IP: The resilience of networks

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

> From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne () warpspeed com>
>
> [Note:  This item comes from reader Steve Schear.  DLH]
>
> At 15:16 -0700 10/24/01, Steve Schear wrote:
> > From: Steve Schear <schear () lvcm com>
> > To: "Dewayne-Net Technology List" <dewayne-net () warpspeed com>
> > Subject: The resilience of networks
> > Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 15:16:31 -0700
> > MIME-Version: 1.0
> >
> > <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/20/arts/20NET.html?todaysheadlines=&pagewanted=print>
> >
> > October 20, 2001
> > Lacking a Center, Terrorist Networks Are Hard to Find, Let Alone Fight
> > By EDWARD ROTHSTEIN
> >
> > He sits motionless like a spider in the center of its web," is one
> > description of the villain, "but that web has a thousand radiations, and he
> > knows well every quiver of each of them. He does little himself. He only
> > plans. But his agents are numerous and splendidly organized," though it is
> > "impossible to get evidence which could convict in a court of law."
> >
> > Such are the wiles of the evil Professor Moriarty, described by his
> > nemesis, Sherlock Holmes, shortly before they plunge into Reichenbach
> > Falls, apparently to their deaths.
> >
> > This metaphor of a spider web with a masterly evil plotter at its center is
> > appealing as a description of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations,
> > but it may also be incorrect. A web, after all, has crucial
> > vulnerabilities. Eliminate its creator, and the threads weaken. Destroy a
> > few crucial links, and the strands collapse.
> >
> > But terrorist organizations are generally referred to as networks, which
> > can be quite varied. Instead of being built around a controlling hub
> > surrounded by terrorist cells, a network can be a sprawling, decentralized
> > arrangement. In fact, the declarations that Americans are engaged in a
> > different sort of war than ever before may have to do with this structure
> > and not just with terrorism itself. Disabling a network often requires
> > different strategies from those used to attack a nation or a hierarchical
> > organization. The challenge may also be a distorted reflection of more
> > profound shifts in culture and politics. For better or worse, the world has
> > entered an era of networks.
> >
> > In recent years, for example the idea of a network has received substantial
> > attention in mathematics, computer science and sociology. A network is, to
> > put it simply, a collection of connected points called nodes. A node can be
> > a telephone connected to switching stations and other telephones. It can be
> > a computer using the Internet. Or it can be an individual communicating
> > with other individuals for a common purpose. Networks are being studied for
> > their properties (in a mathematical field known as network theory), for
> > their applications (as in the Internet) and for an understanding of social
> > organizations (ranging from online newsgroups to terrorist groups).
> >
> > The design of a network determines its resilience, its vulnerability and
> > its power to expand. Manuel Castells, a sociologist at the University of
> > California at Berkeley, argues in a dense analytic trilogy, "The
> > Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture" (1998, Blackwell), that the
> > development of computer networks, the Internet and banking networks has
> > begun to affect the world order.
> >
> > As has been argued by other scholars, Mr. Castells says that these networks
> > are creating new social structures. Once commerce and communication take
> > place beyond national control, the status of the state changes. Notions of
> > sovereignty and self-sufficiency are weakened. These developments have been
> > welcomed by many for their promise of new forms of governance. But at the
> > same time, these wide-ranging networks inspire an opposing reaction. The
> > more the state withers, the more anxious and rootless its citizens become.
> > And so there is an increasing pursuit of identity and a stronger urge to
> > assert distinctions that have nothing to do with the state.
> >
> > In extreme form these network effects are reflected in the current
> > situation. Technological networks helped terrorist networks flourish;
> > agents could ignore national boundaries, rely on remote financial dealings
> > and use the Internet to obtain news, send e-mail and book flights. (The
> > hijackers even walked out of one hotel because it did not offer high-speed
> > Internet access). Such international coordination and communication would
> > have been far more difficult a decade ago. But these technological networks
> > are also being used in fanatical pursuit of fundamentalist identity. The
> > supranational network serves a supranational identity, creating a double
> > threat to the state.
> >
> > Purely apart from its fundamentalist fury, in fact, Al Qaeda's network is
> > trying to undermine at least some aspects of the modern nation- state. But
> > unlike those who welcome a world free of nationalism, Al Qaeda seeks an
> > almost premodern form of association. The modern state is partly founded on
> > rational principles and is given shape by bureaucratic hierarchies and
> > evolving canons of law. The terror networks are after something different:
> > the dissolution of such principles and hierarchies and the expansion of
> > religious connections across all national boundaries.
> >
> > In this case the attack had an archetypal quality, mounted against the most
> > powerful nation-state on the globe. The vulnerability of the modern state
> > is partly its transparency; its organization is based on interlocking webs,
> > each dominated by a central authority. The sites targeted for the Sept. 11
> > attacks included crucial nodes of the state, the points required for
> > maintenance of civic order: military and financial centers and possibly
> > executive and legislative centers.
> >
> > The difficulty is that now a state must fight a network, which is far from
> > easy since a network can be made unusually resilient and need not be
> > designed around dominant power centers. This was, for example, a
> > characteristic of a computer network designed for the Defense Department in
> > the 1960's. It was meant to be invulnerable to nuclear attack. There was no
> > hierarchical organization. No single computer or computer site was the
> > center for the transmission of communications. Every message was broken
> > into "packets" that could take completely different paths to their goals.
> > If one node - a computer system or communications center - was taken out,
> > messages could continue unimpeded. The Internet is the heir of that early
> > network and preserves the same resilient design, which is one reason it was
> > so much less affected than local telephone and television service on Sept.
> > 11.
>
> <snip>


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