IP: NERF-Based Security: Reassurance Through Illusion, Rhetoric, and Fear-Mongering

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

> From: Richard Forno <rforno () infowarrior org>
>
> Dave, fyi and for ip if you deem appropriate. Again thanx for putting out
> this great service to the community....cheers, rf
>
> ----------
> NERF-Based Security: Reassurance Through Illusion, Rhetoric, and
> Fear-Mongering
>
> Richard Forno
> 22 October 2001
> (c) 2001 by Author. Permission is granted to quote, reprint or redistribute
> provided the text is not altered, and appropriate credit is given. The
> author has no grudge with the NERF Company.
>
> Summary: An easy-to-read look at various current issues and actions
> resulting from September 11th and asking if they are really effective.
>
> http://www.infowarrior.org/articles/2001-09.html
>
> With all the hype surrounding the events and aftermath of September 11th it
> is difficult to separate the reality and 'signal' from the hype,
> sensationalism, and 'noise'. We see increased security at buildings and
> airports, and hear of threats around each corner - but how much of what
> we're seeing is real, and how much is fear-mongering and/or feel-good
> security measures designed more to reassure the American public than be
> truly effective? Is the United States scrambling helter-skelter to
> investigate, prevent, respond, or censor anything that might be remotely
> connected to past or potential terrorist actions? How effective are the
> proposed 'enhancements' to existing security postures, really?
>
> This article is intended to provide reality-based answers to these
> questions, and are probably not what you'll see on television or the
> mainstream media. The decision to write this came from the public reaction
> to Susan Sontag's recent op-ed column in the New Yorker Magazine. Her
> comments - rooted in reality - generated a significant public uproar that
> had some branding her as 'unpatriotic' - the logic being that anyone who
> does not blindly accept and support everything the United States proposes in
> its response to terrorism must be supportive of terrorism. While I am an
> American, and patriotic as Yankee Doodle Dandy, I happen to agree with many
> of her comments, and thus this article was born.
>
> If you're wondering, the title of this article symbolizes the knee-jerk
> attempts to 'enhance security' in the United States by overt yet ineffective
> actions in the public eye, some of which are mentioned below. We all played
> innocently with NERF's various sponge toys (balls, frisbees, guns, spears,
> darts) as children since it was very difficult to hurt someone with these
> realistic-looking toys. Realistic But Harmless - particularly on the
> airlines - we're becoming NERFed against anything that might pose a danger
> through realistic-looking but totally ineffective security measures. (No
> offense to the NERF Company, they make some great products, but with
> respects, the analogy fits well for this article.)
>
> Anthraxophobia Wrongly Rules News and Our Lives
>
> Since the case of anthrax was reported in Florida, the media - particularly
> the 24-hour cable news channels - focused on the story, calling in pundit
> after pundit to discuss the bacteria, preventive measures, responses, and
> the nation's ability to defend against a biological attack. Even now, days
> later, news 'crawlers' at the bottom of the television screen continue to
> display statements and sound bites that - while adding nothing substantive
> to the story - serve to elevate the public's collective blood pressure
> simply because the word "anthrax" appears on the screen. On October 19th,
> the Associated Press even reported that Northwest Airlines removed powdered
> artificial sweetners from its airline food service meals to allay passenger
> fears! How far will this lunacy go? Will it soon be illegal to walk down the
> street eating a powdered doughnut?
>
> This media-driven "Anthraxophobia" and contradicting government actions
> sends mixed messages to the American public, and perpetuating public fear
> and misperception about the issue. While the White House presents an "all is
> calm" image, the US House of Representatives adjourned for a long weekend
> claiming anthrax security concerns, although the Senate - where there were
> confirmed anthrax attacks - remained open for legislative business. Does
> this sound like a confused government establishment unsure of how to proceed
> in today's era of terrorism? A recent New York Times editorial by Tom
> Friedman notes that "We have U.S. troops in the field all around
> Afghanistan. It can't be easy duty. But the House is running scared. Just
> what the terrorists wanted. The House members should be meeting on the
> Capitol steps, popping Cipro if they have to, telling America's troops and
> America's enemies that nothing - N-O-T-H-I-N-G - will derail our democracy."
>
> Anthraxophobia has even forced the Pentagon to shutter its Operation DEAR
> ABBY service that sends holiday morale messages to troops deployed overseas.
