IP: "Real Security, Not Eye-Wash"

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

> Date: Tue, 09 Oct 2001 15:50:27 -0700
> To: farber () cis upenn edu
> From: Bob Hinden <hinden () iprg nokia com>
> Subject: "Real Security, Not Eye-Wash"
>
> Real Security, Not Eye-Wash
> An Editorial by Equipped to Survive™ Editor Doug Ritter
>
> http://www.equipped.org/editorial_092701.htm
>
>
> This week, as a result of the terrorist attack on 9/11 and as a member of 
> the SAE S9 Cabin Safety Provisions Committee, I was asked by SAE to submit 
> a list of recommendations to the FAA on the subject of security.  That 
> list was submitted by the 9/27/01 deadline, though by all appearances it 
> was mostly another exercise in futility, a token offering to SAE so they 
> would feel a part of the solution. There seems little question that the 
> FAA and its
> industry dominated task forces had already decided what they intend to do, 
> or not do, as the case may be.
>
> <snip>
>
> The FAA and others involved in security need to quit fighting the last 
> war, for crissakes. At this point even the dimwits in the FAA should 
> recognize that terrorists are willing to commit suicide and as a result, 
> EVERYTHING is changed and old style solutions and attitudes don’t work. 
> Unfortunately, there’s little indication that this revolution in thought 
> has occurred.
>
> <snip>
>
> Focusing on preventing another 9/11-style attack is not the major issue 
> now. Having said that, there’s also no reason to make it easy should they 
> decide they want to make another “statement.” Typically, terrorists don’t 
> repeat the same attack unless nobody does something about the basic flaws 
> that allowed it to be successful.
>
> The issue of “sharps” on board aircraft is a red herring. Rules that 
> allowed passengers to board with small knives did not cause or contribute 
> in any substantial way to the success of the attacks of 9/11. Not being 
> prepared to deal with suicide hijackers was the problem, the flawed policy 
> that allowed the attacks to succeed. From the perspective of stopping a 
> repeat of the 9/11 attack, that’s the problem that needed addressing, and 
> from a practical standpoint this has already occurred by the change in 
> attitudes and policy since 9/11.
>
> With or without official regulatory guidance, flight crews have already 
> decided on an aggressive defensive policy. No crew or planeload of 
> passengers will ever again cooperate with hijackers, which was the flaw in 
> policy that allowed the 9/11 attacks to succeed. I cannot imagine any crew 
> or passengers who wouldn’t immediately resist and attack hijackers in the 
> current environment. The heroes aboard United Airlines Flight 
> 93  recognized the stark reality and acted accordingly, as others would 
> today. Hopefully some idiot or drunk won’t get themselves killed trying to 
> be cute.
>
> <snip>
>
> Current restrictions are asinine. They prevent passengers from carrying on 
> a BIC razor when they can keep their car keys, a far more effective 
> “weapon.” A terrorist can make an effective lethal weapon from something 
> as innocuous as a newspaper, let alone all the materials and equipment 
> already on the aircraft. Then there’s non-metallic weapons that are 
> capable of being easily concealed. Unless you strip search and perform a 
> body cavity inspection of every passenger, you will not stop a determined 
> terrorist from having access to weapons on board. If the crew won’t 
> cooperate and other reasonable anti-hijacking measures are in effect, it 
> doesn’t much matter what weapons are brought on board, a hijacking won’t 
> succeed.
>
> 100% security isn’t possible in a free and mobile society, but you can 
> easily bankrupt the airline industry and reduce productivity in America 
> enough to cause a depression trying to get there. Make it painful enough 
> to fly and only those with absolutely no alternative will do so. 
> Irrational over-reaction such as banning all carry-ons and eliminating 
> pre-assigned seating, as has been suggested and even implemented in some 
> cases, will certainly have that effect, without appreciably improving 
> security.  We need to remember the “law of unintended consequences” and 
> stop reacting with knee jerk “feel good,” often politically motivated 
> security measures.  It only encourages a false sense of security and is 
> wasteful of scarce resources that could actually be doing something effective.
>
> <snip>
>
> Right now the biggest threat is not another hijacking, it’s a bomb. The 
> easiest would be a suicide bomber with the explosive device in his checked 
> baggage, but there are plenty of other likely scenarios. Everything, 
> (supplies, equipment, baggage) that goes on board a commercial aircraft 
> should be screened. If that takes an army of screeners to get it done 
> expeditiously, so be it.  There are thousands of furloughed airline 
> employees who would probably jump at the chance to diligently search all 
> this stuff if it meant that passenger confidence was restored by actually 
> attending to security and they might stand a chance of getting their real 
> jobs back. Yes, it will be expensive.  So?  It makes a lot more sense to 
> pay them to do something effective about security than to provide 
> unemployment payments that don’t solve anything. Give people real, honest 
> security and confidence to fly and it will pay for itself.
>
> <snip>
>
> When you plug one security hole, the terrorist will just look for 
> another.  If you ever stop plugging them creatively, you lose the battle. 
> There is no practical, final solution, it’s an ongoing battle. Complacency 
> is deadly.
>
> Also, just to set the record straight, bullet holes will not result in 
> “explosive decompression.” Aircraft have outflow valves that regulate 
> pressurization, there’s much more than needed. The fuselage is not a 100% 
> sealed pressure vessel, it is always leaking.  Even a slew of bullet holes 
> won’t make much difference, the outflow valves will simply close up 
> some.  Boeing has extensive experience with bullet holes in aircraft 
> fuselages.  B-29s bombing Japan regularly took .50 caliber bullets through 
> their pressurized fuselages without any harm whatsoever.
>
> <snip>
>
> Finally, we need to accept the fact that no matter what is done, 
> terrorists may succeed sometimes, more so if we are to retain the freedoms 
> we have worked so hard to develop and preserve to date. We only set 
> ourselves up for added trauma by denying that likelihood.  We accept 
> 40,000 plus innocent lives lost on the highways every year because it is 
> the price we, as a society, have decided is worth the freedom that we 
> enjoy owning and operating automobiles.  Each of those deaths is no less 
> tragic than all those lost as a result of this heinous terror attack, or 
> any that will be lost going forward, we just view cause and effect 
> differently. To succeed and prosper we need to change our viewpoint and we 
> need to address the real security issues.  Eye-wash just won’t cut it!
>
> -- Doug Ritter



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