Interesting People mailing list archives
IP: two more Re: Another take on Microsoft-specific worms from Poor Richard
From: Dave Farber <farber () cis upenn edu>
Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 12:13:54 -0400
Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 10:00:26 -0600 From: Gerald Shifrin <gerald.shifrin () wcom com> Subject: RE: Re: Another take on Microsoft-specific worms from Poor Richard To: farber () cis upenn edu X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 Importance: Normal Just one brief comment on this -- As an ordinary non-attorney consumer of computer products, I seems reasonable to me to expect that my software should ask permission before sending email to everyone in my address book or performing a mass deletion or modification of my files. If vendors like Microsoft allow or assist unsolicited foreign email to perform these acts, they they are, at least in my mind, guilty of gross negilgence.
Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 12:06:16 -0400 To: farber () cis upenn edu, Gene Spafford <spaf () cerias purdue edu> From: "David P. Reed" <dpreed () reed com> To further agree with Gene's point about tobacco and "what consumers want", let me suggest that at any one point the market offers only a tiny subset of what is possible to create for consumers. Mere selection cannot create possibilities that are not developed or invented. Monopolies distort the creation of selections - in particular in systems' properties like security. Because of its installed base dominance, Microsoft's primary drive for innovation comes from a need to motivate an orderly "upgrade" revenue stream, while at the same time blocking competitors from entering the market to take that revenue away. That means innovations will be small, incremental, and extremely easy for customers to adopt. A new architecture that would be more secure would create interoperability problems with prior generations of Microsoft's mail program - thus threatening to open the market to competitors by creating a "disruption umbrella" because customers see several equally disruptive alternatives to getting what they need. For example, an email competitor like Eudora could participate in a new, more secure environment based on end-to-end cryptographic authentication of the source of attachments along with a Kerberos-based system of authentication - if Microsoft's directory services architecture required a similarly disruptive infrastructure change. But if Microsoft can damp down the change rate in its own installed base by a series of very small steps, then there will never be an opportunity for the Eudora solution to achieve critical mass needed for adoption. In this completely market-driven scenario, even though customers really want security, they will get it only slowly and under control of the dominant player. Thus, to let the market do its work of selecting among alternatives, we probably need to look for disruptions that create an umbrella of change to enable those alternatives, such as breaking the business linkage between application and infrastructure a la the proposed MS breakup. - David -------------------------------------------- WWW Page: http://www.reed.com/dpr.html
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- IP: two more Re: Another take on Microsoft-specific worms from Poor Richard Dave Farber (May 29)