> Traditionally, letters - not addressed to anyone in particular - are sent to
> the central DEAR ABBY offices and then passed on to troops. As a result of
> bureaucratic Anthraxophobia, however, the Military Postal Service Agency
> simply shut the service down. Did it ever occur to them that it might have
> been a better compromise to perhaps only accept postcards instead of sealed
> envelopes that could contain anthrax? We are starting to see fear influence
> and dictate policy and operational decisions - not educated fear, but
> assumption-based knee-jerking that's rooted in anything but facts.
>
> While the casual observer - perhaps those whose only source of 'news' is
> from shows like 'Hard Copy' or who receive their news from a single source -
> may be concerned at the potential of an anthrax attack, realists may have a
> far more sinister assessment: given that confirmed anthrax incidents and
> anthrax-related scares occurred in isolated areas - Reno, Manhattan,
> Madison, and Palm Beach - could it be that an adversary, be it al Qaeda,
> Iraq, or a domestic nut case, is simply mailing anthrax and anthrax-like
> letters to either cause public paranoia, or (more likely) is sitting back
> observing how the government, media, and public react and respond to this
> perceived threat, in advance of a future, more widespread attack?
>
> Nobody seems to be interested that anthrax is a very treatable bug - even
> after an infection is diagnosed - or that Cipro is not the exclusive remedy.
> Folks don't realize that it takes more than a few spores to cause problems
> in people. Worse yet, the average person - including television's talking
> heads - does not understand or discuss the concept of drug-resistant
> infections. If everyone starts taking antibiotics for any symptom of
> illness, over time such practices will not only weaken the protective effect
> of such medicines on the human body, but also reduce the impact of such
> drugs on various infectors like anthrax, smallpox, and plague
>
> The panic and paranoia we're currently seeing about anthrax is insignificant
> compared to what we'd see if smallpox, plague, or any other significantly
> more deadly substance was reported. Several specialists I've spoken with
> agree that on the ' bioweapons food chain' anthrax is nowhere near the top
> of deadly weapons. Yet by watching the news, you'd think it was worse than
> anything else. One confirmed death from anthrax is certainly newsworthy, but
> does not imply terrorism or justify a round-the-clock news cycle on
> thestory. However, one person being diagnosed with smallpox would be both
> newsworthy and almost certainly terrorism, and nobody's wondering about that
> on the airwaves.
>
> Osama Most Likely Isn't Sending Encoded Messages to the Networks
>
> Last week, National Security Advisor Condeleeza Rice contacted the major
> media outlets and strongly suggested they not broadcast unedited videos from
> those involved with Osama or Al Qaeda, fearing that such videos might
> contain hidden messages to sleeper cells instructing them to execute
> additional pre-planned attacks. Historically, this is not a new concept, as
> it was quite effective during World War II with the Special Operations
> Executive (SOE) and the Office of Strategic Services (the forerunner to
> today's CIA) using civilian radio broadcasts to pass coded messages to the
> maquis (the French underground resistance fighters) instructing them to
> carry out pre-planned strikes in advance of the Normandy invasion in June
> 1944.
>
> Casual observers may think this is a wise precaution, even if they don't
> know the success of this technique during World War II, and agree with the
> White House's statement that such messages are also propaganda to incite the
> rank-and-file Muslim population in the United States in support of al Qaeda.
> To a certain extent, that's probably true.
>
> Realists, however, seem to agree that such 'encoded messages' are probably
> not a very viable method of communication for our adversaries. It's already
> known that al Qaeda knows how to communicate securely - without encryption,
> by the way - to coordinate its cells and plan attacks around the world.
> Besides, even if the United States media censors such videos, what prevents
> people from seeing the video from satellite television, over the Internet,
> from international news sources, via telephone, obtaining a transcript, or
> placing calls to non-Internet (and old fashioned) computer bulletin board
> systems to access the video or text of the statement?
>
> Crazier still, news executives are most likely not intelligence
> professionals trained to look for hidden messages or nuances in such
> statements, nor do they have the background information on the situation -
> much of it from classified sources in the intelligence community -- to
> provide specific guidance on what to look for. So, how effective is this,
> really? That being said, if the real reason behind the White House request
> to censor unedited terrorist videos is a method of quieting propaganda
> directed at the United States, why not simply say so? Are they that
> concerned that the American people would start believing Osama's babbling
> that they must NERF its perceptions of the adversary?
