IP: Technological Decision-Making at the National Level

[Dave Farber <farber () cis upenn edu>]

Date: Wed, 7 Oct 1998 10:21:06 -0400
From: wfs () image mit edu (William Schreiber)


There were so many requests for the paper that I decided that it would,
after all, be appropriate to broadcast it.  This paper is nearly 12 pages
long.  Mark Schubin helped me with some of the history.

I would appreciate any comments and any suggestions as to where I might
get it published.  After dealing with first round of comments, I intend to
circulate it a bit more widely.

DRAFT FOR COMMENTS
Technological Decision-Making at the National Level

William F. Schreiber
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

International Conference on Image Processing
Chicago, 5 October 1998

1. Introduction

In 1987, the Federal Communications Commission initiated an Inquiry, initially 
intended to last two years, that evolved into a process for setting 
standards for digital terrestrial television broadcasting in the US.  I 
participated in and followed this process carefully up to its culmination 
with the Fourth Report and Order 96-493 in December 1996, available at the 
FCC Web site.  The FCC has run many such Inquiries, and has established 
elaborate procedures intended to ensure that each issue is thoroughly and 
properly explored and that decisions will be rendered that serve the "public 
interest, convenience, and necessity."  In spite of having all the required 
apparatus and procedures in place, the final decision, in my opinion, had 
many serious flaws, as a result of which the transition to digital 
television (DTV) may well not be successful.

Having spent so much time and effort since 1983 on this subject, and having 
been convinced, after careful study, that a standard could have been 
developed that would have greatly eased the transition from analog 
broadcasting and that would have met the needs of all the participants, I 
have been highly motivated to study the reasons for failure.  This study has 
led me to believe that the failure was methodological, and was likely to 
occur in any governmental decision-making involving technology.  The main 
flaw appears to have been failure to separate the political from the 
scientific or technological (sci/tech) aspects of the issue.  

All acts of government affect different entities and individuals in the 
society differently.  By a "political" decision, I mean the selection of 
winners and losers.  By a "sci/tech" decision, I refer to a process that can 
be carried out by objective methods based on careful analysis.  In the DTV 
case, I believe that the problems in the DTV Inquiry were mainly due to the 
failure to separate these two kinds of decisions.

If the decision-making process that failed in the FCC's DTV case can be 
improved, the improvements could likely be applied to many other regulatory 
agencies.  In this paper, I have attempted to devise a scheme that would 
avoid these problems and therefore produce a better result.  A key element 
is the separation of the political from the technological or scientific 
aspects of decisions.  In a democracy, it is the people's sovereign right to 
determine the distribution of the good things that the country provides.  
The political aspects would therefore be dealt with by Congress or perhaps, 
in some cases, by regulatory agencies following detailed Congressional 
guidelines.  The technological aspects would be dealt with by the regulatory 
agencies using the best unbiased sci/tech advice available.

2. The Proper Locus of Decision-Making in a Democratic Society

Before we can address the question of just how government should make these 
decisions, we must deal with a point of view that has gained substantial 
following in the last 25 years.  Those holding this view believe that most 
decisions, especially those concerning money, can be left to the 
unsupervised market.  Faith in this principle has been shaken by recent 
events in the economies of Asian countries, but the view that the market is 
always right is far from dead.  My own opinion is that, in order to achieve 
the proper aims of a democratic society, among which is the promotion of the 
general welfare, government action is often necessary.  No one argues that 
we can do without traffic lights, for example, and there is growing 
awareness that "traffic lights" are needed in many places besides roads.  
There is no necessary conflict between promoting the general welfare by 
government action and allowing each person to seek his own maximum benefit 
entirely without government interference, since everyone generally benefits 
from ensuring that everyone else has a reasonable standard of living.  This 
is a large topic, far beyond the scope of this paper, in which we will 
assume that we are dealing with issues on which there is general agreement 
that at least some government action is required at the national level.

