IP: INTERNET and RELATED HISTORY -- Just the facts Ma'm

[David Farber <farber () cis upenn edu>]

>  >To: Recipients of CYHIST digests <CYHIST () MAELSTROM STJOHNS EDU>
> >
> _
>  >Date:    Fri, 17 Mar 2000 16:16:25 -0800
> > From:    "Willis H. Ware" <willis () RAND ORG>
>  >Subject: INTERNET and RELATED HISTORY
> > ______________________________________________________________________
> >  Community Memory: Discussion List on the History of Cyberspace
> > ______________________________________________________________________
> >
> >
> > --
> > Folder: YES
> > --
> >
> > A few issues ago, Les Earnest commented that Paul Baran's work had been
> > classified and therefore, was generally unknown to the world at large.
> > Someone else believed that the motivation for his work was a requirement for
> > a survivable command-control system; and lastly, someone asserted that the
> > contract that supported him came from the DoD.
> >
> > I don't want to reopen the sporadic argument about who knew what and who
> > talked to whom, or what influenced what; nor do I wish to engage in this
> > Digest's prior discussion of whether mythology (associated with some field)
> > is a legitimate topic for historians of that field.  I'll address just the
> > three points above.
> >
> > I was in the management structure of RAND's Computer Sciences Department at
> > the time of Paul's work, and interacted with him continuously.  I can do
> > what Sgt. Joe Friday always demanded: (in paraphrase) "Give me the
> > facts; just the facts."
> >
> > 1.  First, contract support.  In the period of interest (1960s) RAND's two
> > major contracts were with the USAF and the AEC.  However, all the work on
> > distributed communications was done under Project RAND (USAF) funding.
> >
> > 2. Next, the question of classification; here's the publication chronology.
> >
> >      a.  The first - and unclassified -- publication to discuss the payoff
> > from redundancy in a communications system was:
> >
> >      May 27, 1960, Reliable Digital Communications Systems Using Unreliable
> >      Network Repeater Nodes, P. Baran, The RAND Corporation Paper P-1995.
> >
> > It suggested a fishnet-like structure for a network and introduced (in
>  >1960) the idea of "hot potato routing" for fixed length message blocks
> > (described in more detail in documents noted below.
> >
> >      b.  Another slightly later unclassified paper of relevance was:
> >
> >      September 1962, On Distributed Communications Networks, P. Baran, The
> >      RAND Corporation.  Paper P-2626.
> >
> >      This paper spelled out the distributed communications system and
> >      specifically described the main characteristics commonly associated
> >      with packet switching; including packet housekeeping and separation of
> >      the physical address from the logical address to allow users moving in
> >      the network to maintain their addresses.
> >
> > Concurrently with the above a longer series of documents was in preparation
> > and we intentionally withheld publication of any until all could be released
> > concurrently in August 1964.
> >
> >      c. The series, often referred to as the "dozen research memoranda" were:
> >
> >      August 1964, On Distributed Communications
> >
> >      Vol.  I.  Introduction to Distributed Communications Networks,
> >      P. Baran, RAND Corporation, RM-3420-PR.
> >
> >      Vol.  II. Digital Simulation of Hot-Potato Routing in a Broadband
> >      Distributed Communications Network; Sharla P. Boehm, and P. Baran,
> >      RM-3103-PR.
> >
> >      Vol.  III.  Determination of Path Lengths in a Distributed Network,
> >      J. W. Smith, RM-3578-PR.
> >
> >      Vol.  IV.  Priority, Precedence and Overload, P. Baran, RM-3638-PR.
> >
> >      Vol.  V.  History, Alternative Approaches, and Comparisons,
> >      P. Baran, RM-3097-PR. (This is must reading for anyone who wants to
> >      understand what work was going on at the time.  Each new idea is
> >      almost always based to some degree on previous work.)
> >
> >      Vol.  VI.  Mini-Cost Microwave, P. Baran, RM-3762-PR.
> >
> >      Vol.  VII. Tentative Engineering Specifications and Preliminary
> >      Design for a High-Data-Rate Distributed Network Switching Node, P.
>  >     Baran, RM-3763-PR.
> >      Vol.  VIII. The Multiplexing Station, P. Baran, RM-3764-PR.
> >
> >      Vol.  IX.  Security, Secrecy and Tamper-Free Considerations,
> >      P. Baran, RM-3765-PR.
> >
> >      Vol.  X.  Cost Estimate, P. Baran, RM-3766-PR.
> >
> >      Vol.  XI. Summary Overview, P. Baran, RM-3767-PR.
> >
> > NOTICE that there were only 11 -- not 12 -- of them; and moreover,
> > everything cited above is now and always has been unclassified.