>
> Terrorists are asymmetric and unconventional in their actions, choosing
> unorthodox methods of attack. On September 11th, four aircraft were hijacked
> with the intention of destroying buildings and killing thousands. In early
> October, there were statements by Osama stating that "storms of airplanes"
> would never defeat his cause. Soon after, an al Qaeda spokesperson warned
> American Muslims "not to board airplanes" or be in skyscrapers "anytime
> soon." The news channel 'experts' and government spokesmen were quick to
> state these were serious hints that future airline hijackings were possible.
> While that's certainly a possibility, given the unconventional nature of
> terrorism, perhaps we could interpret these messages as items intended to
> draw our attention toward airports and airplanes while ships, trains, and
> busses (for example) are the real targets in a follow-on attack. Nobody
> wanting to be successful in battle outlines their exact battle plan or
> weapons capabilities for their adversaries. Ask any military historian, this
> is one of the oldest tactics in the book, not to mention a common one in
> boxing - draw your opponent's attention to the left while aiming for the
> right. In this case, a terrorist's 'Rope-A-Dope.'
>
> A much more effective method of communicating is through sequential events.
> Perhaps establishing a one-time-use system along the lines of "if you hear
> that a car bomb exploded in Mexico City near Building Y, begin your
> particular phase of our operation in 48 hours.." How will the White House
> prevent this (and other such) forms of communication from signaling further
> attacks? Again, censoring terrorism messages in the mainstream media may
> have some impact, but it's not as foolproof as they, or the public, are led
> to believe. NERFY Security. Sounds important, but totally ineffective.
>
> Threat Inflation by The Regal Court of W.
>
> After September 11th, anything that could become a terrorist tool was deemed
> a possible threat and became the object of close scrutiny by the federal
> government. Some of the more memorable items that came under investigation
> and analysis as possible terrorist tools included crop-dusters, hazardous
> material tanker trucks, airplanes, semi-trailers, box cutters, nose-hair
> clippers, the Internet, encryption, and barbecue grills. (Well, maybe not
> barbecue grills, but you get the idea.) A few of these deserve special
> mention:
>
> The crop-duster 'threat' might give the uninformed observer pause, but the
> realist would look at Justice claims and shake their heads in disbelief.
> Granted, crop-dusters spray chemicals from the air, but what kind of
> chemicals do they spray? Insecticides and Pesticides - fancy terms for
> substances that kill bugs, infections and germs in plants. Assuming that the
> adversary doesn't switch tanks or completely clean them out, it's a good bet
> that the residual pesticides would negate part if not all of the biologic
> agents intended to attack people via crop-dusters. In addition, experts note
> the spray orifices (the 'nozzles') used on crop-dusting aircraft are the
> wrong size for creating the droplet size necessary for distributing biologic
> warfare agents. Further, several of the common biologic agents require
> specific environmental conditions to live in - changes in light or
> temperature can render such attacks ineffective. Given the highly-fickle
> nature of biological weapons, many educated security experts believe that
> chemical weapons, not biological ones, would be the preferred weapon in an
> aerial attack.
>
> Given the attention drawn to crop-dusters by the government and media, an
> adversary wanting to distribute biowar agents could be free to wait for the
> right weather conditions and simply blow them across an interstate highway
> or river. Wait for a temperate, windy day -- it doesn't even need to be in a
> city or during rush hour. Drivers would likely think it's dust from a
> construction project and drive through the dust as they often to, and not
> give the matter a second thought. Meanwhile, the particles get caught in the
> vehicle air system and move with the vehicle (and its occupants) to their
> destination, thus spreading the given bioweapon across a wide area. Short of
> closing all major highways, roadways, and waterways, how would this be
> prevented?
>
> Recently, the White House created the Office of Homeland Security that
> includes a mission to guard against the so-called, highly-sensational
> concept of "cyber-terrorism" against computer networks. While discussing
> this issue is an article in itself, suffice it to say that terrorists are by
> definition low-tech brutes looking to cause the maximum amount of public
> fear. Images of smoking craters and high casualties are much more effective
> in generating fear than a darkened computer screen. Being an effective
> "information warrior" takes significant technical and analytical experience
> and training, something that the impoverished, uneducated, run-of-the-mill
> twenty-something member of Club Osama or the al Qaeda club does not possess.
> While there always ongoing threats to critical networks, and a possibility
> of a 'cyber war' many security professionals - at least, the few realists in
> our line of work - deem this as a potential terrorist target very low.
> Besides, there are enough inherent problems in many of today's computer
> networks and systems that cause them to fail without any outside assistance!