2.1 Issues properly decided by markets.  

The classical market idea is that there are many buyers and sellers, no one of 
whom alone affects prices very much.  In the market for goods and services, 
supply and demand are balanced at equilibrium, and prices settle at a point 
where the buyers are just able to afford to fulfill their needs and 
producers make a very small profit.  As products of perceived superiority 
come to market, they displace inferior products.  In the market for labor, 
employers pay as little as possible, and workers try to maximize their pay.  
At equilibrium, the cost of labor permits the employer to make a very small 
profit while producing just what can be sold, and wages are just sufficient 
to sustain workers and their families.  There is no role for government in 
this arrangement, since the "invisible hand" of the market keeps everything 
in balance.  However, there is nothing in the model that sets the absolute 
level of production or that controls the distribution of income.  This 
rather grim picture is lightened by the principle that, as productivity 
increases and more goods and services can be produced with a given amount of 
labor, everyone's standard of living rises.  A common metaphor is that a 
rising tide -- i.e., the GDP -- lifts all boats, but the economy has not 
worked that way for the last 25 years.  A more accurate metaphor for this 
period is that unless all the boats rise together, a phenomenon that never 
occurs without government intervention, a rising tide sinks the lowest ones. 
 

Obviously, the economic jungle of the classical free market would not meet the 
aims of the founding fathers in crafting the constitution.  In addition, the 
real market is not "free," in that it does not have perfect competition in 
that monopoly power exists at least to some extent.  All developed countries 
have added regulations to establish a criminal code, to protect health and 
safety, to provide a "safety net" for those who are not able to compete, to 
protect children and the elderly, to reduce fraud, and for other agreed-upon 
purposes.  All developed countries also levy taxes that are used for 
defense, education, construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure, 
police and judicial functions, etc.  However, in spite of these various 
limitations and imperfections, the somewhat regulated free market that 
exists does work rather well in many areas, particularly the provision of 
consumer goods and services.  

Since the early seventies, the idea that the country would be better off with 
less regulation has become the prevailing viewpoint of a majority of 
mainstream economists and politicians.  Airline deregulation is an example.  
The results are mixed, as there are fewer airlines and less competition than 
ever.  The larger airlines have all introduced the "hub-and-spoke" route 
system, which has made travel less convenient by reducing the number of 
direct flights between many cities.  Average fares are lower, but the fare 
structure has become extremely complicated and tickets not bought well in 
advance are much more expensive.  It is of interest that no one has yet 
suggested deregulating airline safety.  After all, in a free market, the 
public would surely give more business to airlines with better safety 
records.  Perhaps this is related to the fact that business executives and 
members of Congress, who fly a lot, are not willing to leave their personal 
safety to the free market.  In addition, they have assistants to arrange 
their travel plans and almost never pay their own fares, making them 
indifferent to the complexities just mentioned.

The Communications Act of 1996 was intended to promote competition in the 
telecommunications industry through deregulation, but the main effect so far 
seems to be consolidation of the industry into a rather small group of 
companies of unprecedented size.  Deregulation of the electric power 
industry is now underway and many observers, including this author, feel 
that we are in for some unpleasant surprises.

2.2 Issues that are properly governmental decisions  

Among the issues that require action by government, the appropriate method of 
deciding what action to take depends on the degree to which technology is 
involved.

Purely political issues.  By a purely political issue, I mean one in which 
governmental action produces winners and losers, and in which the technology 
to be used is not a significant issue.  For example, if the United States 
adopted a single-payer health-care system of the kind used in most other 
developed countries, those profiting from the present system would lose out 
and could be expected to object vigorously.  Of course, the objections would 
be cast as predictions of a decline in the quality of health care, while the 
prospect of lost profits would not be mentioned.  If the nation decided to 
pay the tuition for every student attending college, everyone in the 
higher-education business would profit, but the advantages of such a system 
would surely be put in terms of the prospective benefit to students and 
country from raising the educational level of the populace.  The structure 
of the Social Security system, regulation of financial markets, minimum wage 
laws, and the welfare and unemployment-insurance systems are all examples of 
purely political issues.

Deciding on the merits of such cases, which have nothing to do with the 
technology that might be employed, is a political matter to be decided by 
Congress.  One would hope that such decisions would be made on the basis of 
careful analysis rather than as a result of pressure from vested interests.  
The legislative system is not perfect, but it is the best that can be done 
in a democracy.  Improving the system so as to get better decisions is 
primarily a question of devising an electoral system that produces electees 
of high quality who are truly representative of the electorate, and are not 
beholden to campaign contributors.