> >
> >      d. There were two collateral documents:
> >
> >      RM-4236-PR by P. Baran and Rein Turn: Cryptophone:  An All-digital
> >      Telephone Privacy Subsystem for the Distributed Adaptive Message Block
> >      Network (U) (Confidential) and RM-3247-PR by Rein Turn, Computer
> >      Simulation of the Cryptophone (U) (Confidential)
> >
> > Since each of these could stand alone, we decided not to put them into the
> > series.  While classified at the time, the declassification interval has
> > long since run out.
> >
> >      e. Finally, numbers 12 and 13 appeared and were included in the series
> > which implies that the titles started out with "On Distributed ...":
> >
> >      RM-5067-PR by P. Baran, July 1966. Vol. XII On Distributed
> >      Communications:  Weak Spots and Patches (For Official Use Only); and
> >      Vol XIII by P. Baran and R. Heirschfeldt, RM-5174-PR, On Distributed
> >      Communications:  User Locations for the Digital Distributed
> >      Communications System (U). (Confidential).
> >
> > These last four RM's were either "for official use only" or CONFIDENTIAL
> > because 1) we discussed specific vulnerabilities, 2) we dealt with
> > cryptography and 3) we dealt with real world geometry and physical
> > vulnerability.  Depending upon how one counts, the "dozen series" had
> > either 11, 13, or 15 documents in it.  As I mentioned above, however, the
> > declassification interval has run out.
> >
> > I cannot know of course who read what or who, out of our earshot, might
> > have talked to whom.  What I can certify is that ARPA was on the
> > distribution list for all documents, and that the ARPA folks had security
> > clearances in any event.  Based on calendar dates that others have
> > mentioned and provided in past postings to this DIGEST, Paul's unclassified
>  >work -- the first 11 in the series -- predated Larry Roberts' tenure at
> > ARPA; but we do know from various records (such as trip reports) that the
> > work had been discussed with Lick Licklider and Bob Taylor.
> >
> > The bottom line: by August 1964, full and extensive engineering details
> > were in the public domain because we had an extensive distribution list for
> > this work, and we know from the records that ARPA [DARPA] was included.
> > All essential key points were discussed in unclassified volumes.
> >
> > At that time, RAND document distribution always included a lengthy list of
> > deposit campus and urban libraries; so these documents would have also been
> > in such places.  Hence, my phrase: ...in the public domain. RAND's policy
> > also was to distribute P's (papers prepared for publication) as well as RM's
> > (Research Memoranda) to clients.
> >
> > The record is clear; Paul Baran's work on Distributed Communications, so
> > far as all essential engineering and system details are concerned, was
> > never classified and it was widely distributed and available.
> >
> > 3. Motivation -- and here semantics becomes important.  The USAF and
> > national policy at the time was mutual assured destruction which meant that
> > if the USSR were to launch a nuclear strike, the US would have to be able
> > to launch its nuclear forces in spite of damage inflicted by a USSR first
> > strike.  In the jargon of the time, the emphasis was on getting out "the go
> > code" which was a fairly brief highly encrypted message specifying what
> > nuclear attack plan was to be executed and its time table.  It would be
> > sent to all nuclear forces, land-air-sea based.  The communications
> > infrastructure to support such a last-ditch force deployment of course
> > functioned as a command-control system of sorts but not in the usual sense
> > of the phrase; for example, there was no return path for communications
> > from the forces to the command structure; there was no intent to use the
>  >arrangement to prosecute a lengthy war.
> > I personally discussed such issues with the USAF in that interval and would
> > ask: how do you expect to reconstitute any surviving forces for subsequent
> > strikes?  The attitude was (and with some justification since no one could
> > really know what might survive): "...we'll make do with whatever we have
> > left....we'll cobble things together."
> >
> > Given such a posture in the national policy and given the brief nature of
> > the go code, Paul's first proposal to the USAF was for in fact a single
> > teletypewriter channel using the AM network in a distributed communications
> > arrangement.  It could be thought of as a minimal command control system,
> > but certainly not an all-up C-C system with which to manage a long-term
> > war.
> >
> > The USAF asserted that it needed more bandwidth and the final proposal
> > did in fact provide it.
> >
> > So the motivation for Paul's work was to provide a minimal but highly
> > survivable one-way communications arrangement to get out the go-code; it was
> > NOT motivated by a requirement for a survivable command-control system that
> > could support the forces fully in both peace and in war.  Later on, of
> > course, packet technology became involved as a component of contemporary
> > C-C systems, and along the way, a part of the ARPANET was folded into
> > Defense Data Net, the MILNET, etc.
> >
> > Without knowing in detail how the nuclear forces were intended to be used
> > in the 60s, it is easy to understand how things would get confused.  The
> > usage of "command control network" is not unique, is sometimes ambiguous,
> > and often context dependent.
> >
> > If someone wants to pursue the diffusion of the ARPANET and its technology
> > into the support-infrastructure of the military services, probably the
> > best individual to write about it would be Steve Walker, who was in the
> > Office of Secretary of Defense at the time.  He was the founding president
> > of Trusted Information Systems, is now a venture capitalist, and can be
>  >reached at steve () stevewalker com