>
> Creating another bureaucracy charged with accomplishing what four previous
> government offices tried to do since 1995 doesn't sound promising, and
> continuing to draw on the advice and counsel of CEOs (the last people
> competent enough to understand the reality and dynamics of the
> infrastructure security environment) through yet another Presidential
> Advisory Board further demonstrates the government is once again thinking
> very conventionally with its response to a very unconventional problem. We
> know what the problems are - we don't need continued studies, research, and
> bureaucracy to generate jobs and more paperwork. We need action and
> authority to implement effective countermeasures. Unfortunately, the sad
> truth is that nobody in charge wants the responsibility to rock the boat and
> really fix things - thus we continue creating Boards, Councils, and
> generating reports. To use a historical analogy, our President Nero is
> fiddling while his cyber-infrastructures burn!
>
> Expanded Electronic Surveillance Doesn't Work Against Low-Tech Brutes
>
> In the month after the events of September 11, the Justice Department and
> FBI received nearly everything it sought to (but could not) get under the
> Clinton Administration regarding wiretapping, electronic monitoring, and
> definitions of terrorism. As a security professional that's worked with law
> enforcement investigations in the past, while I question some of the new
> powers granted federal law enforcement and the rush to get them past
> Congress, I'm happy that the FBI finally received its 'roving wiretap'
> authority, something they've needed for a long while, something that was a
> major obstacle to the timely investigation of interstate criminal matters.
> (One has to wonder if they scheduled an after-hours champagne party in the
> FBI's sixth-floor SIOC to quietly mark this historic event.)
>
> Aside from rushing a flawed anti-terrorism bill through Congress (the
> discussion of which is a separate article in itself) there were indications
> that those responsible for September 11 used e-mail and instant messages to
> communicate. Immediately after the attack, there were claims the attackers
> hid messages in photos on internet auction site Ebay and used strong
> encryption to protect their messages, but these have been unsubstantiated by
> hard, tangible evidence. If so, there is a slim chance that expanding
> wiretaps and electronic sniffing of data (e.g., Carnivore) would have been
> helpful in monitoring such communications. Yet there were renewed calls to
> restrict strong encryption, a technology policy horse that's not only left
> the barn, but is already across the meadow....attempting to enact encryption
> restrictions under the guise of 'anti-terrorism' is another effort in
> futility given how technology works, as evidenced in the mid-1990s. As I've
> said for years, there are any number of ways to communicate - electronic and
> otherwise -- that totally confounds law enforcement interception and renders
> any 'expanded authority' obsolete. Expanding electronic surveillance won't
> work against such tactics, but presents the appearance of being 'good for
> anti-terrorism." An example of E-NERFy restrictions and legislation.
>
> The experienced co-authors of an as-yet-unpublished article "Terrorism Today
> and Tomorrow" correctly note that "our new adversaries are diverse and
> linked in unfamiliar ways....Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and a
> loose coalition of criminal actors, guerillas and insurgents now challenge
> national security capabilities that were designed to operate within a
> nation-state framework. As we're now seeing, outside that framework, our
> traditional structures have great difficulties.
>
> America's current adversaries present a significant challenge to our
> government and law enforcement organizations so enamored with
> high-technology devices and tradecraft that we are grossly unprepared to
> handle operations and adversaries in a low-tech environment. As previously
> mentioned, terrorists are low-tech brutes. It's common knowledge (to both
> VIP visitors at NSA and the public) that Osama stopped using satellite
> phones once it was learned that NSA was intercepting his calls. This also
> begs the question regarding the responsibility of the media and NSA tour
> guides in reporting these types of facts in the first place, and how these
> entities balance national security, public knowledge, and the needs of their
> organization's ego about its capabilities.
>
> Information Resiliency and Futility of the Government's Self-Imposed Web
> Clampdown
>
> Late last week, word got out that the federal government started to remove
> items from their web sites that 'could help' terrorists. William Beecher,
> spokesperson for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) said in an AP story
> last week that NRC pulled the coordinates of all 103 US nuclear power plants
> from the agency's web site. "In most cases it is common
> information...nothing top secret was on the Web site to begin with," he
> said. "We just don't want to provide anything that a terrorist might find
> helpful." The Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety also
> pulled maps of various domestic pipelines from their web site as well, and
> the Environmental Protection Agency conducted similar actions on its own
> site with regard to chemical plant security.
>
> The casual observer may find this a prudent measure to prevent terrorists
> from gaining any information that could be used to conduct additional acts
> against the United States, and thus wrongfully assume that once this
> information out-of-sight, it is therefore out-of-mind. Unfortunately, I also
> see this mindset in action in the IT security industry all too frequently,
> and it does not work. They are attempting to 'nuke' information out of the
> public eye, but they're only succeeding in NERFing it to another public
> venue.