Purely technological issues.  By a purely technological issue, I mean one in 
which the decision can be made entirely on an objective sci/tech basis.  
Generally, the objective or function of the structure or process would have 
first been specified by a political body.  For example, the route and 
capacity of a new highway might have been specified and the question to be 
decided is the design of the roadbed.  A good design can be chosen on the 
basis of cost and performance by a government agency, using expert knowledge 
obtained from unbiased sources.  The decision will usually have political 
(win/lose) consequences, but these should not enter into the decision.  For 
example, concrete or macadam could be selected, producing a benefit for the 
producer of the chosen material.  What would be wrong (and corrupt) would be 
to specify the material so as to give the business to a particular company.  
A problem of exactly this nature is under consideration at the moment.  It 
concerns paper for use in printing US currency, which has been supplied only 
by the Crane Paper Company for many years.

Just because an issue is truly scitech does not mean that it can be settled 
quickly or easily, and that all qualified professionals will agree.  Global 
warming is a case in point.  However, on issues of this kind, at least 
everyone agrees on what we have to do and what kind of information we need 
in order to make a judgment highly likely to be correct.  When we do not 
have all the information, at least we can make an informed judgment.

Mixed issues.  Most issues up for consideration have both political and 
technological aspects, corresponding roughly to the questions of what to do 
and how to do it.  Examples of such mixed issues are telecommunication 
networks and environmental regulations.  Both come under the interstate 
commerce clause of the constitution.  There is little argument as to whether 
the federal government has the power to enact regulations in these fields, 
and it is clear that both involve political as well as sci/tech questions.

It is obvious that the market will not produce clean air and water by itself.  
Government action is therefore called for, but there is a great deal of 
argument as to the degree of cleanliness that is desirable and the amount of 
money that ought to be spent to achieve it.  Cost/benefit analysis has been 
suggested as a help in decision-making.  This might be useful in comparing 
two methods of reducing infant mortality, for example, but it certainly does 
not eliminate all quandaries, as the basic assumptions of the electorate, 
such as the idea that all children deserve an equal chance to live a 
satisfying life, are hard to quantify.  Attempts are being made to reduce 
pollution by charging for the right to emit noxious material rather than 
simply forbidding it.  Some have even suggested establishing a market for 
trading in pollution rights.  It is too early to tell whether these attempts 
to achieve the aims of regulation in a market-like manner will be effective, 
or whether this approach has any advantages over straightforward regulation.

In the case of telecommunications networks, the demise of the concept of 
natural monopoly has made this field extremely complicated.  It was once 
thought that, in each area of the country, the existence of a single 
electric-power company, a single water supplier, and a single telephone 
company (and more recently, a single cable company) would be more efficient 
than allowing competition, with its implied duplication of very expensive 
infrastructure.  In return for the monopoly, the chosen company was 
typically closely regulated by a public-utility commission with respect to 
price of services, level of investment, and permissible profit.  Indeed, in 
many countries and in some localities in the US, government itself operates 
such utilities.  For example, the federal government still operates the 
enormous flood-control and power generation projects built during the New 
Deal years.  The city of Cambridge, Massachusetts operates its own 
water-supply system.  In the particular case of terrestrial ("over-the-air") 
broadcasting, the limited spectrum, which certainly is owned by the people, 
requires a government regulator, in this case the FCC, to decide who gets 
the license and under what conditions.

Adding to the complication in this field is the rapid development of 
technologies such as digital compression and transmission, packet-switched 
networks, cellular broadcasting, interactive systems (still in their 
infancy, as far as actual deployment is concerned), and computer control of 
communication systems.

With respect to services that use the airwaves, one proposed solution, 
advanced by the-market-is-always-right crowd, is to auction the spectrum and 
to allow successful bidders to use it in any way that they think will be 
profitable.  With respect to services that do not use the airwaves but have 
some of the characteristics of a public utility, such as the Internet, 
confusion reigns, as nobody has come up with an intellectual or 
philosophical approach that has gained general support.  How such complex 
subjects might be approached will become more apparent after discussing what 
actually happened in the FCC Inquiry intended to deal with digital TV. 

