any contrary 
opinion with the brush of terrorist support is very real and it will take 
an extraordinary effort to preserve open discussion and dissent in the face 
of this crisis.  There is a real danger of demonizing opposition at a time 
when it is essential.

3.  Global governance is even more critical now than it was a week 
ago.    We live in an asymmetric world where the economy, the Internet and 
terrorism are global but where most of our political, legal  and social 
institutions are local and national.  Dealing with terrorism, and with all 
of the factors contributing to it, will require a cooperative international 
effort, a true multilateral response.  While the U.S. may have been the 
most visible proponent of unilateralism, especially under this 
Administration, true international cooperative efforts  whether economic or 
political  have been limited.  Ad hoc multilateralism is difficult, at 
best.  It is essential that international institutions and processes be 
developed which facilitate international cooperation and which are 
perceived as legitimate by citizens of most states.  One hope is that these 
attacks may demonstrate the need for sustained and institutionalized 
international cooperation in a way that makes sense to a wide range of 
observers.

4.  The terrorist attacks should not become a "Tobin Tax."  A global world 
economy is dependent upon, indeed it is a function of, the revolution in 
communications and transportation and the information revolution.  It is 
inevitable that the security measures imposed in reaction to the threat of 
terrorism will make international travel more difficult and costly and may 
even limit international communication through restrictions on encryption 
and other law enforcement measures.   It is critical that efforts be made 
to minimize the effects on international flows of trade, investment and 
information.  To take steps to insure that the global world economy does 
not grind to a halt as a result of last week's events.

5.  Pearl Harbor is not an appropriate metaphor.    The Japanese attack 
against Pearl Harbor took place in world of clearly defined, territorial 
nation states.  The American objective of working its way from New Guinea 
to the Japanese homeland was clear at the outset.  Sixty years later the 
international system is exponentially more complex comprised of a wide 
range of actors, many of whom are organized as global networks rather than 
discrete geographic entities.   That certainly includes the terrorist 
networks responsible for this attack.

The question of whether one or more states aided the attack is, in some 
sense, irrelevant.  What we are likely to find is a complex global network 
comprised of parts of states (e.g., intelligence agencies), financial 
institutions, the actual terrorist cells, etc.  The critical point here is 
that networks are relational rather than spatial, they lack both borders 
and a center.  It is flows across the network rather than the nodes that 
matter; flows of money, information, people and arms.   Hitting one or more 
of the nodes may not be productive, the real task is interrupting 
relationships and stopping flows.  The asymmetry between the U.S. as a 
geographic fixed entity and a fluid terrorist network provides an important 
advantage to the latter.

Any terrorist attack is immediately visible while effective attacks on the 
network may not be.  It will difficult to resist public pressure to "do 
something," especially if there is another attack.  Fighting this sort of a 
"war" will require public officials who can lead rather than respond to 
public opinion.   There have not been an overwhelming number of examples 
lately.







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