>
> The reality is that any information published on the Internet becomes able
> to be instantly copied and archived by any number of sources aroundthe
> world. Further, while the government may restrict pipeline information and
> coordinates of nuclear plants, it does not take a terrorist mastermind or
> uber-spy to find the same information via any other traditional reasearch
> methods, including visiting local libraries, industry associations, reading
> the local phone book, or (dare I say it?) using common sense. A fact of
> physics is that while you may be able to remove information about a nuclear
> plant or pipeline from one site in cyberspace, you can't easily remove its
> physical presence in real life or everywhere on the Internet - you have to
> look at the entertainment industry's cartel and its failed attempts to quash
> music file-sharing services to see this exercise in futility. Think about it
> -if someone drives by Turkey Point Nuclear Plant in Florida, they know where
> it is without having to visit a website, right? Again, only blind arrogance
> assumes that removing information from a few websites will impact a
> terrorist's plans. As mentioned earlier, it's an ineffective and high-tech
> approach to an effective and low-tech adversary.
>
> I've said repeatedly that terrorists are by definition low-tech brutes. They
> don't use Joint Directed Air Munitions (JDAM), Joint Stand Off Weapons
> (JSOW), or Tomahawk cruise missiles reliant on Global Positioning System
> (GPS) coordinates to locate their targets. Being low-tech means that such
> adversaries have much simpler methods of determining the locations of their
> targets, and an easier time conducting such attacks. It's a good bet that
> the hijackers didn't need the GPS coordinates of the World Trade Center
> towers in New York on September 11th, and didn't step all over themselves
> coordinating radio frequencies, codewords, go/abort signals, and network
> adapters. They Keep It Simple.
>
> Despite the government's clampdown on pipeline and power plant information
> on its federally-owned websites, a few minutes at my local library and
> online resulted in information that can be found here. You'll see several
> examples of information that could be considered 'helpful' to a terrorist in
> planning attacks. Yet this information is also quite useful for the
> law-abiding citizens, visitors, and businesses of the United States. Some of
> this information was removed from government websites recently, but most of
> it is freely available in a variety of formats to the public.
>
> Thus, the realist knows that the government's much-publicized restriction of
> its various web sites does little to impact or prevent an adversary from
> obtaining useful targeting information from a variety of sources - both
> electronic and traditional - and is the government's inside-the-box response
> to a non-issue. As we see in the IT security community, information is a
> dual-use item, and the mere fact that a given set of facts (or knowledge)
> can be used for evil does notnecessarily follow that it will be used for
> evil. The point-and-click convienience may be gone, but the information
> exists in a multitude of other formats.
>
> Airport Security as The Screen Door on The Submarine (NERF Security @ Its
> Finest)
>
> Since September 11th, we've seen airport and airline security measures
> reviewed and increased...at least as far as the public is concerned. Seeing
> camouflaged and armed National Guardsmen patrolling our airports presents
> the appearance of increased airport security. Prohibiting everything from
> nail clippers to tweezers, Swiss Army Knives, box cutters, and sewing
> needles results in increased pre-board search times at airports, and the
> public's perception that security is being strengthened on our airplanes.
> For a firsthand account of the current airport security fallacies -
> including bags not being matched to passengers and arriving at a destination
> before their owners - I encourage you to read this missive from a respected
> intelligence professional who's also a close friend. While some security
> procedures, such as reinforcing cockpit doors and developing 'auto-land'
> capabilities for aircraft will truly increase aircraft safety, some of the
> other measures - particularly at the airports - are just downright goofy.
>
> Recently, an officer friend in the National Guard called and asked if I
> noticed anything odd about his fellow Guardsmen posted at the airports I
> frequent. I said that nothing looked strange, but that I'd look again when
> on travel later in the week. Sure enough, a closer, casual observation
> revealed that many of the Guardsmen at airports are either unarmed or
> apparently instructed to hold their hands strategically over their holsters
> (perhaps containing an unloaded or non-existent weapon) to give the public
> impression they are indeed armed. To the average person, this presents the
> warm-and-fuzzy illusion of security, but that's just about what it is - only
> an illusion.