3. The Digital Television Decision 

The FCC Inquiry that produced the DTV decision is an example of an attempt to 
solve a mixed-issue problem of the kind just discussed.  It lasted nine 
years, involving hundreds of television professionals and many companies.  
The procedure, as in other Inquiries, involved the appointment of an 
Advisory Committee eventually referred to as the Advisory Committee on 
Advanced Television Service (ACATS) and the establishment of a complex 
committee structure to look into various aspects of the problem. The 
Commission issued a series of Reports representing the FCC's view of the 
problem and soliciting comments from the public.  Submitters could also send 
in Comments on the submissions of others.  The subcommittees undertook 
various tasks and issued reports.  I don't think anyone has calculated the 
cost, which was borne by the participating companies.  My opinion is that 
the process was a failure, in spite of the very large effort, in that the 
"standard" that was issued is likely to cause so much confusion as to place 
the success of the transition to digital broadcasting in danger.  This 
matter is dealt with in more detail in my paper "The FCC Digital Standards 
Decision," Prometheus, 16, 2, June 1998, pp 155-172, which is also available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/tech/schreiber/.html.

3.1 The Federal Communications Commission

The FCC issues licenses for the use of radio spectrum and sets transmission 
standards and conditions of use.  It makes both political and sci/tech 
decisions.

Origin and functions of the FCC.  In the infancy of radio broadcasting, there 
was no regulation; each group that wanted to transmit radio signals for any 
purpose simply chose a frequency and a modulation scheme and went on the 
air.  It was not long before even the most ardent free-marketeers amongst 
radio users realized that this chaotic situation was to no one's benefit.  
Government control of spectrum assignments began with the Wireless Ship Act 
of 1910.  At the behest of the then-existing broadcasters, a various laws 
were later enacted giving the government authority to issue licenses for the 
use of specific frequencies.  Today's FCC dates from the Communications Act 
of 1934, which was heavily amended in 1996.  Obviously, one of the most 
important duties of the Commission is to grant licenses for the use of the 
radio spectrum and to establish, for each licensee, a reception area within 
which the signals can be received reliably and without serious interference. 
 This task has become much more difficult as the demand for spectrum now 
greatly exceeds the supply.

Since satellite broadcasting uses radio spectrum, licenses are also required.  
Cable, which does not use spectrum, does not require a federal license but 
is regulated so that outward signal leakage does not interfere with 
terrestrial broadcasting.  However, regulation of cable goes well beyond 
that, which I find surprising.  One of the clearest cases of delegating to a 
regulatory commission a purely political issue is the "must-carry" rule, 
under which cable companies were once required to carry the signals of all 
local TV stations.  This may or may not be a good idea -- it surely is 
convenient for subscribers -- but a decision like this, which significantly 
effects the profits of communication companies, belongs in Congress.

Under its more obvious responsibilities, the FCC established specifications 
for terrestrial (over-the-air) radio and television transmission so that 
manufacturers could design receivers guaranteed to work with the signals 
that were broadcast.  The NTSC monochrome standard was adopted in 1941 and 
the NTSC color standard was adopted in 1953.  The DTV "standard" was set in 
1996, but, as we shall see, it is incomplete.  No standards are in place for 
satellite and cable broadcasting.  The former uses digital transmission, but 
the various broadcasters use noncompatible standards at present.  The latter 
uses NTSC, some programs being encrypted to prevent reception without 
payment.  

3.2 The HDTV Inquiry.  

In 1987, at the request of the TV broadcasters, who allegedly feared that they 
would need more spectrum to compete with the HDTV system designed in Japan, 
the FCC initiated an Inquiry and appointed an advisory committee to 
investigate the effect of this new development on the existing service, 
which is both popular and profitable.  Broadcasters generally regarded HDTV 
as a threat rather than an opportunity.  From the beginning, the FCC 
acknowledged that the Inquiry was governed by the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (FACA) which requires that all meetings be held in public (this was 
faithfully carried out) and that all interested parties be represented (this 
was largely disregarded, especially with respect to the representation of 
the public, women, minorities, labor, and academia.).  The change in purpose 
of the Inquiry to a standard-setting process, first for HDTV, then for 
advanced television (ATV), and finally for digital TV (DTV) was not the 
result of any public discussion.  FACA does not require the Commission to 
oversee the actions or decisions of advisory committees, and there was no 
oversight in this case.  The committees were to make their decisions by 
consensus.  There was no basis for voting, since any company that wished to 
participate was welcome to do so.  The intentional lack of oversight is not 
surprising, since it is the fervent wish of all regulatory agencies that the 
industries under regulation agree among themselves as to the regulations, in 
which case the agency can simply adopt the industry position, knowing that 
there will be no complaints, at least from those regulated.

The extremely complex committee organization and the appointment of particular 
individuals to key positions, both done in private, led many to conclude 
that the process would be the means by which the already developed Japanese 
HDTV system (the NHK system) would be adopted as the US standard, but that 
is not what happened.  The original NHK system had been developed for 
satellite, not terrestrial, transmission.  Narrow MUSE, the version 
developed by NHK that could be transmitted in the 6-MHz US terrestrial 
channels, never performed very well.  What really caused the death of the 
NHK system for transmission service, however, was the development in the US 
of digital systems that had much better performance.

Compatibility vs. simulcasting.  At the onset of the Inquiry, almost the 
entire American TV establishment favored making the HDTV system 
backward-compatible with NTSC, just as NTSC color was backward-compatible 
with monochrome NTSC.  A noncompatible hybrid analog/digital system 
developed at MIT that was intended to be used with simulcasting was 
ridiculed.  Later on, it became apparent that a compatible 6-MHz HDTV system 
was technically impossible, as the required amount of enhancement data could 
not be hidden within the NTSC signal format.  In addition, making the signal 
usable on NTSC receivers would also preserve the extreme vulnerability of 
NTSC to interference, together with its very poor spectrum efficiency.  (By 
spectrum efficiency, we mean the amount of service that can be provided 
within a given spectrum allocation.)  Zenith then proposed a simulcast 
system similar to that of MIT and claimed that its signal could be 
transmitted in the so-called "taboo" channels that cannot be used in NTSC 
because of cochannel interference.  This turned the tide against compatible 
systems.  Then the FCC ruled against 12-MHz enhancement systems (NTSC in one 
channel and enhancement data in a second channel) on the grounds of poor 
spectrum efficiency.  Finally, on the last day for submission of proposals 
in 1990, General Instrument entered an all-digital system, and, within 
months, three other digital schemes were announced.  Note that, in order to 
use digital coding and transmission, one must accept that the new signals 
will not be receivable on the 200-million existing TV sets without a set-top 
converter.

The Submissions.  All submissions were read by Commission staff, as evident by 
the discussions in subsequent Reports.  However, they appear not to have 
been read very critically.  The Commission seemed to have forgotten that 
submissions from organizations hoping to make money from the new system were 
likely to be self-serving.  This was particularly evident in the discussion 
of interlace, which has no place in any new television system.

3.3 System Testing

The first round of laboratory testing resulted in the withdrawal of NHK's MUSE 
system as well as a compatible system from the Sarnoff Laboratory, leaving 
four digital systems whose performance was sufficiently similar that there 
were no grounds for selecting any one over the others.  (Why the FCC thought 
that the new system, even including the audio coder, had to come from one 
company is a mystery.)  ACATS is then universally believed to have forced 
the four competitors to join together in a "Grand Alliance," (GA) which had 
more the characteristics of a shotgun wedding.  (This must have been done 
with the tacit agreement of the Commission.)  Since no competitor was 
willing to give up his format, all were retained as variants in the final 
system.  Thus both a 1080-line 30-fps interlaced version and a 720-line 
60-fps progressive system, plus a 24-fps systems for film were all included.

In the laboratory testing of the GA system, somewhat better performance was 
achieved than in the first round.  One field test was conducted, with 
less-than-perfect results, but this did not raise a flag.  Although nearly 
2/3 of American homes have cable service, more than half of all receivers 
use antennas.  Satisfactory reception of the digital signals on antennas is 
thus not optional; it is essential to the acceptance of the system by the 
public.

3.4 Role of the Advanced Television Systems Committee

ATSC is a nongovernment organization of companies in the television industry.  
Although its name was selected to make it appear to be the current 
incarnation of NTSC, which developed the existing standard, the decimation 
of the American electronics industry has had the result that ATSC is 
dominated by foreign-owned companies.  Furthermore, ATSC has a powerful 
executive committee that campaigned for years to make the NHK system an 
American standard.  At one point, ATSC even convinced the US State 
Department to support the Japanese system as an international standard, much 
to the consternation of our European allies.