>
> Let's not forget that a pen, house key, a piece of plastic, string,
> shoelace, belt, credit cards, and any number of other innocuous everyday
> items or trinkets can be made into a weapon, yet can be carried onboard
> aircraft, even after the latest security changes. More fundamentally, anyone
> with two fists, feet, and teeth - regardless of any martial arts training -
> can endanger passengers or flight crews. Even something as innocuous as an
> airplane fire extinguisher - a handheld device readily available to all
> passengers in an emergency -could be misused as a blunt trauma weapon
> onboard an aircraft. Are we going to prevent anyone from using such items
> under anything but 'approved' circumstances? Who determines what those
> circumstances are?
>
> It is important to realize that the items used as weapons to commandeer four
> aircraft on September 11 were not prohibited by existing federal airport
> security guidelines. Anything that can be controlled by a person - tools,
> pens, trinkets, guns, knives, and information - can be turned into a weapon
> with the proper modification and intent. Incidentially, a six hundred page
> Danielle Steele hardback novel could be used as a weapon. And what about
> blunt force trauma caused by impact from a metallic laptop or strangulation
> from a power cord or a Walkman's headphones? As if airline food wasn't bad
> enough of a concern for us.
>
> Are we destined to live in a hardened world of safety scissors and plastic
> sporks, boarding airplanes in hospital scrubs after being strip-searched and
> separated from our carry-on bags? Will our flights become extended periods
> of people sitting at a cramped 'attention' in their airborne sardine cans,
> staring at the seatbacks in front of them, prohibited from standing, eating,
> reading, listening to music, or using anything sharper than a witty remark
> to their seatmates? If this becomes reality - and were' on that course
> already - you can bet I'll start driving home for the holidays.
>
> The reality is that these are feel-good, scrunchy, NERFy steps to encourage
> the public to fly again by presenting the appearance of increased security.
> Yet, there have been numerous cases of pilots, flight attendants, and
> passengers 'testing' these new security requirements and successfully moving
> newly-prohibited objects past security checkpoints since September 11. That
> fact alone should indicate the nature and state of these vaunted 'increased'
> security measures, and question its true effectiveness.
>
> Terrorists Don't Keep Bankers' Hours (But Those Guarding Our Buildings Do)
>
> There are currently new provisions prohibiting semi-trailers from driving on
> the two major DC roads that flank the Capitol grounds. The casual observer
> will interpret this as increased security to prevent against future
> terrorist attacks.
>
> Realists, however, will note that the events of September 11th demonstrate
> one of any number of ways to attack a facility that bypasses street
> closings, and something that's been quietly discussed in security circles
> for years. While street closings may reduce the size of vehicles that can
> pass through it, nothing precludes an explosives-laden SUV or Volkswagen Bug
> from wreaking havoc in the area at an opportune moment.
>
> More strikingly, working close to the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, the
> week after the attacks saw increased police vehicles and military policeman
> checking credentials of those driving into garages of military buildings
> here. Three weeks after the attacks, there was no sign of military police
> checking vehicles as they entered garages...it was as if the threat to those
> buildings had magically disappeared. However, after the October 11th FBI
> advisory warning that additional attacks were possible, military police were
> back checking vehicles and patrolling the sidewalks in front of their
> buildings during the business day. However, driving by at 7:45 one evening,
> I did not see any police or guards checking vehicles, and was able to drive
> into the same garage that was protected by military policeman three hours
> earlier! I've also been in DoD facilities that prohibit entry from any door
> but the front door during work hours, where staff identification is checked
> - but after 5:00pm, since there are fewer security guards to check badges,
> monitor cameras, and make rounds, authorized staff are free to use their
> access cards and enter the building from any external door. This is
> Feel-Good, Look-Good security in action, plain and simple.
>
> Based on these observations, one assumes that those in charge of homeland
> security believe that we're facing an adversary working on a 9-5 40-hour
> workweek schedule. Something tells me that an unconventional adversary
> doesn't keep bankers hours or regular schedules.
>
> Contrary to Patriotic Rhetoric, America Is Reaping What It Sowed (We just
> don't want to know or admit it)
>
> Any discussion of Islam would take several pages alone, but suffice it to
> say that those that understand Islam know it is a religion rooted in charity
> and peace. Those Americans that equate Islam to terrorism, Hezzbola,
> bin-Laden, and al Qaeda are ignorant of the reality of Islam, and wrongfully
> interpret these extremists as representatives of the Islamic and Arab
> communities, as evidenced in the increased anti-Arab, anti-Islamic criminal
> incidents in recent weeks. Nothing could be further from the truth -- Islam
> is a religion of peace and tolerance; the nut-cases in al Qaeda do not speak
> for the world Islamic community, just as a Christian blowing up an abortion
> clinic does not speak for all Christians around the world. In the same vein,
> American evangelists Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson used religious
> overtones to explain and justify the September 11 attacks, but these two men
> don't represent mainstream Christianity as a whole. As Americans, we have
> always prided ourselves as a tolerant mixing pot of world cultures and
> ideologies, and we should continue being tolerant of our fellow Islamic and
> Arab citizens and neighbors. Being Islamic or Arab does not indicate a
> proclivity for terrorism. Thus endeth my soapbox sermon.