ATSC was given the function (by what means I never discovered) of producing 
the formal system proposal to be presented to ACATS, which it did in 1995.  
ACATS, in turn, presented the proposal to the Commission for final decision. 
 In the meantime, the possibility of transmitting a number of 
standard-definition  (SD) programs in each 6-MHz channel, rather than one 
high-definition program, had become attractive to some broadcasters.  ATSC 
then held a meeting, which I attended, to choose the scanning format for 
these SD transmissions.  No laboratory or field testing had been done on any 
of these formats.  Nevertheless, the T3/S6 committee chose several standards 
by ballot, contrary to the procedure mandated by the Commission for the 
conduct of the Inquiry.  (I was outvoted on what I thought was much the best 
SD format -- 360 lines/frame, progressively scanned.)  The number of formats 
was thus increased to 14.  Actually, it is more than that, since both 60 fps 
and 59.94 fps are allowed.  ATSC stated that all receivers on the market 
would work with all the standards in the list, called Table 3.  Not only 
will this increase the cost of receivers, ATSC does not have the power to 
enforce this policy, raising the possibility that not all of the receivers 
to be put on sale will work with all of the formats that will be transmitted.

The Grand Alliance System, as modified by ATSC, contained four main faults: it 
had no migration path to higher quality, too many formats (including some 
with interlace), and no provision for inexpensive receivers.  The version of 
the proposal that was adopted by the FCC, as we shall see shortly, added an 
additional fault: the lack of a fully specified transmission standard.

3.5  Conflict Between Television and Computer Interests

As soon as the ATSC proposal was made public, objections came from the 
computer industry, whose future profitability depends on displaying TV 
signals on computer screens.  The most important reason for disagreement was 
the inclusion of interlaced formats, which the computer industry had given 
up years ago for good reasons, mainly interline flicker.  In addition, the 
computer industry favored a "layered," or multiresolution, system, in which 
a standard-definition baseline signal would be transmitted as well as 
additional enhancement signals that could be combined with the baseline 
signal to produce higher definition.  This scheme, which I greatly favored, 
would reduce the cost of the cheapest receivers and provide a clear 
migration path to higher definition.  Nondisruptive improvement over time, a 
characteristic lacking in NTSC, had been on the FCC list of desiderata from 
the beginning.

The Commission evidently felt that it would be unwise to proceed without some 
agreement between the contending parties.  Commissioner Susan Ness, in 
flagrant violation of FACA, then appointed a new advisory committee, 
composed primarily of executives and lawyers from the television industry -- 
both broadcasters and receiver manufacturers -- and the computer industry, 
with no representatives of the public.  (Some Hollywood interests were also 
invited, but declined.)  The new committee met in private -- another FACA 
violation -- and produced an extraordinary proposal, in which the ATSC 
system would be adopted without Table 3 that listed the scan formats.  
Before this committee met, there had been very little support for such a 
bizarre possibility, which would be bound to introduce a totally unnecessary 
element of uncertainty into the transition.  Nevertheless, the Commission 
approved the proposal after an unprecedented very short comment period.  The 
Commission's approval may well have been influenced by the deregulatory 
views of Chairman Reed Hundt, who had been voicing the view that the 
"market," and not the FCC, should decide standards.

My own opinion was that the two positions were irreconcilable, and therefore 
the Commission should make a decision on its own.  I felt that the positions 
of both parties were superior to the "compromise," but that an even better 
solution could have been devised that would have met the needs of all the 
parties, including the public, which will bear nearly the entire cost.  
Because of the secrecy of the proceedings, it is not possible to state 
exactly what the participants had in mind, but it appears that both sides 
were concerned about possible Congressional action should no agreement be 
forthcoming.

3.6  Final Result

Nearly two years have elapsed since the Fourth Report and Order was issued.  
Broadcasts are to start in November, 1998, and no receivers are yet in the 
stores.  Many broadcasters have not yet chosen the scanning standards that 
they will use, and production equipment is only slowly coming to the market. 
 No agreement has been reached as to how to connect digital receivers to 
set-top boxes used in cable or satellite service.  Field tests conducted in 
the last year have shown that the primitive indoor antennas used by many 
viewers will not provide reliable reception in many cases.  In other words, 
the "standard" has many problems, most of which could have been avoided had 
the FCC taken a different route to the final decision.

A most unfortunate but likely result of the current confusion is that, by 
2006, when NTSC is to be shut down, many viewers will still be relying on 
their NTSC receivers.  Faced with pending loss of service, viewers will 
complain to their congressmen, and Congress will order the FCC to keep NTSC 
on the air.  There is no reason at all for making the transition to digital 
broadcasting unless NTSC can be shut down and the spectrum reassigned to 
other wealth-creating services.  The public is not complaining about NTSC 
picture quality.  On the contrary, the service is very popular.  If NTSC 
stays on the air, or if the shutdown is delayed by a significant period, 
then DTV will probably fail, and a great deal of money will be lost.

4. An Improved Method of Making Decisions having a Strong Technological 
Component

In trying to devise a better process for the kinds of decision-making 
described above, it is useful to examine the FCC process carefully to see 
which elements were primarily responsible for the faulty result.  One 
obvious problem was that the Commission was called upon to make many 
political decisions, for which it was ill-equipped.  One should expect that, 
on political questions, the proponents of one policy or another will make 
arguments that are structured to maximize the benefits of the pending 
decision to a particular group.  That is exactly what was done in many of 
the submissions of companies hoping for profits, but the arguments 
masqueraded as objective sci/tech discussions.  "Interlace is better for 
sports." really meant "Interlace is better for my bottom line."  The 
arguments did, of course, have a good deal of technical content, but since 
it was immersed within a political pleading, it was difficult for the FCC 
staff, which understands the technology but evidently not the politics, to 
deal with it scientifically.

Another observation is that the FCC proceedings are much like a civil judicial 
procedure.  In such procedures, the responsibility of the lawyers is not to 
judge, but to present their client's case as persuasively as possible.  The 
judge or jury then makes the decision, knowing full well that the pleadings 
are very one-sided.  That is not the only way to run a courtroom.  At the 
International Trade Commission, a government agency that enforces American 
trade laws, the court has its own lawyers who participate in the trial on an 
equal basis with lawyers for the parties to the suit.  Their duty includes 
representing the public interest, studying all the evidence, questioning the 
witnesses as seems appropriate, and making an unbiased recommendation on 
both the law and the facts to the administrative law judge.  The judge's 
decision is automatically reviewed by the full Commission.  The equivalent 
of this, at the agency level, would be a procedure to use the agency staff 
to study the problem, review submissions, and make a recommendation to the 
Commission heading the agency.

4.1 Separation of Political and Technological Issues

Since regulatory agencies are well equipped to deal with technological but not 
with political issues, the issues should be separated.  Political questions 
should be settled by Congress, which is designed specifically for that 
purpose, and which represents, or should represent, all the people.  
Technological questions should be dealt with by the cognizant regulatory 
agency, which should be staffed as needed to carry out this function.  

Making the separation.  Congressional committees generally exercise oversight 
over the agencies -- in the case of the FCC, the Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and Finance -- so the required apparatus already exists.  
The congressional oversight committee is in the best position to make a 
first try at the separation.  One possible procedure is for the committee to 
direct the agency to deal with all questions that the committee does not 
understand because of their technical content.  In the case of television 
systems, this obviously would include the formulation of transmission 
standards.  A decision concerning the date for turning off NTSC, on the 
other hand, is certainly political and should be dealt with by the 
committee.  This may involve specific technical opinions, such as the date 
by which the required products might be available.  The committee would ask 
the agency for this information.

It may well turn out that, during the formulation of a technical standard, an 
unexpected political issue might surface, such as balancing the costs and 
benefits affecting competing industries.  In that case, the agency may call 
this issue to the attention of the oversight committee and ask for 
direction.  A degree of cooperation and back-and-forth communication will be 
required, which should not be hard to implement.  In complicated cases, 
several iterations may be needed to make the proper separation.

4.2 Dealing with the Political Issues

Political decisions, which often affect the division of costs and benefits 
among the various elements in society due to government actions, should be 
made by Congress  That is the reason why that body exists.  It is not to be 
expected that this Congressional duty can be carried out without rancor.  In 
addition, members of Congress are always, and with good reason, concerned 
about the effect of their votes on their chances for reelection.  In certain 
cases, especially where there is a conflict between the national interest 
and the interest of a particular state or district, Congress appoints a 
nonpartisan commission to take the pressure off individual members.  This 
was done when military bases had to be selected for closing.  More 
importantly, the responsibility for the balance between inflation and 
unemployment, which affects nearly every citizen, was given, incorrectly in 
my opinion, to the Federal Reserve System just because it is so contentious.