>
> Truth be told, the Taliban have a reason to hate America - as is often the
> case when America gets involved in foreign nations' conflicts, we tend to
> pull out once our goals are reached, leaving those we supported to fend for
> themselves. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989, the
> Untied States also withdrew its support of the anti-Soviet mujhadeen, since
> American interests in the country were reached once the Soviet war machine
> and communism departed. Post-Soviet Afghanistan became one of deep poverty,
> civil war, estranged elections, and famine....yet because the Soviets were
> gone, the United States had little interest in helping rebuild the battered
> nation. It is this type of foreign policy that generates anti-American
> sentiment and support for al Qaeda. It may also be justifying our current
> humanitarian relief mission in Afghanistan as a way for the United States to
> relieve its guilt at 'abandoning' the Afghans in 1989. If we do not learn
> from our history, we're potentially doomed to not only repeat it, but become
> endangered by it, as we are today.
>
> Club Osama, on the other hand, is filled with individuals possessing limited
> education and exposure to (and perhaps are jealous of) the international
> standards of conduct and society. Nearly all of what they know comes from
> cave-borne propaganda and religious brainwashing. Simply put, their goal is
> to return the Arab world to the strict medieval Islamic culture of the 15th
> Century, using the world's oil interests in Saudi Arabia and the presence of
> Israel as a cassus belli for an Islamic holy war with the intentions of
> freeing Saudi Arabia's religious lands from so-called "Western invaders" and
> restoring the Palestinean State where Israel currently sits. Club Osama's
> radical, tyrannical view uses a very warped interpretation of the Koran to
> strive toward an isolationist Islamic world where religion is the absolute
> law, women serve as disposable walking wombs (incidentally, female US
> soldiers in Saudi Arabia really angers Osama) and anything non-Islamic is
> inherently evil and must be destroyed.
>
> The concept of a holy war (a jihad) in the Club Osama Brochure does not
> refer to the quest by Muslim individuals to lead a wholesome life according
> to their religion, but to use any means necessary to defend the Islamic
> culture against the declared Evil De Jour. Unfortunately, the word 'jihad'
> has been in frequent use in the Western press over the past decade or two,
> explained directly or subtlety, to mean an Islamic 'holy war.' (As a matter
> of fact, the term 'holy war' was coined in Europe during the Crusades,
> referring to the many wars waged against Muslims by European invaders in the
> Middle Ages.) Jihad is not a declaration of war against other religions and
> certainly not against Christians and Jews as some media and political
> circles want it to be perceived. Islam does not fight other religions.
> Christians and Jews are considered as fellow inheritors of The Abrahamic
> traditions by Muslims (historically called "People of The Book") that
> worship the same God.
>
> The Koran makes reference to war as a last resort, very much like the Just
> War Ethic of the Catholic Church or international laws. Reading similar to
> the United Nations Charter, the Koran states that adveraries should "..make
> peace between them (the two fighting groups), but if one of the two persists
> in aggression against the other, fight the aggressors until they revert to
> God's commandment." (49:9) Military action is therefore a subgroup of the
> Jihad and not its totality, and represents the ultimate scenario when
> diplomacy and communications break down between international parties.
>
> We have to acknowledge that nearly all major religions - Islam,
> Christianity, and Judiasim, among others - had their lapses in honestly
> following the valued ideals of their religions or philosophies. Over the
> course of human history, religion has been responsible for more man-made
> deaths than any man-made device. This is no reflection on religion, but it
> shows how desperately humanity is in need of better education, more enduring
> concern for human dignity, rights and freedom, tolerance, and vigilant
> pursuit of justice, even at the price of curbing political, economic,
> ideological, and individual greed.
>
> Unfortunately, as we saw during the 1930s in the Great Depression and post
> World War I Germany, people that are impoverished, with little direction in
> life, and not much to live for tend to elect and follow leaders promising
> radical change for their society. This, coupled with religious laws,
> customs, and occasional brainwashing, presents a significant adversary with
> no reservations about dying (and ascending to heaven) for conducting actions
> that their religious beliefs or national loyalties - however warped - deem a
> just cause (Incidentally, Adolph Hitler's campaign slogan in the 1930s was
> 'give me four years and you won't recognize Germany.' A historical
> demonstration of the Law of Unintended Consequences.)