4.3 Dealing with the Technological Issues

An important precondition for good technological decision-making is the 
collection of accurate and unbiased technical analyses of the issue at hand, 
made by persons with no financial interest in the subject under study.  The 
analyses should include, but not be limited to, an evaluation of the 
proposed technology (Is it ready to go?  Is the cost acceptable?  Are there 
better alternatives?) and a prediction of the likely outcome of particular 
decisions.  For example, if the FCC had adopted either the original 
proposals of the computer industry or those of the broadcasters rather than 
trying for a compromise, what would have happened?  

Submissions by interested parties should be subjected to the same kind of 
unbiased rigorous analysis as the issue to be decided before they are 
considered by the commission that makes the decision.  It is a law of 
hierarchical organizations that the decision-makers almost never understand 
the technology and therefore may be unduly influenced by self-serving 
submissions.  They can be protected against this, in part, by seeing the 
analysis at the same time.

The FCC staff is the main resource to be used in evaluating sci/tech issues.  
Unbiased advice can also be requested from the appropriate government or 
private agency.  There is no shortage of places to look to for such 
analyses:  These include the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA, a 
congressional agency, was unwisely eliminated by the Republicans), National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA is the principal 
advisor to the president on telecommunications, part of DOC), Natl Acad of 
Sciences, Natl Acad of Engineering, Natl Inst of Science and Technology 
(NIST, formerly Natl Bureau of Stds), DOJ (legal aspects), DOD (very strong 
in telecommunications), Library of Congress, and the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO.)  In addition, many experts can be found in academia and 
private think tanks.  In coming to a decision, the agency should be required 
to place the public interest before any other considerations.  If any 
advisory committees are appointed to help with the work of the agency, they 
must, of course, adhere strictly to the FACA rules, and some oversight 
should be provided to ensure that this actually happens.  

4.4 Automatic Periodic Review

All decisions, both political and technological, must contain within them 
provision for periodic review of the actual results, since, in spite of 
one's best efforts, things may not turn out as expected.  This is true, for 
example, of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which has promoted 
monopolies rather than competition, as allegedly intended.

4.5 Feasible Half-Measures

In the event that this proposal is seen as too far-reaching for early 
adoption, there are some useful half-measures that might be taken.  Since 
the separation of political and technological issues is the biggest change 
suggested, we might consider what improvements might be made without going 
this far.

Strict adherence to FACA.  It would not seem too much to propose that 
regulatory agencies act in full compliance with FACA, since it is the law of 
the land.  In cases where it appears that exceptions should be made, then 
these exceptions should themselves be put into law.  For example, the Natl 
Acad of Sciences, last year, obtained partial exemption so that some of its 
deliberations could be carried out privately.  Although I think this was an 
error, at least it was done properly.

Getting good advice.  No change in law is needed for regulatory agencies to 
make it standard practice to subject all issues to unbiased expert analyses 
and to go outside, if appropriate, to get analysis beyond the expertise of 
the staff.  These analyses, as well as staff studies of the issues, which no 
doubt are already being done, at least in some cases, should be made public.

Analysis of submissions of interested parties.  One of the most important 
elements that contributed to the poor quality of the FCC's DTV decision was 
the apparent acceptance, at face value, of self-serving submissions from 
groups that expected to profit from the final decision.  In the case of the 
Intl Trade Commission, I believe that the analysis done by staff attorneys 
has proved an invaluable approach for separating truth from falsehood.  All 
regulatory agencies should adopt this practice, which requires no change in 
law.

5. Conclusion 

Based on the experience of the FCC's DTV case, we have proposed changes in the 
way in which the federal government makes decisions having a significant 
technological or scientific component.  The most important of these changes 
is to separate political questions from technological questions.  Congress 
would make the political decisions and regulatory agencies would make the 
technological decisions.  The separation would be done by agreement between 
the agency and its congressional oversight committee(s).  All issues, as 
well as submissions by interested parties, would be subject to unbiased 
public analysis by agency staff as well as that of other agencies, both 
within and without the government.  Individuals involved in the review 
process would be requuired to have no financial interest in the outcome.  
All decisions would be automatically reviewed on a periodic basis to ensure 
that the results were those intended.

In the event that the changes discussed are seen to be too far-reaching, then 
it is proposed that at least the new procedure for analysis be adopted, and 
that FACA be complied with.  Neither step would require any change in law.

It is believed that these proposals would markedly improve the quality of 
technological decision-making.

The statements in this paper are the opinion of the author, who is not in the 
pay of any company having an interest in the DTV standard.

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