>
> What Osama's Real Problem Is (Rick's Patriotic Comedy)
>
> Has anyone else noticed the Freudian picture presented whenever America's
> adversaries (Osama, Omar, and al Qaeda representatives) appear in the media?
> Has anyone seen these individuals without a Kalishnikov rifle slung over
> their shoulder, hanging on the wall behind them, next to them on a cushion,
> or being casually stroked in their lap while they deliver their messages to
> the world? While the casual outsider would probably interpret this as an
> attempt to convey fear in the image on television - I suggest this
> demonstrates a high degree of personal insecurity, possibly hinting at
> deeper personal issues, perhaps physical limitations or the absence of a
> significant, meaningful adolescent experience. Maybe that's what this is
> really about, these warped men trying to enhance their manhood in a part of
> the world that doesn't carry Viagra. After all, everyone has personal
> problems.
>
> Conclusions
>
> The co-authors of "Terrorism Today and Tomorrow" noted that "the world of
> today and tomorrow is one dominated by a conflict between those ìwho haveî
> and those ìwho have notî. Those with a conflicting cultural or religious
> ideology are likely to challenge our superiority according to their rules,
> not our rules. Their modus operandi blurs and will continue to blur the
> distinctions between crime and war, criminal and civil, combatant and
> non-combatant. Their actions will seek to exploit the seams of the modern
> stateís internal and external security structures. These emerging
> challengers will embrace unconventional means not amenable to conventional
> responses.
>
> If we begin to live in constant fear, we allow the adversary to win. The
> United States is not the first industrial nation to experience terrorism at
> home - Israel has lived with assorted Arab-sponsored terrorism since it
> became a state in 1948, and the United Kingdom has been victimized by Irish
> terrorism for longer than that. We, too, will survive thisÖ.and we will,
> provided we keep things in perspective, do our own research, and draw our
> own conclusions on what the real threats and security measures are, instead
> of taking what is presented by the government and media as undeniable
> gospel.
>
> The wisdom I hope you've gleaned from this article is that contrary to what
> is presented on the media and enacted as law or new procedures, little is
> really effective at preventing or adversely impacting future terrorist
> activities. This is a different kind of war - not only is it a military one,
> but a psychological one for us at home. We're not as secure or as prepared
> as the government would lead us to believe, and there is no clear defense
> against the impact of terrorism except to keep an open mind and continue our
> normal lives the best we can.
>
> The President is waging a self-declared "war on terrorism" against a "new
> enemy" that modern America is not prepared to face. This article has shown,
> however, that much of the defensive posturing in this new war -- especially
> at home -- is conventional, traditional, and predictable - and thus rather
> ineffective against an unconventional adversary and philosophy. We would be
> wise to recall the warning of Edward Luttwak in his 1997 text Strategy: The
> Logic of War and Peace:  "War, in common with sport, has the characteristic
> that what worked well yesterday may not work well tomorrow, precisely
> because it worked yesterday."
>
> Welcome to tomorrow.
>
>
> - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
> Resources:
>
> A military intelligence professional's firsthand report on the state of
> airport security
>
> A demonstration of what can be gleaned online despite the government's
> removal of information from its websites. Anyone with the right resources,
> time, and effort could use libraries, phone books, and traditional research
> methods to obtain this type of targeting information.
>
> "Terrorism Today and Tomorrow" - Currently unpublished article (draft copy)
> co-authored by Col. G.I. Wilson, USMCR, Sgt. John P. Sullivan, Los Angeles
> County Sheriff's Department, and Lt.Col. Hal Kempfer, USMCR.
>
> Thomas Friedman's Op-Ed: "A Tweezer Defense Shield?" appearing in the 19
> October 2001 New York Times Foreign Affairs Section. (We've all had a Eureka
> moment in recent days when we realized the new world we're living in
> post-Sept. 11. For me it came at National Airport the other day when, while
> checking in for the Delta Shuttle to New York, my small overnight bag was
> searched and the security agent found my tweezers. "I'm sorry," she said.
> "You have to check this...")
>
>
>
> (c) 2001 by Author. Permission is granted to quote, reprint or redistribute
> provided the text is not altered, and appropriate credit is given. The
> author has no grudge with the NERF Company.


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